Governance and Accountability Issues in Nigerian Parastatals:The Case of Ajaokuta Steel by Obera, Johnson
University of Dundee
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Governance and Accountability Issues in Nigerian Parastatals
The Case of Ajaokuta Steel
Obera, Johnson
Award date:
2015
Awarding institution:
University of Dundee
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Feb. 2017
 
 
 
                
Governance and Accountability Issues in Nigerian Parastatals:  
The Case of Ajaokuta Steel 
 
 
 
 
Jeremiah Ojochema Johnson Obera 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award                                                          
of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting and Business Finance 
                                                  July 2015 
 
 
University of Dundee 
School of Business 
Dundee, Scotland, UK.
i 
 
 
 
 
                                             
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Dedication 
 
To Almighty God 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     
ii 
 
                                                      Declaration 
This is to certify that the work herein is my work and has not been accepted for higher 
degree previously. 
 
………………………………………… 
OBERA J.O.J. 
Signature and Date          
                                        
                                                
 
                                                 Certification 
We hereby certify that Jeremiah Ojochema Johnson Obera has fulfilled the conditions of 
the relevant ordinance and regulations of the University of Dundee, Scotland, UK for the 
award of PhD in Accounting and Business Finance. 
 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Professor Robin Roslender                                                           Professor Jim Haslam 
   Signature and Date                                                                        Signature and Date 
 
                                                   
 
 
 
                                                                     
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to record my special thanks of gratitude to God and people who helped me to 
complete this thesis. To God be the glory for all that He has done for me. My appreciation 
goes to two men of power, calibre, and generals in academia who agreed to mentor me 
from whom I tap great knowledge and experience. These men are Professors Robin 
Roslender and Jim Haslam. Thank God to be mentored by Professor Robin Roslender 
whose wealth of experience has being brought to bear in my work. Thank you very much 
Professor Robin. I want to put on record the efforts of Professor Jim Haslam who was my 
first supervisor from 11 January 2010 up to early 2012. He wrote to Nigerian authorities 
to help me financially because that will add to the progress of the country. This was a 
very difficult time in my life and God intervened. Thanks Professor Jim. 
 Also Prof. Rania Kamla and Prof. Christine Helliar, thank you.I wish to thank accounting 
staff for their kindness. I admire the uniqueness of Professor David Power, Professor 
Bruce Burton and Dr Theresa Dunne and want to remember them. I am grateful to my 
PhD colleagues especially Dr Ahmed Ahmed Hassan from Egypt for his friendliness. I 
would also like to acknowledge some help with proof-reading from Angela Wilkie (ICAS 
Research Administrator). My thanks also go to Dr Ayodele Asokemeh and Dr Aminu 
Hassan. 
My thanks go to my parents Mr Obera Johnson Okakwu and late Mrs Adijetu Obera 
Okakwu for educating me and whose potent prayers keep me going. John Ejeh thank you, 
for your prayers keep me going. John, you have been a brother, friend and pastor to me. I 
appreciate John Sani of FPI and others too numerous to mention in this thesis that have 
helped me directly or indirectly especially those interviewed at Ajaokuta and outside 
Ajaokuta. I am grateful to ETF Abuja and Kogi State Polytechnic, Lokoja for their 
sponsorship. I express my gratitude to Ahonya, Ojonugwa, Oj’arome, Unekw’ojo, 
Ojodomo, and Ojoma for their supports. Unite Ekwo thanks for your encouragements. I 
thank Matthew Oguche and his family, Monica and Atayi for their assistance to me at a 
crucial moment.  The researcher is always grateful to God and himself for always 
remembering Joshua 14:12; “Now therefore give me this mountain, whereof the LORD 
spake in that day.”  To God be the Glory.   
 
 
 
                                                                     
iv 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine and understand why parastatals in Nigeria are on 
the face of it performing so poorly. Parastatals are critised for being ostensibly immersed 
with ethnicism, corruption, nepotism, patronage, clientelism, low accountability and 
transparency.  These issues were explored in the context of Ajaokuta Steel; an enterprise 
that was substantially complete two decades ago but subsequently progressed no further. 
Ajaokuta Steel is an industrial giant meant to take the lead of industrialising, developing, 
and taking Nigeria and Africa from poverty and unemployment. To pursue this study the 
researcher employed mixed methods of research with interpretivism combined with a 
critical ambition and a case study as the main research strategy. The researcher used 
questionnaires, observations, interviews to gather data. Theoretical framework based on 
neopatrimonialism was used to guide the researcher in the empirical work and in the 
study. The interviews from the case site and stakeholders were analysed from the voice 
recorder and those from the questionnaires were analysed using descriptive statistics. The 
use of several data collecting methods was to achieve triangulation and because of the 
seriousness of the problem which needed an in-depth investigation to unveil the mystery 
behind the non-completion of the giant moribund industry. The results of the interviews, 
case study and questionnaires indicated that the problems of governance and 
accountability of parastatals in Nigeria are that governing board members and chairmen 
who formulate policies are appointed to boards based on political patronage, ethnic 
balancing and religious considerations, thereby loading boards with unqualified people 
who may ultimately compromise an organisation such as Ajaokuta Steel. Interviewees 
and respondents also identified a lack of political will on the part of the government, 
suggestions of an international conspiracy, corruption, military incursions in politics, the 
geographical location of Ajaokuta Steel and the culture of neglecting projects, as further 
contributory factors. Interviewees and respondents mentioned also lack of accountability 
and transparency in the affairs of parastatals. These factors have greatly affected all 
parastatals in Nigeria. It was recommended that parastatals should appoint board 
members, the CEO and staff based on track records of good antecedents; publish their 
accounts in the national newspapers; or be privatised by Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
so that government will be able to concentrate on its primary duties of providing security, 
health services and education for its citizens.  
 
Key words: Neopatrimonialism, accountability, patronage, clietelism, governance, 
transparency, triangulation and corruption. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 1.0 Background  
The government of a country is charged with delivering good governance and creating a 
sustainable and enabling environment for the development, welfare and protection of her 
citizens (UNDP, 1997). Pursuant to some of these duties, several African governments 
established parastatals1 immediately after they obtained independence - largely in the 
name of or for the public interest (Etukudo, 1997). Parastatals in Africa were established 
to provide goods and services to the citizens of their countries; while some were 
established essentially to make profits, others were not; and they were separated from the 
regular bureaucratic ministry to enable them to enjoy autonomy, take quick decisions and 
compete with their counterparts in the private sector (Babaita, 2001; Mwaura, 2007).  
Such parastatals, according to Urgoji (1995) and Etukudo (1997), cover fields for which 
the large sums involved usually discourage private companies from committing such 
mammoth resources into them and also help sustain and develop African countries in 
terms of more economic independence in the future. Governments of Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe as well as Nigeria in this regard decided to fill the entrepreneurship 
gap, promote economic development and participate in industrial development (Etukudo, 
1997). However, such parastatals have, on the face of it, been badly managed over the 
years with serious financial maleficence and misappropriation of assets and funds (Ugorji, 
1995). The failings of commercial parastatals ostensibly include, according to Ugorji 
                                                          
1Parastatals (also known as Public Enterprises or State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) – Mwaura, 2007) are 
defined as “institutions or organisations which are owned by the state or which the state holds a majority 
interest, whose activities are of a  business in nature and which provide services or produce goods and have 
their own distinct management” (Adeyemo and Salami, 2008 p.402). 
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(1995) and Needle (2004): (i) not making profits while continuing to draw resources from 
the government; (ii) for some, government having to get involved in too many things, 
diverting its attention from more relevant tasks; (iii) a lack or ineffectiveness in public 
enterprise in practice; (iv) a blatant disregard of the interests and views of relevant 
stakeholders including customers; (v) the dictating by government of pricing policies to 
control inflation distorting the market; (vi) the impact of conflicting demands and 
expectations of many stakeholders including politicians at the National Assembly and 
governing boards; (vii) lack of  management independence; (viii) inappropriate 
performance measurement and reward systems making parastatals unattractive to 
ambitious professionals; and (ix) that decision-making follows bureaucratic procedures 
which are slow and complex. Especially given the perception of sabotage and mischief, 
African governments advised by the World Bank (Ariyo and Jerome, 1999) subsequently 
followed a trend in the developed world by “hollowing out”2 parastatals (Rhodes, 1997 
p.53).  
It has been argued that a major problem is that successive governments rarely continue 
with the projects initiated by their predecessors but would rather start their own plans for 
development (Okafor, 2007). In March, 2011, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, 
set up a Presidential Projects Assessment Committee (PPAC) to look into the issues of 
abandoned Federal Government projects. The PPAC discovered that about 11,886 
parastatals had been abandoned by successive governments in Nigeria since independence 
(El-Rufai, 2012). According to El-Rufai (2012), Olalusi and Otunola (2012), and Ubani 
and Ononuju, (2013), the reasons for neglecting projects in Nigeria include: (a) non-
continuation of policies as occupiers of political offices change; (b) nepotism; (c) 
                                                          
2 Introducing private sector management principles into the public sector or privatising parastatals (Rhodes, 
1997). 
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corruption and impunity3; (d) re-awarding of projects at inflated prices to political 
supporters; (e) lack of accountability and transparency; (f) incompetent contractors; (g) 
wrong location of the parastatal; and (h) lack of skilled personnel and technical experts. 
These problems of parastatals are linked to weaknesses of governance, transparency and 
accountability (Fagbadebo, 2007).  
It is also the apparent lack of good governance and accountability in the public sector that 
has prompted the World Bank to encourage countries to privatize parastatals, introduce 
budgetary discipline, decentralise administration, encourage market competition and 
make greater use of non-governmental organisations to achieve efficiency in the public 
service (Rhodes, 1997). Rhodes (1997) maintains that segregation of politics from 
administration may actually help the government to have effective control with 
privatisation being accompanied by a tightening of the regulatory capacity of the state. 
The “hollowing out”, according to Rhodes (1997), started in developed countries like 
Britain in the 1980s and the 1990s under Margaret Thatcher, who introduced private 
sector management principles into the public sector. Most developing countries are 
beginning to follow this step, especially as it is required by the World Bank and other 
lending agencies as a condition for loans and aids (Uddin and Hopper, 2003). Nigeria 
promulgated the Nigerian Privatisation and Commercialisation decree No. 25 of 1988 and 
subscribed to the view that business should be left in the hands of professional people 
(Ahunwan, 2002).  
 
 
                                                          
3 This is manifested in insufficient planning for such projects, deliberately delaying funding, collusion 
between government officials and contractors or absconding after the collection of mobilisation fees almost 
equal to the full contract sum without prosecution (Public and Private Development Centre, 2011). 
 
 
                                                                     
 
5 
 
1.1 Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited (ASCL), Ajaokuta: an introductory overview 
of the case  
Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited (ASCL) was established in 1979 as a parastatal under 
the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development (Mohammed, 2002b). It was established to 
provide a base for the industrial development of Nigeria (Agbu, 2007). However, the 
completion stage of this moribund giant steel project in Africa was deemed 98% in the 
1990s (see table 1.1; ASCL Website) and has remained uncompleted to date (NATE, 
2009). 
ASCL is located at Ajaokuta town in Kogi State, the middle-belt region of Nigeria. Kogi 
State is popularly known as the “Confluence State” because the rivers Niger and Benue 
meet in Lokoja, the former capital of Nigeria (see fig. 2.1, Map of Nigeria, p.25).  Kogi 
State was created on the 27th of August 1991. Ajaokuta town is situated on the west bank 
of the River Niger, about 564 kilometres north of the Atlantic Ocean, and covers an area 
of approximately 800 hectares (Diary, 1983).  
Apart from Decree No. 60 of 1979 that established ASCL, it was also incorporated by 
Companies Decree No. 51 of 1968 with its own Memorandum and Articles of Association 
(MEMART) dated 16 August 1979. The Memorandum of Association states that the 
name of the Company shall be called “Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited”. The 
memorandum further states that the objects for establishing the company are to carry on 
the business of manufacturing, producing and dealing in steel products and to do all such 
other things that are incidental to, or the company may think conducive to, the attainment 
of the objects. Similarly, the Articles of Association of ASCL state in section 4 that the 
company is a private company owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and 
restricts the rights to transfer its shares; thus it cannot invite the public to subscribe for 
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any shares or debentures of the company and shall not have power to issue share warrants. 
Section 26 states that the Chairman of the Company shall be appointed by the FGN. 
Section 27 states that the General Manager of the Company shall also be appointed by the 
FGN.  
ASCL was established to actualise the construction, erection and operation of an 
Integrated Steel Plant at Ajaokuta based on the Blast Furnace-Basic Oxygen Furnace 
Steel Making Process and to serve as a base for Nigerian industrialisation (Miachi, 1998). 
Before the concessions, the management of ASCL was headed by a Managing 
Director/Chief Executive, supported by eight General Managers and one Company 
Secretary/Legal Adviser (Miachi, 1998).  
ASCL has 17 major units in accordance with its design (NATE, 2009). Table 1.1 below 
shows the annual capacities and state of readiness of each unit.  
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Table 1.1 The state of readiness of each unit of ASCL 
S/N UNIT/PLANT MAIN PRODUCT/ANNUAL      
CAPACITY 
STATUS OF EACH         
UNIT/PLANT 
1 Sinter Plant 2,610,000 tonnes of Sinter 100% completed 
2 Coke Oven & By-
Product Plant 
880,000 tonnes of Coke 
12,000 tonnes of Fertilizer 
48,000 tonnes of Tar 
350,000 tonnes of Steam 
210,240,000 m3 CO of Gas 
89.91% completed 
3 Iron Making Plant  
(Blast furnace) 
1.35 million tonnes of liquid 
metal 
155,000 tons of Pig casting 
675,000 tons of BF Slag 
99% completed 
 
4 Steel Making Plant 1.3million tons of liquid steel 99% completed 
5  Billet Mill 795,000 tonnes of billets 100% completed 
6 Light Section Mill 400,000 tonnes of rods and 
light sections 
100% completed 
7 Wire Rod Mill 130,000 tonnes of wire coils 100% completed 
8 Medium Section & 
Structural Mill 
560,000 tonnes of structural 
steel 
100% completed 
9 Thermal Power 
Plant 
110 MW of electrical energy 100% completed 
10 Forge & 
Fabrication Shop 
4,200 tonnes of forging  
4600 tonnes of fabricated 
structures 
100% completed 
11 Machines and 
Tools Shop 
19,000 tonnes of machined 
products 
100% completed 
12 Foundry Shop 7,000 tonnes of Ferrous & non-
ferrous casting 
100% completed 
13 Power Equipment 
Repair Shop 
Repair of electrical Motors, 
Transformers etc. 
100% completed 
14 Rubberising Shop Repair of Conveyor Belts, 
manufacture of seals and 
adhesives 
100% completed 
15 Lime Plant 91,000 tonnes of Calcinated 
Lime 
98% completed 
16 Refractory Plant Alumino-Silicate Refractory 
Bricks 43,400 tonnes 
Dolomite bricks 8,800 tonnes 
98% completed 
17 Oxygen Plant 426,000 tons of Oxygen 
127,800,000m3 of Nitrogen 
2,130,000m3 of Argon 
1,020,000m3 of Hydrogen 
98% completed 
Source: NATE (2009, pp.10-11) 
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The above evidence (Table 1.1) shows that the project is 98% complete in terms of 
equipment installed. NATE (2009) posits that ASCL has been 98% complete since the 
1990s (see also ASCL website). The information in table 1.1 and the analysis provided in 
NATE (2009) indicate that ASCL is all but 98% complete. However, the steel 
manufacturing process/technology cannot be launched until all units and element of 
infrastructure have been put in place (Okoroanyanwu, 2008). This means that although it 
may appear that only a little bit of additional work and installations are required, the 
missing infrastructure has delayed the take-off of production at the complex. The missing 
infrastructure includes: completion of a rail line from Ajaokuta to Warri; necessary 
dredging of the River Niger;  linking the Dolomite (Osara) and Limestone (Jakura) mines 
by rail; dredging and lowering of the Escravos bar (Warri); and the completion of the 
super-concentrate plant and other auxiliary units (Madueke, 2010).  
In 2000 the technical audit of the plant, which was carried out by Tyazhpromexport (TPE) 
of Russia, the original builder of the plant, estimated “about US $460 million to complete, 
rehabilitate, and commission the first phase of the steel plant” and “that the plant was in a 
commendable state of preservation” (Agbu, 2007, p.49).      
ASCL was scheduled to be completed in three phases. The first phase was intended to 
produce 1.3 million tonnes annually of long products meant for construction. The second 
phase, producing 2.6 million tonnes per annum, would yield flat products meant for 
manufacturing. The third phase of 5.2 million tonnes per annum would produce both long 
and flat products of steel (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). The first phase was to be 
completed in 1986 but the new protocol agreement signed in 1986 with Tyazhpromexport 
(TPE), rescheduled the completion date to 1989 because of lack of funds (Miachi, 1998; 
Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007; Okafor, 2007; Inabo, 2010). ASCL almost stopped 
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completely in the mid-90s, according to Mohammed (2002a, b) due to political instability, 
interference by the government and poor public services. The Nigerian government 
decided to involve the private sector in the completion and administering of ASCL. This 
led to the concession of ASCL to Solgas Energy Limited (SEL) on 13th of October 2003 
in order to rehabilitate, complete, commission and operate the Steel Plant and recoup their 
investment within a period of 10 years, with the concession renewable for another 10 
years (Agbu, 2007). Unfortunately, SEL could not secure the funds required for the 
reactivation and completion of the ASCL plant as provided for in the agreement, resulting 
in the termination of the contract in August 2004 (Agbu, 2007). 
On the 13th of August 2004 the FGN entered into another agreement with Global 
Infrastructure Holdings Limited (GIHL) for the reactivation, completion and operation of 
ASCL (Agbu, 2007; Mohammed, 2008). According to Mohammed (2008), the concession 
agreement was terminated by the FGN in April 2008 due to poor performance and failure 
by GIHL to comply with the major provisions of the agreement. Following this 
termination, the FGN approved the constitution of an Interim Management Committee 
(IMC) with the following terms of reference: (i) oversee the day to day management of 
the company pending the approval of a substantive management for the company; (ii) 
ensure the safety, security and proper maintenance of the plant to avoid rust, deterioration 
and waste; (iii) prepare the plant for a comprehensive technical audit; (iv) foster industrial 
harmony and also good neighbourliness with the host communities; and (v) take inventory 
of all outstanding liabilities including staff salaries and allowances (Gusau, 2008).  
Subsequently, the IMC was dissolved and a sole administrator was appointed for ASCL 
on the 14th of November 2012 (Ugeh, 2012). According to Ugeh (2012), the sole 
administrator was to inject new ideas to make the company operational and conserve the 
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assets; appoint the management team on the basis of seniority, experience and 
competence; and carry the labour union along in the discharge of his responsibilities for 
optimal performance. The sole administrator was also expected, per Ugeh (2012), to come 
up with ideas that will move the company forward as it occupies the strategic position for 
the economic and industrial development of Nigeria. GIHL dragged the Nigerian 
government to the International Chamber of Commerce in London to arbitrate on the 
termination of the concession in April 2008, claiming $1 billion damages for the cost 
incurred in running ASCL and National Iron Ore Mining Company (NIOMCO). In a 
meeting held from 29th April to May 1st, 2013 in Dubai, GIHL agreed to forfeit the $1 
billion (Umoru, 2013). This settlement with GIHL meant the FGN then had full control of 
ASCL once more.  
The main thrust of this thesis is to empirically examine in-depth the ASCL case. The aim 
is to assess the developments, considered contextually and in detail and informed by 
access to ASCL and interviews and surveys, against the theoretical discourses of effective 
public sector management (see section 1.3 – research aims and objectives). And in 
particular the role, or non-role, actual and potential, of governance and accountability, is 
focused upon. 
1.2 Governance and Accountability 
In relation to a government and its people, according to Hope (2005), governance means 
discharging responsibility which may be conferred by election or appointment. 
Governance here, according to UNDP (1997), comprises three players in the typical 
modern state: The first, the state creates a politically and legally conducive environment 
to ensure that people go about their businesses without being molested; the second, the 
private sector creates jobs and income; the third, the civil society encourages citizens to 
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participate in the economic, social and political affairs of their country. Good political, 
economic and corporate governance is important for sustainable development, ensuring 
people enjoy political freedom, protecting people from economic and political risk, and 
helping in the reduction of poverty. Good governance involves being transparent and 
accountable in discharging one’s responsibilities (United Nations, 1998; Hope, 2005).  
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 by African leaders to 
promote unity and development, including in relation to issues of governance in Africa 
(Akokpari, 2004). For Akokpari (2004), the OAU could not meet its objectives and was 
replaced in 2002 by the African Union (AU) with the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) to oversee African development and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) to be responsible for the assessment of African governance. In 
addition to the APRM, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) was established 
in 2007 to assess the governance of every African country. It aims “to assess the delivery 
of public goods and services, and policy outcomes, across Africa” (MO Ibrahim 
Foundation, 2013 p.3). Despite these measures, many African leaders continue to be 
understood to be corrupt and to have “transformed into personal rulers and run their 
countries as their private estates” (Akokpari, 2004 p.245).  
Regarding parastatals, Hope (2005) has argued that parastatals in Africa are often used by 
African leaders to serve their personal purposes. Urgoji (1995) argues that parastatals in 
Africa were established to “provide jobs for constituents, political allies, and friends” 
(p.540). For these reasons, according to Uneke (2010), appointments into parastatals and 
other public services are not based on honesty, merit and integrity but on “patronage and 
ethnic balancing” (p.118), a patron-client relationship. For Hope (2001), such governance 
problems have led to the collapse and privatisation of many parastatals in Africa. For 
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instance, countries like Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal have privatised their 
electricity, telecoms, water, and banking sectors while others like Uganda, South Africa, 
and Botswana have privatised their telecommunications enterprises (Hope, 2001). In 
Nigeria, Mozambique, Togo, Guinea, Kenya and South Africa airways, ports and airports 
have been privatised (Hope, 2001). Privatisation is a controversial policy, not obviously 
the best one (Josiah et al., 2010): Uddin and Hopper (2003) argue against privatisation 
because of its effects on the citizens. In contrast to much African experience, parastatals 
have been successful in Singapore, even providing useful lessons for sectors 
establishments (Anwar and Sam, 2006). 
Further, governance problems are not confined to the public sector. In the private sector, 
many corporate organisations including Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, Maxwell 
Communications Group, and three indigenous banks in Uganda have failed as a result of 
failure in their corporate governance (Wanyama, 2006). In Nigeria, the private Savannah 
Bank’s license was withdrawn in 2002 by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for 
governance failure (Nworji et al., 2011).  
An accountability expectation in relation to a government and the people is created by the 
principal/agent relationship when decision making is transferred from the citizens (the 
principal) to the government (the agent) and there must be a mechanism in place to hold 
the agent responsible for their decisions and impose sanctions by removing the agent from 
power (Lindberg, 2009). In Africa, it has been argued that accountability is made difficult 
because of the culture of respect for elders (Wanyama, 2006; Bondamakara, 2010; Iyoha 
and Oyerinde, 2010). It has been suggested that African governments have a degree of 
accountability to aid donors but rarely give an account directly to African people 
(Therkildsen, 2001; Akokpari, 2004; Dowden, 2011). Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) cite the 
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case of Gambia where records were deliberately made chaotic to make it difficult to 
follow audit trail as evidence of failure of accountability and lack of transparency in 
Africa. Namibia’s Prime Minister refused to join the APRM claiming that his country 
does not have a problem with governance (Akokpari, 2004). These examples begin to 
illustrate the challenge of a lack of accountability in Africa. 
Failings in governance and accountability affect people adversely. The problem 
manifests, for instance, in the form of poverty (United Nations, 1998); loss of jobs; loss of 
investments; inability to recover debts; and loss of revenues to the government (Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003; Wanyama, 2006). 
This study is concerned to give due attention to governance and accountability issues in 
parastatals in Nigeria (Africa), where the environment and culture are different from 
developed countries. It will contribute to the literature and understanding of governance 
and accountability in parastatals, a very under researched area.    
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
This study sets out to examine in detail the Ajaokuta Steel case and to relate this to 
governance and accountability issues of Nigerian parastatals. A key aim of the study is to 
identify the reasons for the apparent failure of ASCL: why has ASCL, which was 
established in 1979, not started producing steel despite being certified as 98% complete in 
the 1990s? If steel is seen as one of the foundations and base of economic, industrial and 
technological development of a country, it can be argued that the delay has stagnated 
Nigeria’s technological development. An in-depth understanding will allow the 
articulation of governance and accountability issues and ways forward in relation to 
governance and accountability. Objectives of this study include: 
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• To identify reasons for ASCL’s apparent failings; 
• To gain insights into how governance and accountability are executed in Nigerian 
parastatals; 
• To identify the ways in which governance and accountability of parastatals can be 
enhanced in Nigeria and beyond; and 
• To contribute to existing knowledge on governance and accountability of 
parastatals.  
1.4 Research questions 
In Africa, the citizens claim ownership right to government and whatever it has. For 
example, in Sierra Leone, the government and parastatals are understood by the people as 
“our own”; in Ghana, the slogan is “Public service - it’s yours; private service - it’s 
theirs”; and in Nigeria the slogan used is “Nigeria is not for sale” in opposition to 
privatisation (Etukudo, 1997 p.1). According to Ugorji (1995) these slogans translate in 
practice to a situation where most of the parastatals rely on government subsidies without 
making profits, are badly managed and are bedevilled with corruption and nepotism4 
(Ugorji, 1995). And, for Etukudo (1997, p.4), parastatals are being used by small and 
privileged politicians and civil servants as “conduits for official patronage”5. Arguably 
since the political authority, economic power and wealth of Africa are in the hands of few 
people and services are in a poor state, there is suspicion and dissatisfaction with the 
performances of parastatals, hence the call for good governance and accountability (see 
Ariyo and Jerome, 1999; Gatamah, nd; NEPAD website).  
                                                          
4 Corruption, nepotism and patronage are the characteristics of neopatrimonialism which is “a system of 
governance where the formal rational-legal state apparatus co-exists and is supplanted by an informal 
patrimonial system of governance” (Nawaz, 2008 p.2). 
5 Patronage is politically motivated distribution of favours to groups as distinct from individuals and is 
“mainly ethnic or sub-ethnic groups” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007 p.107).  
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Research questions are crucial to help define the scope, goal and the focus of a study 
(Omar, 2005). In order to direct the enquiry and provide scope for achieving the 
objectives of this research, the following research questions represent the key issues being 
explored here, stemming from the above problematic: 
• Why has ASCL experienced serious delays in steel production over the period 
from 1979 to date in relation to practices of governance and accountability? 
• How are governance and accountability executed in Nigerian parastatals?  
• How can governance and accountability of parastatals be enhanced in Nigeria? 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The main objective of this study is to explore the issues, including governance and 
accountability issues, behind the protracted delay in the take-off of operations at ASCL 
since its establishment in 1979. By examining governance and accountability issues of 
this specific parastatal in Nigeria, it is envisaged that governance and accountability 
issues in other countries especially from Africa will be put into perspective given 
contextual similarities. An interpretive and contextual theory, with a critical orientation, 
drawing upon the theory of neopatrimonialism, will be used to explore ASCL’s and other 
parastatals’ governance and accountability issues and proffer ways forward. This thesis 
adopts, then, interpretivism with a critical orientation (see Laughlin, 1995) to explore 
ASCL’s governance and accountability issues in particular and for those of developing 
country public sector establishments more generally.  
Data or empirical materials for this study derive mainly from questionnaires, case study 
interviews, and interviews with parastatal stakeholders. The stakeholders interviewed 
were lawyers, civil servants, medical doctors, politicians, academics, management staff of 
ASCL, labour unions and community leaders. Those who could not be interviewed were 
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given questionnaires to complete. The objective of using many data gathering methods is 
to achieve triangulation, as will be discussed.  
1.6 Gaps and contributions to knowledge  
The contributions made by this thesis to address the gaps in the literature on governance 
and accountability include the following. In the first place many researchers in Africa 
(Ariyo and Jerome, 1999; Yakasai, 2001; Ahunwa, 2002; Okike, 2007; Pamacheche and 
Koma, 2007; Inyang, 2009; Josiah et al., 2010; Wanyama et al., 2013) concentrate on 
corporate governance in the private sector, privatisation of parastatals, and often combine 
private and public sector governance issues in one study. There are not enough published 
materials on governance and accountability of parastatals in Nigeria - Africa (Rossouw, 
2005; Inyang, 2009; Wanyama et al., 2009), perhaps as a result of the notion that 
corporate governance is a private sector phenomenon (IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 2004; 
Sarbah and Wen, 2014; Simpson, 2014). This thesis helps to fill this gap of researching 
into the public sector governance and accountability.  
Secondly, most literatures on corporate governance of parastatals in Africa (Urgoji, 1995; 
Etukudo, 1997; Mwaura, 2007) dwell on corruption, inefficiency, and lack of profit as the 
main reasons for public sector failings to which the blunt recommendation of privatisation 
of parastatals is proffered, overlooking advantages of parastatals in society (see Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003). An alternative approach is to examine more in-depth the factors 
explaining public organization failings and to proffer alternative ways forward instead of 
simply calling for an outright privatisation of parastatals - privatisation might be seen as a 
last resort. This thesis especially emphasizes, for instance, the need for appropriate and 
meritocratic appointments: it argues that if people of integrity, faithfulness and honest 
report, with a track record of good performance elsewhere are put in governance positions 
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in parastatals, there will be no need for privatisation. Both private and public sectors in 
this respect have a similar problem – corruption – as has been argued (see Ugorji, 1995; 
Klitgaard, 1997; Anwar and Sam, 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009).  
Thirdly, one of the reasons why governance and accountability in parastatals in Africa is 
under-researched is because of the difficulty of having access into parastatals, which tend 
not to be very open to researchers about their affairs (see Etukudo, 1997; Agbiboa, 2012). 
In this study, access to ASCL was gained through the labour union, a personal friend in 
ASCL and by means of a letter from one of the thesis supervisors to the CEO to support 
investigation of ASCL. The empirical chapters in this study provide enhanced knowledge 
and understanding of governance and accountability in parastatal organisations in Nigeria 
and beyond.  
Fourthly, accountability to the parliament in the public sector means accountability 
discharged and no gathering of stakeholders as in the private sector at Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) (Sendt, 2002; ESCAFA, 2004). This thesis fills the gaps in the literature 
in terms of addressing accountability between the parliament and the stakeholders of 
parastatals by calling for accountability to common stakeholders of a particular parastatal 
and/or publication in widely read national newspapers.   
Worthy of note is the contribution through the theory with its emphasis on 
neopatrimonialism. The theory of neopatrimonialism presents a new insight into 
governance and accountability in Africa. The theory of neopatrimonialism is used to 
explain why there is economic underdevelopment and political problems in developing 
nations (Roth, 1968). It is a theory that theorizes the leader using personal discretion to 
administer rather than constitutional rules and regulations; the subjects have respect for a 
leader rather than the office the person is occupying; and leaders occupy office to acquire 
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wealth and to increase their affluence (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). The two most 
noticeable characteristics of neopatrimonialism are ethnicism and corruption. Ethnicism 
renders people loyal to their ethnic group rather than to their country (Salawu and Hassan, 
2011). Office holders see parastatals as “our own”, and use such positions to satisfy their 
personal goals and still be welcomed by their people as heroes (Etukudo, 1997; Ikpe, 
2000; Guest, 2004; Agbiboa, 2012). Corruption for Klitgaard (1997 p.500) is “the misuse 
of office for unofficial ends” and is more likely to exist both in the public and private 
sectors anywhere in the world if there is more monopolistic control over the production of 
goods and services; where the incumbent decides whether or not you get a particular good 
or service; and where there is no obligation to give account. Parastatal organisations are 
accused by some of not making profits while depending on government for subsidies; 
they are inefficient, nepotic, and do not respond to changes (see Ugorji, 1995; 
Pamacheche and Koma, 2007). The insights gained in the analysis here demonstrate how 
the theory of neopatrimonialism can be used to see how governance and accountability 
work in parastatals in Africa (for detail see chapter 4).  
1.7 Motivation and importance of the study 
The idea of researching this topic comes from the high publicity given to the struggles of 
ASCL in Nigeria. Nigerian daily newspapers often carried various captions such as: 
“Ajaokuta: When a challenge defies a nation” (Ezeobi, 2008); “Nigeria: Why Ajaokuta 
Steel must be completed” (Inabo, 2010); “Nigeria gets business plan to restart Ajaokuta 
Steel” (Steel Guru, 2010); “Fed Govt to re-open Ajaokuta Steel Plant” (Ofikhenua, 2010); 
“Mega Fraud at Ajaokuta” (Melah, 2007); “Termination of Ajaokuta Steel concession 
agreement is a big setback” (Okoroanyanwu, 2008); “Massive Looting of equipment and 
property of Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited and National Iron Ore Mining Company, 
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Itakpe” (House of Representatives, 2009 Sec.7); “World Bank cautions Nigeria on 
outmoded Steel mill” (Botha, 2002); “Ajaokuta: The story of a deadly conspiracy” 
(Samuel, 2003); “Don’t sack Ajaokuta Steel Company workers – FG cautioned” (Subair, 
2009); “We can fix Ajaokuta Steel, NIOMCO with N650m” (Ofikhenua, 2010); 
“Ajaokuta, the 31-yr jinxed company” (Alao, 2010); “How to keep Ajaokuta plant 
running – Varsity lecturers” (Sun News Publishing, 2009). Academic articles about 
governance and accountability against the context of the above headlines provide a basis 
for exploring the apparent neglect of ASCL in this thesis.  
The topic is worthy of studying because of the colossal amount spent by the Nigerian 
government on the project since its inception. Although substantial installations have been 
put in place, most of the machines installed are lying idle and the project is not yet 
operational. There is the question of what Nigerians stand to gain if the project is 
completed. Sanusi Mohammed, the secretary general of the African Iron and Steel 
Association (AISA), argues that iron and steel developments are the bedrock of 
industrialisation and engender other industrial activities (Ayorinde, 2012). He further 
states that the completion of the first phase of 1.3 million tonnes of ASCL will lead to the 
employment of up to 10,000 professionals apart from unskilled workers, petty traders and 
other ancillary professional services. Other benefits of completing ASCL are 
technological acquisition, employment in the downstream and upstream of the steel 
sector, national security and pride and markets for the by-products (Chukwu, 2013). 
Using neopatrimonialism, in an interpretive, contextual and in-depth theory, provides a 
search light unveiling the governance and accountability issues behind ASCL’s situation. 
This thesis attempts to proffer solutions to the moribund steel industry in the most 
populous black country of Africa. The lessons learnt will be useful in understanding the 
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governance and accountability complexities of large public sector projects in developing 
countries and make a general contribution to the governance and accountability discourse. 
Moreover, this work will assist researchers in Nigeria and Africa in general by (i) filling 
the gaps in literature about governance and accountability of parastatals; (ii) guide 
decision-makers in their decision-making; (iii) help in the socio-economic development of 
African countries; attract foreign investors to Africa; (iv) help African policy makers to 
make the right decision about parastatals and the ASCL; (v) help in managing parastatals’ 
resources transparently; (vi)  promote accountability of parastatals to their stakeholders; 
and (vii) good governance will ignite productivity/efficiency and competition in 
parastatals through good governance including accountability.  
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into nine chapters. Chapter one (this introduction) outlines the 
context to and the key question of the study and justifies this research.  
Chapter two involves a Nigerian contextual analysis. This chapter covers the Nigerian 
political, social and economic environments; the Nigerian National Development Plans; 
and Nigeria’s roles in Africa.  
Chapter three reviews prior studies undertaken in the broad area of the thesis. Problems of 
governance and accountability in parastatals in Nigeria are covered and privatisation of 
parastatals.  
Chapter four discusses the theoretical framework that is used to interpret the findings. An 
interpretive and contextual theory with a critical orientation is adopted. This gives 
emphasis to neopatrimonialism.  
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Chapter five goes on to elaborate the methodology that is linked to the theoretical 
framing. The philosophical assumptions upon which this study stands are analysed. 
Elucidating the ontological and epistemological assumptions of social science in four 
paradigms - radical humanist, radical structuralist, functionalist and interpretivist (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979), this study clarifies its positioning in the interpretive paradigm. The 
study employs semi-structured interviews, survey questionnaire, case study, document 
analysis and observation, influenced by this paradigmatic positioning. Support is given 
here to triangulation and the use of some quantitative analysis to add to the substantively 
qualitative approach.  
Chapter six is a key empirical chapter. It details the results of the first and second 
interviews held with stakeholders from December 2010 to March 2011 and December 
2011 to February 2012 respectively. 13 stakeholders were interviewed in the first phase of 
interviews while 10 others were interviewed in the second phase of interviews. The 
stakeholders interviewed were journalists, civil servants, academics, human rights 
activists, doctors, labour unions, Ajaokuta community and politicians. The chapter 
summarises the results of the two phases of interviews. The interviews were conducted in 
two phases because of the sensitive nature of ASCL and also to have an in-depth 
investigation of the case study. 
Chapter seven, substantively developing the case study, documents the results of the 
interviews held with the management staff of ASCL at two different times. The first 
round of management interviews was conducted with three management staff between 
December 2010 and March 2011. The second interview was held with seven management 
staff between December 2011 and February 2012. The chapter shows the results of 
empirical study from the two phases of interviews and questionnaires administered in 
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Nigeria from December 2011 to February 2012. Mean, group means, and non-parametric 
statistics – Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests - were used to determine the level of 
significance of each group of stakeholders. The interviews from the case and 
questionnaire survey were combined in chapter seven because most of the respondents 
who responded to the questionnaires were staff of ASCL and its environment. 
Chapter eight discusses the findings from the interviews, case study and the 
questionnaires, relating them back to the literature, and to the interpretive theory with its 
emphasis on neopatrimonialism.  
Chapter nine answers the research questions set out in chapter one and summarises the 
results from the case interviews, interviews with the stakeholders and survey 
questionnaire analysis. The chapter presents the suggestions by the stakeholders 
interviewed and policy implications, limitations and suggestions for future research.     
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Chapter Two 
Nigeria: a contextual analysis 
 
2.0    Introduction 
This chapter elaborates, for the purpose of this study, the key dimensions of Nigeria’s 
historical, social, political, legislative, judicial and economic environments. It seeks to 
bring to light the factors that can be cited vis-à-vis the governance and accountability 
issues shrouding Nigeria as a nation state and in this sense begins to indicate how to 
minimise them.  
The chapter discusses in section 2.1 Nigeria: historical context and social background; 
section 2.2 explores the Nigerian political environment — executive branch; section 2.3 
examines the Nigerian National Assembly — legislative branch; section 2.4 discusses the 
Nigerian Judicial System; section 2.5 provides the overview of the Nigerian economic 
environment; section 2.6 explores the importance of the iron and steel industry and its 
development in Nigeria; section 2.7 examines the Nigeria National Development Plans; 
section 2.8 provides the analysis of regional militias in Nigeria;  section 2.9 analyses 
Nigeria’s role in Africa  and section 2.10 summarises and  concludes the chapter. 
2.1     Nigeria: historical context and social background  
Nigeria took her name from the River Niger when a British lady, Flora Shaw, who was 
then a correspondent for the London Times newspaper, coined the word from ‘Niger area’ 
in her despatch of 8 January 1897 (Omolewa, 1986; APRM report No.8, 2009). Nigeria 
lies between latitudes 4o and 14o north and longitudes 2o and 15o east of the Greenwich 
meridian. It is located in West Africa; and bounded in the north by the Sahara Desert and 
in the south by the Gulf of Guinea, an arm of the Atlantic Ocean (Ikime, 1980; Library of 
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Congress, 2008; APRM report No.8, 2009). The Nigerian population was 140m in 2006, 
152m in 2010, and estimated to be 177m in 2014 - occupying an area of about 923768 
square kilometres, Nigeria is the most populous Black Country in Africa and is referred to 
as the giant of Africa because of her population, resources, socio-economic and political 
might in Africa (Ikime, 1980; Fagbadebo, 2007; Rustad, 2008; Library of Congress, 2008; 
Olokor, 2011; U.S. Department Report, 2011; Agbiboa, 2012; The World Factbook [nd]). 
Nigeria shares borders with Niger in the northwest, Chad in the northeast, Cameroon in 
the southeast and Benin Republic in the southwest (Rustad, 2008; see figure 2.1).  Figure 
2.1 below shows the map of Nigeria. 
Fig. 2.1 The Map of Nigeria 
 
  Source: Infoplease.com website- accessed on 18/01/2013  
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Nigeria is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse countries in the world. For 
instance, she has 250 to 300 ethnic groups6 with separate customs, traditions and 
languages (Jekayinfa, 2002; Kraxberger, 2004; Iyoha, 2008; Library of Congress, 2008; 
Rustad, 2008; Salawu and Hassan, 2011). The map below shows the diversity of Nigeria, 
including the location and relative sizes of some of Nigeria’s major ethnic groups. 
Fig. 2.2 The Map showing Nigeria’s diversity- accessed on 15/09/2014 
 
 
                                                          
6 There is no precise number of ethnic groups (Rustad, 2008). 
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English is the official language together with three major dominant languages which are 
Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa-Fulani (Iyoha, 2008).  
Ethnic group according to Cohen (1974) (in Salawu and Hassan, 2011) is “an informal 
interest group whose members are distinct from the members of other ethnic groups 
within the larger society because they share kinship, religious and linguistics ties” (p. 28). 
Ethnicity is interaction among the ethnic groups and ethnicism is feeling of attachment to 
one’s ethnic group while ethnic nationalism is attaching more to one’s ethnic group than 
to one’s country (Salawu and Hassan, 2011). Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with about 
250 to 300 ethnic groups (Jekayinfa, 2002; Salawu and Hassan, 2011). This ethnic 
difference is manifested through the food they eat, dress they wear and their relationships 
with other ethnic groups (Salawu and Hassan, 2011). Ethnicism, according to Salawu and 
Hassan (2011), is so powerful that globalisation is yet to break through. It has been 
argued that the mistake Britain made in 1914 was the merging together of the northern 
and southern protectorates of Nigeria (Rustad, 2008; Salawu and Hassan, 2011). 
However, the amalgamation was done for administrative convenience and to reduce the 
cost of administration (Salawu and Hassan, 2011).  
Ethnicism has led to selfishness and love for one’s ethnic group; diversion of public 
goods, infrastructure, and employment to one’s region or political base; and an 
ethnocentric leader returning home is given a heroic welcome even when such a leader 
had acted to the detriment of the country (Iyoha, 2008; Agbiboa, 2012). Guest (2004) 
observes that “Nigerians almost all say they disapprove of corruption, but they tend to 
forgive or even applaud the perpetrator if he is their own tribe” (p.21). Figure 2.3 below 
shows the levels of Nigerians’ loyalty to their country.  
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Figure 2.3 The levels of loyalty and allegiance of a typical Nigerian  
Primary  
Secondary                                         
              
Source: Aluko and Ajani (2009, p.498) 
Figure 2.3 shows that Nigerians put self-interest first, personalising their stewardships 
over public goods and services. Their next levels of allegiance and loyalty are to their 
family, relations and friends; then to their villages where they were born and bred; to their 
ethnic group, religious group and lastly their Nation.  
Nigerians practise three main religions. Christianity is majorly practised in the southern 
part of Nigeria; the Muslim religion is commonly practised in northern Nigeria; and 
traditional religion practises are prevalent across the country (Iyoha, 2008; Rustad, 2008). 
The first two religions, Christianity and Islam, were imported religions (Iyoha, 2008). 
Akinola (1988) notes that Nigeria is a country infested with “mistrust, inter-ethnic 
antagonism and bitter rivalries” (p. 442). It can be argued that Nigeria being multi-ethnic, 
with diverse religious groups, which are ethnically based, makes governance and 
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accountability difficult (Lewis, 2007; Iyoha, 2008; Salawu and Hassan, 2011). Corruption 
is organised along ethnic lines (Lewis, 2007).   
According to Lewis (2007), Britain captured Lagos and gave it Crown colony status in 
1862, took over the Niger Delta region in 1885 and the northern region in 1899 where the 
Royal Niger Company (RNC) was stationed. U.S. Department of State Report (2011) 
argues that Britain began to trade with Nigeria after the Napoleonic wars and established 
the RNC in 1886 in the north. APRM report No. 8 (2009) appeared to suggest that the 
establishment of RNC may be the reasons why Nigeria came under British government 
and control. Britain merged the southern and northern protectorates in 1914, thereby 
making Nigeria a corporate political entity under British Imperial domination (Rustad, 
2008). The amalgamated Nigeria in 1914 gave birth to three regions in 1939 that were 
ethnically and economically distinct (Lewis, 2007). Nigeria’s three major ethno-linguistic 
tribes are two-thirds of Nigerian people (Lewis, 2007). Britain governed Nigeria until 1 
October 1960 when Nigeria was granted her independence and became a sovereign nation 
(Rustad, 2008). Nigeria, since independence has been under the military dictatorship and 
experienced “poor governance, lack of transparency and accountability” (APRM report 
No 8, 2009 p.41). 
2.2 The Nigerian Political Environment — Executive Branch 
Section 135(2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) provides that a President 
who is duly elected is expected to spend four years in office and the incumbent is 
qualified to contest for a second term in office. Thus in total, the President is qualified to 
occupy office for eight years and no more. The President is the Chief Executive of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 
Nigeria (United Nations, 2004).                    
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On 1 October 1960, the eightieth British Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, handed 
over power to Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Governor-General and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
as the Prime Minister (Esterhuysen et al., 2013). Both Abubakar and Azikiwe ruled until 
15 January 1966 when a coup was staged by some Igbo army officers (from the southeast) 
who killed Abubakar Balewa (the Prime Minister), Ahmadu Bello (the Premier of 
Northern region), four senior army officers from the north, and Western Premier (Rustad, 
2008; Ojeleye, 2010). The coup, it was felt, was carried out to make Igbo dominant in the 
political scene in Nigeria (Ojeleye, 2010). Ojeleye (2010) maintains that “regionalism, 
nepotism, thuggery and political brinkmanship were the order of the day” (p.xi) 
immediately after independence. 
The coup on 15 January 1966 brought in General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi from the 
southeast as the new Head of State (APRM report No.8, 2009; Ojeleye, 2010). Ironsi, 
according to APRM report No.8 (2009) and Ojeleye (2010), was accused by the northern 
leaders of not bringing to justice those who killed their leaders but went ahead to set up a 
commission of enquiry immediately the Igbos were being massacred in the north. This led 
the northern army officers to stage another coup killing General Aguiyi Ironsi on 29 July 
1966 and installed Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Jack Gowon as the Head of State (APRM 
report (APRM report No. 8, 2009; Ojeleye, 2010). Gowon, according to APRM report 
No.8 (2009), abolished the regions and divided the country into 12 states in 1967 in a bid 
to give greater autonomy to the minority ethnic groups. The abolition of the regions by 
Gowon and unfettered killings of Igbos in the north irked Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu 
Ojukwu (the head of Eastern Region) and other Igbo elders who declared the southeast a 
sovereign state of Biafra on 30 May 1967 (Library of Congress, 2008; APRM report 
No.8, 2009). 
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The Nigerian civil war took place between 1967 and 1970 as a result of Ojukwu’s 
declaration and caused the death of about one million Nigerians (APRM report No.8, 
2009). The civil war was fought by Nigerian government to re-unite the country 
(Atofarati, 1992). The civil war in Nigeria brought hardship, famine, diseases, poverty, 
and death to Nigerians, especially to the Igbo people from the south east of Nigeria 
(Library of Congress, 2008).  
Gowon’s promise to return the country to civilian rule was broken in 1974 and he was 
accused of “delaying the promised return to civilian rule and becoming corrupt and 
ineffective” (US Department Report, 2011 p.3). Crime and deterioration of political 
atmosphere ensued, which led to a bloodless coup on 25 July 1975 organised by General 
Murtala Muhammed who promised to return the country to civil rule in 1979; Murtala 
stood firm by his decisions; restored confidence in government; reduced government 
expenditures; encouraged expansion of private sector;  and initiated the plan to move the 
Nigerian capital to Abuja but was murdered on 13 February 1976 in a coup led by 
Colonel Buka Suka Dimka (Library of Congress, 2008). The coup which was 
unsuccessful but bloody ushered in General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was Murtala’s 
deputy, as the new Head of State (APRM report No. 8, 2009). He ruled from 13 February 
1976 to 30 September 1979 and in keeping with the promise of his boss, Murtala, handed 
over power to the elected civilian President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari on 1 October 1979 
(Library of Congress, 2008). This established Nigeria’s second republic (APRM report 
No 8 (2009). 
Another coup was staged on 31 December 1983 bringing in General Muhammadu Buhari 
as the Head of State. He accused the government of Shagari of corruption and 
mismanagement of resources amidst growing lack of confidence in civilian regime; and 
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fraudulent re-election of Shagari in 1983 election (Library of Congress, 2008). The 
Library of Congress (2008) argues further that the new government of Buhari promised to 
return the country to civil rule and trimmed the federal government budget; introduced the 
War Against Indiscipline (WAI) to deal with people’s disorderliness including 
environmental cleanliness and queuing before service; and promised to stamp out 
corruption and encourage patriotism. General Buhari’s highhandedness; draconian rules; 
controversy over the application to join the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC); 
and rigidity resulted in another coup by General Ibrahim Babangida on 27 August 1985 
(Library of Congress, 2008). Buhari was peacefully overthrown by Babangida with the 
promise to return to civil rule (APRM report No. 8, 2009). APRM report No. 8 (2009) 
discloses that General Babangida conducted elections on 12 June 1993 which were widely 
acclaimed by local and international observers to be free and fair and believed to be won 
by a wealthy Yoruba businessman, M.K.O. Abiola from the southwest, the result of which 
he annulled. The crisis which arose as a result of the annulment, according to APRM 
report No. 8 (2009), led to the death of hundreds of people. Eventually, Babangida 
stepped aside and appointed Chief Ernest Shonekan as the head of Interim National 
Government (ING) on 27 August 1993. Shonekan was not able to reverse the country’s 
economic problems and increasing political tension and was forced to resign on 17 
November 1993 by General Sani Abacha, who took over as the Head of State (APRM 
report No 8, 2009).  
The ruthlessness with which General Sani Abacha ruled Nigeria led to widespread 
dissatisfaction. For instance, he hanged Ken Saro-wiwa (an environment activist and 
minority rights campaigner) and eight others on 8 November 1995, thereby leading to the 
suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth (Rustad, 2008). Abacha died suddenly on 
8 June 1998. General Abdulsalami Abubakar became the new head of state and he 
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released all Abacha’s political prisoners and handed over to the democratically elected 
government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May 1999. This marked the beginning of 
what was the Nigerian third republic (APRM report No 8, 2009). 
General Olusegun Obasanjo who ruled the country as a military Head of State between 13 
February 1976 to 30 September 1979 was returned as a civilian President and was faced 
with a:  
Highly militarised political system, breakdown in the rule of law, erratic 
and distorted policies, public sector dominance in production and 
consumption, unbridled corruption and pervasive rent seeking, weak 
institutional capacity for economic policy management and coordination, 
unsustainability of public finance at all levels of government, large 
external and domestic debt (APRM No.8, 2009 p.47). 
President Olusegun Obasanjo was highly praised for his institutional and governance 
reforms among which are: the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences 
Commission (ICPC)7, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)8, the Due 
Process Office (DPO), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)9 , and the 
Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) to deal with corruption and money laundering in 
order to ensure good governance, transparency and accountability in the country (Iyoha, 
2008; APRM report No 8, 2009). APRM report No 8 (2009) noted that Obasanjo is also 
credited with for recovering about $6 billion believed to have been stolen by the late 
former head of state, General Sani Abacha. He handed over power to a democratically 
elected president, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, on 29 May 2007 and this is the first 
time in the history of Nigeria that a civilian government handed over power to another 
civilian government (APRM report No. 8, 2009). 
                                                          
7 Established to promote good governance (Iyoha, 2008).  
8 Established to promote good governance (Iyoha, 2008).  
9 It is a means of promoting transparency in the oil and gas sector (Iyoha, 2008). 
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 Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who was the Vice President, became the Acting President 
between 9 February 2010 to 5 May 2010, during the period when Yar’Adua was sick and 
became the substantive President from 6 May 2010 after the death of Yar’Adua (US 
Department Report, 2011). General election was conducted in April 2011 and Jonathan 
retained office as the country’s incumbent President (US Department Report (2011). 
Table 2.1 below summarises the tenure of Nigerian leaders since independence in 1960 
Table 2.1 Leadership transitions in Nigeria from Independence 
Date Name of Leader Mode of 
Authority 
Number of 
years/months 
Ethnic 
Origin 
1960 -1963  Nnamdi Azikiwe (Governor-
General) / Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa (Prime Minister) 
Election 3 years South-East / 
North-East 
1963 -1966 Tafawa Balewa (Prime Minister) / 
Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ceremonial 
President) 
Election 2 years 4 months  North –East 
/South-East  
 
Jan.1966 – 
July 1966 
Johnson T. U Aguiyi-Ironsi Coup-Military 6 months South-East 
1966-1975 Yakubu  Jack Gowon Coup-Military 9 years 1 month North- Central 
1975-1976 Ramat Murtala Muhammad Coup-Military 7 months North-West 
1976-1979 Olusegun Obasanjo  Succession 
due to death 
of Murtala- 
Military 
3 years 8 months South-West 
1979-1983 Shehu Usman Shagari Election 4 years 3 months North-West 
1983-1985 Muhammadu Buhari Coup-Military 1 year 8 months North-West 
1985-1993 Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida Coup-Military 8 years North-Central 
1993-1993 Ernest Shonekan Head ING 3 months South-West 
1993-1998 Sani Abacha Coup-Military 4 years 7 months North-West 
1998-1999 Abdulsalami Abubakar Succession 
due to death 
of Abacha- 
Military 
1 year North-Central 
1999-2007 Olusegun Obasanjo Election 8 years South-West 
2007-2010 Umaru Musa Yar’Adua Election 2 years 8 months North-West 
 2010-2011 Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Acting 
President 
from 9 Feb. to 
6 May 2010, 
then 
President- 
sickness and 
death of 
Yar’Adua 
1  year 4 months South-South 
2011-2015 Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Election 4 years South-South 
2015-to date Muhammadu Buhari Election In Progress North-West 
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Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones comprising 36 states and 774 local 
government areas Abuja is the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and consists of six area 
councils (United Nation, 2004). The administrative headquarters of Nigeria was formerly 
in Lagos, which is a commercial city but the seat of government was moved to Abuja on 
12 December 1991 by the then military ruler General Ibrahim Babangida (APRM report 
No. 8, 2009).  
2.3   The Nigerian National Assembly — Legislative Branch 
The National Assembly of Nigeria is a bicameral legislature comprising the Senate and 
the House of Representatives as the highest elective law-making body in Nigeria (United 
Nations, 2004). Section 48 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) provides that 
the Senate shall consist of three senators from each state and one from the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT), Abuja. The total number of senators from the 36 states and Abuja is 109. 
Section 49 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that the House of 
Representatives shall consist of 360 members representing constituencies of nearly equal 
population as far as possible, provided that no constituency shall fall within more than 
one state. Towards this end, seats in the House of Representatives are allocated according 
to population. 
Section 65 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that for a person to be a 
member of the National Assembly, he must: be a citizen of Nigeria; have attained the age 
of 35 years for Senate and 30 years for House of Representatives; be educated up to at 
least school certificate level or its equivalent; and be a member of a political party and 
sponsored by that party. However, section 66 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) 
states that a person cannot be a member of the National Assembly if he/she is not a 
Nigerian; has acquired the citizenship to another country; adjudged lunatic; declared to be 
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unsound mind; sentenced to death or imprisonment; adjudged or declared bankrupt; and a 
member of secret society or a civil servant. 
The National Assembly has the power to make laws for the good governance of Nigeria 
(sections 4, 58 and 59 of the 1999 Constitution [as amended]). The National Assembly 
exercises powers over public finance (sections 80 and 81 of the 1999 Constitution [as 
amended]). The National Assembly has the power to remove the President or the Vice 
President if he/she is accused of gross misconduct; has powers to debate on current issues; 
approves the appointment to positions made by the President; form committees to 
investigate persons or organisations and control exercise over personnel (Section 88{1, 2} 
of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution [as amended]); make laws on exclusive and concurrent 
lists; and amend the constitution (United Nations, 2004). 
2.4   The Nigerian Judicial System 
The Judiciary is the arm of government that interprets the law in line with constitutional 
provisions. For instance, the Judiciary administers and delivers justice, and adjudicates in 
disputes among individuals, between government, individuals and corporate bodies 
(United Nations, 2004). The sources of Nigerian Law are the Constitution, Legislation, 
English Law, Customary Law, Islamic Law and Judicial precedents (United Nations, 
2004; Dina et al., 2005).  
By virtue of section 6 of 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended), the Judicial powers of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) shall be vested in the Judicial courts which are: the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria; the Court of Appeal; the Federal High Court; the High Court 
of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; the High Court of the State; the Sharia Court of 
Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; the Sharia Court of Appeal of the State; 
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the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT, Abuja and the Customary Court of Appeal of 
the States. 
The Supreme Court, according to section 233 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as 
amended), is the Court that shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court of 
Law in Nigeria to hear and determine appeals from the court of Appeal and Constitutional 
Courts. This means that the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land and its 
decisions are binding on all other courts both on Federal and State matters (United 
Nations, 2004). The composition of members of Supreme Court shall be the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria (CJN) and 21 other Justices (sections 230 and 231 of 1999 Constitution [as 
amended]). The appointment of the Justices is made by the President on the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council (NJC) and confirmed by the Senate and 
its decisions are subsequently followed by the lower courts (United Nations, 2004).  
Section 237 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) states that the Court of 
Appeal shall consist of the President of the Court of Appeal and 49 other Justices, of 
which not less than 3 must be learned in Islamic Personal Law and not less than 3 shall be 
learned in Customary Law as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. The 
appointment of these Justices shall be made by the President on the recommendation of 
NJC and must be confirmed by the Senate (Section 238). The Court of Appeal entertains 
appeals from other lower courts and appeals from the decisions of the Court of Appeal go 
to the Supreme Court (United Nations, 2004). 
Section 249 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) establishes the Federal High 
Court which is composed of Chief Judge of the Federal High Court and a number of 
Judges as prescribed by the National Assembly. They are appointed, according to 1999 
Nigerian Constitution, by the President on the advice of NJC and confirmed by the 
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Senate. The Federal High Court deals with civil matters and other such jurisdictions that 
can be conferred on it by the National Assembly (section 251 of the 1999 Constitution [as 
amended]) and it has also jurisdiction in respect of treason, treasonable felony and allied 
offences, criminal matters and determine whether the term of office or a seat of a member 
of the Senate or the House of Representatives has ceased or the seat has become vacant. 
Other courts are the High Court of the FCT, Abuja. In accordance with section 257 of the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended), the court has the jurisdiction to hear and 
determine both civil and criminal proceedings. The Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT, 
Abuja exercises appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving 
questions of Islamic Personal Law (section 262). 
At the State level, the highest court is the High Court which is headed by the Chief Judge 
of the State and such number of Judges of the High Court as may be prescribed by a law 
of the State House of Assembly (section 270 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution [as 
amended]). The appointment of the State Chief Judge is made by the State governor on 
the recommendation of the NJC and confirmed by the State House of Assembly (section 
271 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution [as amended]). The High Court of a State hears and 
determines civil and criminal proceedings or any other liability in respect of an offence 
committed by any person (section 272 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution [as amended]). 
There is also Sharia Court of Appeal of the State in respect of the State that requires it. 
This Court deals with issues involving Islamic matters (section 277 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution [as amended]). 
Note that the High Courts are the most important courts in the States and the Sharia Court 
of Appeal or Customary Court of Appeal, according to the 1999 Nigerian constitution, is 
optional except in the Sharia States, which compulsorily adopt the Sharia legal system. 
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The inferior Courts are Magistrate Courts, District Courts, Area Courts, Sharia and 
Customary Courts. High Courts and other specialised Courts exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction over the inferior Courts (Dina et al., 2005). According to Dina et al. (2005), 
there are sometimes Judicial Commissions of Enquiry when there are crises and also 
Military Courts in the military to try their armed forces personnel. Good governance and 
accountability will be assured where the rule of law prevails in matters.  
2.5   The Nigerian Economic Environment 
Nigeria’s inability to manage her endowed resources effectively makes her citizens poor 
(Thomas and Canagarajah, 2002). Nigeria is blessed with enough mineral, human and 
agricultural resources. These mineral resources are oil and gas; coal; iron; tin; and 
limestone, together with agricultural products such as cocoa, tobacco, palm products, 
peanuts, cotton, rice, cassava, millet, yams, soya beans, rubber and livestock (Library of 
Congress, 2008; APRM Report No 8, 2009). These resources according to Iyoha (2008); 
Agbiboa (2012) are a national resource curse in disguise in that they have resulted in 
abject poverty, unemployment, low growth rates, poor infrastructure, insecurity and high 
crime rates in Nigeria.  
Nigeria exports oil and ranks seventh in the world but her people are poor (Ali-Akpajiak 
and Pyke, 2003). Nigeria has abundant human, agricultural and mineral resources but out 
of her estimated population of 177m in 2014, about 100 million are living below £1 per 
day (DFID, 2011). According to Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke (2003), poverty is a disease 
affecting all races but there is a wide gap between the poor and the rich in Nigeria, which 
can be traced to corruption.  
Oil and gas form the bulk of Nigeria’s revenue because they contribute about 95% of 
export revenue and 78% of the general revenue to the government (APRM No. 8, 2009). 
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APRM No. 8 (2009) stated that they were discovered in the late 1950s, becoming the 
mainstay of Nigeria’s economy in the 1970s. In 1971, Nigeria became a member of 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Kraxberger, 2004).  In 2007, the 
GDP of the different sectors of the Nigerian economy were: Agriculture, 17.6%; Industry, 
53.1% and Services, 29.3% (Library of Congress, 2008). The bulk of Nigeria’s population 
earns a living from the Agricultural Sector (Thomas and Canagarajah, 2008). 
The estimated Nigerian labour force was 50.1 million in 2007 and unemployment rate 
during the same period was estimated at 4.9% (Library of Congress, 2008). In 2005 
Nigeria’s debts, according to Library of Congress, stood at $37.5 billion. Library of 
Congress states further that the Paris Club cancelled $18 billion of bilateral debt while 
Nigeria paid back the remaining $12.4 billion to the club. Similar arrangements were 
made with London Club group of creditors that led to the cancellation of $2.15 billion of 
related debt and the remaining debt of $4.95 is expected to be serviced (Library of 
Congress, 2008).  
2.6 Importance of Iron and Steel Industry and its development in Nigeria   
The regional militias and ethnic groupings identified in section 2.8 are structured around 
the quest for greater resource control and derivation of benefits for each group. This is 
pronounced by the dependence of the Nigerian economy on natural resources, which are 
sited in specific regions of the country. While the most prominent is crude oil, in the 
context of this study, the role of iron and steel as a potential driver of economic growth is 
reviewed in the following discourse.  
Technology is defined by NATE (2009) as a means whereby “human beings fashion tools 
and machines to increase their control and understanding of the material environment” 
(p.4). NATE (2009) further argues that industrialization is driven by technology which is 
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driven by steel. Steel is the melting of iron and carbon and other materials in furnaces and 
steel making is “the production of an extensive series of complex alloys of iron and 
carbon and other elements from raw materials usually contained in pig iron, and normally 
the addition of further alloying materials” (Agbu, 2007 p.35). For some the might and 
usefulness of steel in all spheres of life make it a basis of present-day civilisation; it also 
helps to accelerate economic and industrial development (Alli-Balogun, 1988; Oyeyinka 
and Adeloye, 1988; NATE, 2009). Steel, for Duru and Sunday (2006), is important to all 
sectors of the economy. In the construction industry steel is used in buildings and bridges. 
Consumer goods like cans, tins and household appliances use steel. Agriculture requires 
mechanised hoes, machetes, spades, and cutlasses made from steel. Defence needs 
military weapons and hardware which are steel products. Transportation requires steel for 
construction of rails, ships, tanker bodies, and automobiles. Textile and food processing 
equipment and stainless steel, oil pipelines, heat resistant and anti-corrosion materials 
used in the petroleum industry are steel products. See figure 2.4 below.  
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Fig. 2.4 The roles of Iron and Steel in Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Duru and Sunday (2006 p.56). 
The first industrial revolution in Britain in 18th century; the second industrial revolution in 
Germany and USA 100 years later; the wide spread industrialisation in the Western 
Europe between 1750 and 1800; industrial capitalism in Northern America in the 1870s; 
industrialisation and infrastructure development in Russia between 1860 and 1900; the 
over-running of Europe by West Germany and innovations in computer and automobiles 
by Japan are traced to the power of Iron and Steel (Agbu, 2007; NATE, 2009).  
Planning for Nigeria’s Steel Industry began in 1958 (Mohammed, 2002b; Okafor, 2007). 
The first steel plant was established in Emene, Enugu State (1962) and two others through 
private initiatives followed in Lagos, 1968 and 1970 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2008). 
There were negotiations with western experts as to the possibility of establishing an 
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Integrated Steel Company but these failed. Nigeria was rather advised to concentrate on 
agriculture (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). Reasons given for this were: high cost of 
technology and accompanying infrastructural facilities; lack of skilled people to start a 
full-scale steel industry; lack of local market for steel products; prevailing diplomatic 
interests and international politics making it impossible for Nigeria to establish a steel 
company at this time (Agbu, 2007).  Soviet experts were invited in 1967, conducted a 
feasibility study and signed a contract to establish Integrated Steel Company at Ajaokuta 
in 1970 (Agbu, 2007). 
Mohammed (2002b) affirms that an extra ministerial agency known as Nigerian Steel 
Development Authority (NSDA) was established by the FGN by decree No. 19 of April 
1971 to develop the steel sector on the recommendation of Soviet experts (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 2008).The mandate of the NSDA was to plan, construct and operate 
the steel plants; carry out geological surveys, study market, metallurgical research and 
undertake training of staff overseas (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). NSDA was 
dissolved by National Steel Council Decree No. 60 of 18 September 1979, and gave birth 
to ASCL; Delta Steel Company Limited, Ovwian- Aladja; Jos Steel Rolling Mill; 
Oshogbo Steel Rolling Mill; Katsina Steel Rolling Mill; National Iron Ore Mining 
Company (NIOMCO); National Steel Raw Materials Exploration Agency, Kaduna; 
National Metallurgical Development Center, Jos; and Metallurgical Training Institute, 
Onitsha (Miachi, 1998; Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). The table below shows 
Nigerian steel companies with production capacities. 
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Table 2.2 Steel Companies in Nigeria 
S/No Type Of Mill Plant Location Rolling Capacity (tons 
of Long Products Per 
Year) 
Products 
i). Integrated Mill 
(Public) 
Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd., 
Ajaokuta  
540,000 Bars, Rods, Light 
sections 
ii). Integrated Mill 
(Public) 
Delta Steel Co. Ltd., 
Ovwian/Aladja 
320,000 Bars; rods; sections 
iii). Rolling Mill 
(Public) 
Jos Steel Rolling 
Company, Jos 
210,000 Bars, rods 
iv). Rolling Mill 
(Public) 
Katsina Steel Rolling Co., 
Katsina 
210,000 Bars, rods 
v). Rolling Mill 
(Public) 
Oshogbo Steel Rolling 
Co., Oshogbo 
210,000 Bars, rods 
vi).  Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Alliance Steel Co., Ibadan 20,000 Bars 
vii). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Alliance Steel Co., Ibadan 20,000 Bars 
viii). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Asiastic Manarin Ind., 
Ikeja 
60,000 Bars, sections 
ix). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Kwara Commercial, Metal 
and Chemical Industries, 
Ilorin 
40,000 Bars 
x). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Mayor Eng. Co., Ikorodu 220,000 Bars, sections 
xi). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Metcombe Steel Co., 
Owerri 
10,000 Bars, sections 
xii). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Qua Steel Products, Eket 600,000 Bars, sections 
xiii). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Selsametal, Otta 100,000 Bars 
xiv). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Union Steel Co., Ilorin 20,000 Bars 
xv). Rolling Mill 
(Private) 
Baoyao Futurelex, Abuja 20,000 Bars 
xvi).  Mini-Mill (Private) Federated Steel Industry, 
Otta 
140,000 Bars, sections 
xvii). Mini-Mill (Private) General Steel Mill, Asaba 50,000 Bars 
xviii). Mini-Mill (Private) Universal Steel co., Ikeja 80,000 Bars, sections 
xix). Mini-Mill (Private) Nigerian Spanish Eng. Co., 
Kano 
100,000 Bars 
xx).  Mini-Mill (Private) Nigersteel Co., Enugu 40,000 Bars, sections 
xxi). Mini-Mill (Private) Continental Iron and Steel 
Co., Ikeja 
150,000 Bars, sections 
xxii). Mini-Mill (Private) Kew Metal Industries, 
Ikorodu 
20,000 Bars, sections 
  Total 3,180,000  
Source: Mohammed (2002b, p.6) and Ohimain (2013, P.4). Public means Parastatal while 
private means private companies. 
2.6.1 Delta Steel Company Limited (DSCL), Ovwian-Aladja. 
DSCL was established in 1975 and supervised by NSDA until 1979 (Mohammed, 2002b). 
It is a Midrex Direct Reduction integrated steel technology, built as a turnkey project, and 
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commissioned in 1982 to produce steel (billets) to be used by the rolling mills in Jos, 
Oshogbo, and Katsina (Mohammed, 2002b; Okafor, 2007; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
2008). It was meant to produce one million liquid steel per annum (Mohammed, 2002b). 
The turn-key, according to Mohammed was that the Austro-German Consortium of seven 
companies that gave the loan of $750 million to Nigeria for the building of DSCL, will 
complete the project, commission it, and hand it over to the FGN for the continuation of 
the project. After the handover of the plant to FGN, the production capacity in 1985 did 
not exceed 25% of the maximum production capacity of 1,000,000 of steel per annum 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2008). The company was shut down in 1996 due to many 
factors: lack of funds, insincere directives from the Ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development, over-costing of inputs and general attitude towards parastatals 
(Mohammed, 2002b; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2008). DSCL and ASCL were 
concessioned to GIHL on 13 August 2004 (Mohammed, 2002b). Government inconsistent 
policies and the failure of DSCL to supply billets to the rolling mills in Oshogbo, Katsina 
and Jos made them to be privatised in 2004 by the FGN and these mills, are not working 
despite privatisation (Ohimain, 2013). 
2.6.2 Private Steel Companies in Nigeria 
According to some, the private steel companies if given appropriate industrial 
environment will operate more efficiently than the public owned companies though their 
installed capacities are very low (Mohammed, 2002b). The private steel companies (mini 
and rolling mills) were established to supplement public owned steel industries 
(Mohammed, 2002b; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2008). Ohimain (2013) argues that 
Nigerian steel industry is about to fold up as a result of the downfall of NIOMCO, ASCL 
and DSCL.  
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A new private rolling mill, Western Metal Products Company Limited (WEMPCO), 
Ibafon, Ogun State was commissioned by President Jonathan on 18 April 2013 (Oketola, 
2013). Oketola notes that WEMPCO management claimed the capacity to produce 
700,000 metric tonnes of flat steel per annum, will import billets and create 5,500 jobs. 
WEMPCO is expected to produce train bodies, agricultural equipment, coils, fan-blades, 
refrigerators and air-conditioners (Oketola, 2013).    
2.7   Nigeria National Development Plans 
Plans are made for development and growth. For Falola (1996), economic growth without 
development results in negative growth, depression and decay. Falola (1996) argues 
further that development in Africa fails not because the ideas are wrong but because of 
problems of politics, governance, transparency and accountability. Development planning 
was introduced immediately after independence to quicken economic growth and 
development so to raise the standard of living of the citizens and to reduce dependence on 
foreign goods (Falola, 1996). 
Planning, for Falola (1996), is a conscious effort by a state to achieve a number of 
development objectives at a future date. Marcellus (2009) argues that development 
planning “involves predetermining a nation’s visions, missions, policies and programmes 
in all facets of life such as social, human, political, environmental, technological factors 
etc and the means of achieving them” (p.198). Adeleye and Olayiwola (2005), Iyoha 
(2008) and Marcellus (2009) note that Nigeria has adopted and implemented four 
development plans since independence in 1960:  
• First National Development Plan          1962-1968 
• Second National Development Plan     1970-1974 
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• Third National Development Plan        1975-1980 
• Fourth National Development Plan      1981-1985 
The First National Development Plan (1962-1968) was a long-range plan to industrialise 
and ensure a quick physical and socio-economic revolution in Nigeria (Ibukun, 1988). 
This plan, for Ibukun (1988), failed as a result of the Nigeria Civil War of 1967 to 1970. 
The Second National Development Plan (1970-1974) was centred on reintegration, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction after the Civil War (Eneh, 2011). Eneh and Marcellus 
argue that the objectives of the Plan were to build: a free and democratic society; a just 
and egalitarian society; a united, strong and self-reliant economy; a great and dynamic 
economy and a land full of bright opportunities for all citizens. Ajaokuta Steel Company 
Limited (ASCL) was part of this plan (Okafor, 2007). The objectives of the Third 
National Development Plan (1975-1980), for Adeleye and Olayiwola (2005), were similar 
to the Second Plan and also included the need to reduce regional imbalances to strengthen 
national unity. The Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) put forward the need 
for the balanced development of the different sectors of the economy, different 
geographical areas of the country and development of rural infrastructure to enhance 
quality of rural life (Adeleye and Olayiwola, 2005). All these plans were good on paper 
but, for Iyoha (2008), the implementation became difficult due to corruption, ethnicism, 
unaccountable governance and lack of transparency. Okojie (2002) pointed out that at the 
end of the Fourth National Development Plan, “the economy did not have its own driving 
force and was therefore highly susceptible to external shocks” (p. 362). For Okafor 
(2007), all the plans failed. 
The new democratic government in 1999 rolled out a further plan (1999-2003).  For 
Marcellus (2009), the primary objective of this plan was to pursue “a strong, virile, and 
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broad based economy with adequate capacity to absorb externally generated shocks” 
(p.203).  For Donli (2004), this new plan was to develop a private-sector driven 
competitive economy. Again, the plan appears not to have achieved much. Another plan 
in 2003 lasted for four years (2003-2007): the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS). All State governments and all Local Government Areas 
were to have similar Plans and the objectives were to raise living standards through 
macroeconomic stability, deregulation, privatisation, transparency, accountability, 
poverty eradication and promotion of prosperity (Library of Congress, 2008; Marcellus, 
2009). Other aims of the plan, for Marcellus, were to inculcate into Nigerians core values 
such as respect for elders, honesty, accountability, industry, discipline, cooperation, self-
confidence and moral courage. The four general objectives of NEEDS are wealth 
creation, employment generation, poverty reduction and value re-orientation (Marcellus, 
2009). There was little visible achievement of the plan. 
Another plan is the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in which Nigeria joined the 
rest of the world in 2000 to achieve eight targets by 2015. These targets are: to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve Universal Basic Education (UBE); to promote 
gender equality; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global 
partnership for development (Igbuzor, 2006). 
The most recent plan, Vision 20:2020, with implementation on-going, sees Nigeria as one 
of the world’s top 20 economies by 2020 (Eneh, 2011). To succeed, it has been argued 
that Nigeria must ensure good governance, transparency, accountability, as well as reduce 
poverty to the barest minimum, eradicate corruption and develop her steel industry (Eneh, 
2011). 
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2.8 Regional militias in Nigeria 
For Obianyo (2007), ethnic militias formed along ethnic divides for a number of reasons:   
2.8.1 Oodua People’s Congress (OPC)  
OPC has its origin in the south-west, comprising: Oyo, Ife, Ijesha, Ekiti, Ijebu, Ketu and 
Ondo (Rustad, 2008). OPC started when Chief Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba businessman, 
won the 1993 Presidential election but was denied the position by the military. Thus OPC 
is seeking political and economic integration or autonomy for their region (Rustad, 2008).  
2.8.2 Niger Delta Groups 
The Niger Delta (south-south) area comprises Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-Rivers, Delta, 
Edo, and Rivers states (Rustad, 2008). The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), the Ijaw National Council (INC), the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw 
Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), the Egbesu Youths (EY) and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) all have south-south origin (Obianyo, 2007). 
These groups, for Obianyo (2007), want the resources in their area to be controlled by 
them or to have greater control of the revenue. The main reason for MEND’s emergence 
is the “neglect of the people in the Niger Delta region, environmental degradation and 
corruption” (Rustad, 2008, p.24). 
2.8.3 The Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 
This represents the Igbos of the south-east, comprising Anambra, Enugu, Abia, Imo and 
Ebonyi states (Rustad, 2008). They want to pull out of Nigeria because in their view they 
have been denied access to the socio-economic and political aspect of Nigerian life 
(Rustad, 2008). This group, for Rustad (2008), speaks of marginalisation and 
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discrimination especially in the spirit of the civil war fought in their secession attempt 
between 1967 and 1970. 
2.8.4 The Arewa People’s Congress (APC)  
The Northern part of Nigeria comprises the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe ethnic 
groups (Rustad, 2008). The Arewa People’s Congress (APC) was formed in the north to 
deal with issues concerning Sharia, rotational presidency and any threat from other ethnic 
based militias (Agbu, 2004; Rustad, 2008). They are not violent because they have being 
in control of political power for the greater part of Nigerian life (Agbu, 2004). 
2.8.5 The Boko Haram (BH)  
BH is a north-eastern based militia group. It started in December 2003; openly challenged 
the Nigerian state; and turned violent when its leader, late Mohammed Yusuf, returned 
from Saudi Arabia in 2009 (Mohammed, 2014).  Its main message is the “rejection of 
secularism, democracy, western education, and westernisation” and subjects such as 
“geography, geology and sociology are forbidden” (Mohammed, 2014 pp.14, 17). 
Mohammed (2014) further states that the group’s leader, late Mohammed Yusuf, 
described as idolatry any form of legislative, executive, judicial functions emanating from 
the secular constitution other than Islamic Sharia Law. Mohammed (2014) holds the 
group believes any person obeying Nigeria’s constitution is an unbeliever: hence the quest 
to make Nigeria an Islamic state. The activities of Boko Haram include targeted 
assassinations; suicide bombings including of churches and government formations; and 
hostage taking (Mohammed, 2014). 
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2.9   Nigeria’s role in Africa 
Nigeria ostensibly has good relationships with other countries in Africa and beyond, 
which is good for growth and development: without peace, local and foreign investors are 
reluctant to invest (APRM No. 8, 2009). Since independence, Nigeria has been in the 
forefront of struggles to liberate other African countries from colonialism, apartheid and 
other internal political crises. E.g., Nigeria contributed logistics to liberation and 
independence movements of Namibia and Mozambique and to the struggle against 
apartheid in South Africa (APRM No. 8, 2009). APRM No. 8 (2009) notes Nigeria was 
involved in suppressing conflicts via peaceful mediation and conciliation measures in 
internal crises in Liberia, Darfur, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Congo 
(DRC), Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Mali and Zimbabwe. APRM No. 8 (2009) 
stated further that Nigeria could achieve this via her membership and participation in 
various regional and continental organisations such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), Monrovia Group of African States, African Union (AU), 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), United Nations (UN), African Development 
Bank (ADB), New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM). Apart from curtailing African crises, Nigeria established a 
Technical Aid Corps (TAC) to transfer technical assistance to other African countries and 
a trust fund at the African Development Bank (ADB) to lend to less developed African 
countries (APRM No. 8, 2009). Generally, Nigeria has spent a lot of money, material, 
men to promote development, peace, and security in Africa (APRM No. 8, 2009). 
2.10 Summary and conclusion 
Nigeria obtained independence from Britain in 1960. Shortly after, the military took over 
Nigeria, ruling for 29 years before handing over power to a democratically elected 
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government in 1999. Nigeria is blessed with agricultural products and abundant human 
and mineral resources. On the face of it, she has a good relationship with her 
neighbouring countries and beyond. She has a bicameral legislature responsible for 
making laws for good governance and judiciary ostensibly interpreting laws for a peaceful 
environment for business to thrive but many have suggested that ethnicism, corruption, 
military incursions in politics, and ethnic militias have stunted the deliverance of good 
governance and accountability.  
The preceding analysis of the Nigerian context provides an appreciation of the 
environmental and cultural differences from the developed world. This helps highlight 
that approaches of governance and accountability in developed countries may not be 
easily adopted and used for Nigeria or other African countries. The specific challenges 
arising for parastatals or State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the theoretical implications 
are to be explored  
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Chapter Three 
Governance and Accountability Issues in Parastatals: Review of prior 
studies 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Parastatals are important organizations. Improving their governance and accountability 
for the public interest potentially contributes much to well-being. Here, studies of 
governance and accountability issues in parastatals are reviewed. The focus is issues 
arising in Africa as brought out in prior studies, and an overview of antidotes to issues 
that have been suggested in prior studies and/or implemented in practice is provided. The 
review is structured as follows: Section 3.1 examines the difference between private and 
public sectors. Section 3.2 explores the definition of governance. Section 3.3 looks at the 
importance of good governance. Section 3.4 lists the principles of governance in the 
public sector. Section 3.5 examines governance issues around the World. Section 3.6 
explores governance issues arising in Africa. Section 3.7 describes governance issues in 
selected African countries. Section 3.8 deals with parastatal organisations. Section 3.9 
describes the parastatal organisation’s stakeholders. Section 3.10 analyses the problems of 
African parastatals. Section 3.11 explores corruption. Section 3.12 gives accountability 
definition. Section 3.13 explores weaknesses in African accountability. Section 3.14 gives 
some antidotes to governance and accountability issues in Africa. Section 3.15 examines 
privatisation. Section 3.16 governance and accountability in the Nigerian context. Section 
3.17 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
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3.1 Governance issues in Mainstream Theory: Private and Public sectors cross 
referred 
In appreciating parastatals’ governance issues, prior studies have drawn from an 
understanding of similarities and differences between public and private sectors. To 
appreciate private sector governance, it is useful to trace historical development. 
Ownership and control of many business units had historically rested with the 
entrepreneur, who provided capital, took decisions, owned profits and bore the risk of 
liabilities and losses: it was thus beneficial for several entrepreneurs to pool resources by 
bringing in capital, sharing decision-making and specialisation, engendering greater 
efficiency and sharing loss liability, if liability initially was unlimited (Davies, 1991).  
Deficiencies of sole proprietorships and partnerships led to the generalized joint stock 
company with separate legal personality and legal rights and duties. Eventually owner 
liability was limited to the amount they agreed to invest and no more (Davies, 1991). In 
the larger limited liability company, ownership is distinct from control due to the large 
numbers of owners (Davies, 1991). Due to dispersion of owners and lack of information 
about the company they own, control is with management who have most corporate 
knowledge (Berle and Means, 1932). The industrial revolution’s factory system led to 
resources of many being controlled by one management (Berle and Means, 1932): owners 
(shareholders) are the principals who entrust corporate resources and decisions to agents 
(managers) (Solomon, 2010). Agents may act in their own interests rather than those of 
the principal (Boatright, 1999; Ahunwa, 2002; Anwar and Sam 2006).10  
                                                          
10Divergence of interest may be such that the principal seeks wealth maximisation while the agent seeks the 
highest bonus possible (Eisenhardt, 1989; Solomon, 2010). Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
(cited in Adams and Mengistu, 2008) wrote that people may be reckless with what does not belong to them. 
For Nyamu (1975), people are by nature selfish, following their own interest to the neglect of others. 
 
 
                                                                     
 
56 
 
Separation of ownership from control may better allow professionals with business 
acumen to run companies, engendering good decisions for shareholder and ostensibly 
social benefit (Needle, 2004). However, information asymmetries make it difficult and 
expensive to know agent activity (Ahunwan, 2002; Solomon, 2010). Separation of 
ownership from control can lead to conflicts between majority and minority shareholders 
(Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Solomon, 2010): in an insider-dominated or relationship-based 
system, the company is owned and controlled by a shareholder sub-group. Here, major 
shareholders may disclose little financial and operational corporate information and 
misuse funds raised by the entire shareholders, ignoring rights and interests of minority 
shareholders (Solomon, 2010).11  
In the realm of practice, post-independence, inefficiency, insufficient private corporate 
funds, and public interest arguments led many governments to nationalise corporations 
(Ugorji, 1995; Griffiths & Wall, 1997; Anwar and Sam, 2006). For Omoleke (2010), 
parastatals12 were established to quicken economic and industrial development as private 
companies could not afford the capital needed to establish such projects. Parastatals’ 
presence became noticeable in the developed world after the First World War after they 
were set up to manage war consequences, mainly the economic aspect (Griffiths & Wall, 
1997; Oruku, 2006). Nationalization was more prominent after the Second World War 
and the success of the Soviet revolution (Oruku, 2006). Then, rail, iron and steel 
industries and the Post Office required large scale investment and repair: nationalization 
                                                          
11 Scandals, financial crises and failures of famous organisations in the developed world have raised 
questions about governance systems, with growing distrust of corporate management. Solutions are seen in 
governance systems with rules and regulations capable of controlling management (Boddy and Paton, 
2011).   
 
12In parastatals, ownership rests with taxpayers, donors, lenders, and other resource providers while control 
is with the management and government-appointed board (International Public Sector Accounting 
Pronouncements, 2013). 
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rather than tax reliefs and grants was seen as the way to reorganize these ailing industries 
in the public interest (Griffiths & Wall, 1997).  
Private companies guided by the profit motive were seen as not wanting to invest in loss-
making business and government had to prevent liquidation and collapse (with associated 
effects on employment and the general populace) of key businesses, especially those 
considered essential (Griffiths & Wall, 1997). Similar efforts were made by Britain in all 
countries she colonised. E.g., during the colonial period the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation (NRC), Commodity Marketing Boards (CMB), Nigerian Postal Service 
(NPS), Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), and 
Nigerian Broadcasting Service (NBS) were established as the core economic and social 
infrastructural capital that private companies could not provide (Ugorji, 1995). In Kenya, 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), Development Finance 
Corporation of Kenya (DFCK), Industrial Development Bank (IDB), Kenya Industrial 
Estate Programme (KIEP) and the Rural Industrial Development Centres (RIDC) were 
created by the government to implement indigenization policies and “fill the existing 
entrepreneurship gap” (Etukudo, 1997 p.2). In Tanzania, parastatals were to act as 
“antidote to capitalist exploitation” (Etukudo, 1997 p.3). In Ghana they were to “promote 
economic growth” (Etukudo, 1997 p.3). In Nigeria, parastatals were to “ensure that the 
economic destiny of Nigeria is determined by Nigerians themselves” (Etukudo, 1997 p.4). 
That is why the Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, during his state visit to 
the UK in 1973 declared:  
We are consolidating our political independence by doing all we can to 
promote more participation by Nigerians in our economic life while attracting 
more investment in sectors of the economy where Nigerians are not yet able to 
rely on themselves (Etukudo, 1997 p.3).  
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Parastatals increased in number as government was determined to: reduce foreign 
economic domination; reduce the risk of demand for future economic independence; 
maintain national security; control strategic economic sectors; prevent wealth 
accumulating in a few hands; and separate some activities from the bureaucratic civil 
service (Ugorji, 1995; Oruku, 2006). In Nigeria, for Oruku (2006), federalism, the 
creation of regions and states, the oil boom and the government’s desire to make 
parastatals an instrument of economic intervention after the civil war led to proliferation 
of parastatals.  
Moreover, parastatals were established for political reasons (e.g., jobs for constituencies, 
political allies and friends), social equity disregarded by the market and as employers of 
last resort to strengthen national integration (Ugorji, 1995). Other reasons, for Nellis 
(1986), in Adeyemo and Salami (2008), are that parastatals represented heritage from 
colonial masters, post-war political ideologies due to: 
The apparent absence or embryonic nature of the indigenous private sector; 
the conversion of failing private enterprises to forestall increases in 
employment; the attractiveness of public enterprises to politicians who use 
them as patronage mechanisms to distribute jobs to both the mighty and the 
minor (p. 402).   
Further, government is evaluated on ability to provide identifiable projects where they are 
visible, without which it will be labelled failed (Nwoye, 2005). The role of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD), promulgated in 1972 as a legal foundation for 
government participation in ownership and control of important economic areas, is also 
significant (Ugorji, 1995). For Ugorji (1995), this promulgation enabled government via 
parastatals to gradually play a more dominant economic role. For Nwoye (2005), the 
indivisibility characterising provision of certain goods and services leads government to 
provide them: e.g., the provision of bridges, tunnels, roads, streetlights and waste disposal 
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facilities cannot be divided or partially provided or left in private sector hands as the poor 
cannot afford to pay for them, with potential exploitation of the masses by the private 
individuals owning them. By implication such goods and services must be provided via 
taxation.  
For Felkins (2009) and Balko (2013), following public choice theory, in the public sector 
politicians and civil servants are the agents (decision/policy makers) of the citizens 
(principals) but they pursue their own self-interest rather than or at the expense of 
citizens’ interests. Public servants are seen as interested in maximising their utility by 
increasing organisation budgets, the source of their remunerations, reputations, powers, 
expenses, patronage and payments to contractors (Lemieux, 2004). For Felkins (2009), in 
contrast, citizens may be subjected to oppression, torture, poverty, confinement and death. 
For Balko (2013), politicians’ and bureaucrats’ self-interest in relation also to families, 
friends, and ethnic groups engenders parastatal failure. Parastatal agency problems have 
been seen to lead to corruption, nepotism and bribery by politicians and public managers 
and subsequently parastatal failure (Anwar and Sam, 2006).  
Differences between private bodies and parastatals (SOEs) (table 3.1) are often 
understood to indicate principal defects in parastatal governance in terms of unclear 
objectives, political interference and lack of transparency.  
Table 3.1 Difference in governance between private sector firms and parastatals 
Details Private sector firms SOEs 
Objectives Clear focus on value maximisation Pursue commercial and non-
commercial objectives 
Agency issues Single agency: concerned about self-
interested behaviour by managers 
Double agency: concerned about 
self-interested behaviour by 
managers and politicians/bureaucrats 
Transparency High level of disclosure (for listed firms) Low level of disclosure 
 
Source: Wong (2004, p.6) 
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Commentators argue that private sector sanctions, incentives, rewards, exit options, and 
insolvency threats encourage managers to maximise profits, while in parastatals there are: 
no market incentives, no sanctions for poor performance; no threats of replacing 
management; no stakeholder exit options; no takeover or insolvency threats; limited 
rewards for best performing employees; skewing of recruitments and appointments 
towards political interests thus displacing relevant technical and professional expertise;  
redirecting by government towards pursuit of political objectives to satisfy the public;     
and, many agents and principals engendering agency problems, leading to issues of 
performance, accountability, transparency, inefficiency and focus (Wong, 2004; Mwaura, 
2007; Solomon, 2010). We now turn our attention to knowing what governance is. 
3.2 Governance: defining Governance 
‘Corporate’ governance is often taken to refer to private sector business, albeit it is 
sometimes broader in scope (ECSAFA, 2004; Simpson, 2014), while government 
governance would encompass parastatal governance (IFAC, 2001). Corporate governance 
applies to both listed and non-listed companies, private sector, parastatals, NGOs, 
charities, churches, trusts and agencies (Sarbah and Wen, 2014). Governance is used in 
this thesis to mean corporate governance in the public sector to avoid ambiguity.   
There are many definitions reflecting different perspectives. Most refer to political 
governance in the public sector.13 E.g., for the World Bank (1989 p.60; 1992) governance 
is the “exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs.” Governance is the 
“exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs 
at all levels” (UNDP, 1997 p.3). In 1993, per the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (2006), the World Bank defined governance as how “power is exercised in the 
                                                          
13Leftwich (1993, p.611) sees this as “a state enjoying legitimacy and authority…from a democratic 
mandate…built on the…liberal notion of…clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers”.  
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management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for development” 
(sec.6). The nucleus of these definitions emphasizes economic, administrative and 
political power in the management of a country’s resources for development. Gregory 
(2000) takes governance as corporate governance,14 arguing it: 
“….encompasses the combination of laws, regulations, listing rules and voluntary 
private sector practices that enable the corporation to: attract capital; perform 
efficiently; achieve the corporate objective; meet both legal obligations and 
general societal expectations” (p.5).  
Others, like Cadbury (1992), ANAO (1999) and IFAC (2001), see governance as the 
process by which organisations are directed, controlled and held to account, underpinned 
by openness, integrity and accountability. For Hope (2005), governance is how the duties 
of those elected, appointed or with delegated authority are enacted in public and private 
sectors. For Inyang (2009), governance is “a system, by which the organisation or 
company directs, manages and controls the business of the company to enhance corporate 
performance and corporate responsiveness to shareholders and other stakeholders” (p.3). 
Thus, governance can be seen to have a dual function in parastatals, combining political 
and corporate governance.15  
3.3 Importance of Good Governance 
Governance of a nation or a supra-national entity is targeted at promoting socio-economic 
development and well-being and for making the environment conducive for people to 
realise their dreams (Rhodes, 1994; UNDP, 1997). Effective governance in parastatals 
“encourages efficient use of resources, strengthens accountability for the stewardship of 
                                                          
14 Corporate governance for Cadbury (1992) is “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. It is popularly and simply known as “Governance” in the public sector (IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 
2004).   
15 As we shall see, ostensibly, corporate governance rules are applied to parastatals also under parliamentary 
control.  
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those resources, improves management and service delivery, improves people’s lives and 
builds confidence in public sector entities” (IFAC, 2001, p.1). Good governance: 
contributes to economic success of a country, increases an organisation’s reputation; 
attracts investors from other parts of the world; and discourages corruption and unethical 
business practices (Young 2010). Governance systems have become important globally as 
governments around the world are handing over parastatals with business motives to 
private organisations in the expectation that their efficiency will facilitate global 
economic development (Rhodes, 1997; Gregory, 2000).16  
In a democracy: freedom is ostensibly respected; decision-makers are held accountable; 
people have a say in decisions affecting their lives; there is no discrimination on account 
of race, ethnicity, class, gender; and the needs of future generations are reflected in 
current policies (UNDP, 1997). For UNDP (1997), proper modern governance includes 
three players: government, the private sector and the civil society. The UNDP (1997) sees 
government making rules and regulations to create the appropriate political and legal 
environment; the private sector creating jobs that generate income for the people; and 
                                                          
16The Kihumba Report (1999), Gregory (2000), and the King Report II (2002) give reasons why good 
governance is important: it attracts both local and foreign investors by giving assurance that their 
investments will be secured and well managed in accountable ways; it enhances business competition and 
efficiency; it enhances the accountability and performance of those entrusted to manage corporations; it 
promotes efficient and effective use of limited resources; managers who do not use the resources efficiently 
or who are incompetent or corrupt will be disciplined; it ensures that corporations comply with the laws, 
regulations and expectations of the society; and (vii) good governance will make it difficult for corruption 
to take root or will deal with it. Inyang (2009) argues that good governance is important because of the 
separation of ownership from control, globalisation and information communication technology, and 
corporate scandals and failures in the developed and developing world. Good governance is necessary to 
draw the attention of investors from all over the world (Wanyama, 2006). Good governance, according to 
the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating 
poverty and promoting development” (United Nations, 1998 p.13). Good governance is necessary for 
sustainable development, and for economic transformation of a nation (Leftwich, 1993). For Gatamah 
(2008), good governance can do a lot to ensure equitable distribution of those resources. Gatamah (2008) 
lists the following as benefits of good governance to African people: best-quality products at competitive 
prices; improved tax collection and use by the government; efficient allocation of resources; increased 
employment; better quality of life; economic competition; social development; increased standard of living; 
and responsible use of resources leading to poverty alleviation. 
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civil society facilitating political, social interaction and mobilizing society to participate 
in socio-economic and political activities. UNDP (1997) states that for governance to be 
taken as “good,” it must be participatory, transparent, accountable, effective, equitable, 
promote the rule of law, produce consensus of opinion, be responsive, and have strategic 
vision. The World Bank opines per Leftwich (1993) that good governance exists/operates 
when the followings are obtainable: an efficient public service; independent judicial 
system and legal framework to enforce contracts; accountable administration of public 
funds; independent public auditor responsible to a representative legislature; respect for 
the law and human rights at all government levels; a pluralistic institutional structure; and 
a free press. 
3.4 The Principles of Governance in the Public Sector  
Good governance in the public sector means that parastatals act in accordance with the 
public interest (CIPFA and IFAC, 2013). ANAO (2003) in its better practice guide, 
volume 1, contends that good governance is where “the organisation’s leadership, its 
staff, the government, the parliament and the population can rely on the organisation to do 
its work well and with full probity and accountability” (p.6). ANAO (2003) posits that 
good public sector governance has two focal points: performance, in which the 
organisation delivers goods, services or programmes to the people effectively and 
efficiently, and conformance, in which the organisation carries out its business by 
complying with the law, regulations, standards and the expectation of the people through 
probity, accountability and openness.17 
                                                          
17 For Odhiambo-Mbai (2003), bad governance is where a nation suffers an “autocratic political system, 
abuse of human rights, corruption, and inefficient organisation and management of public institutions” 
(p.116). 
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Parastatal employees are expected to display a high level of good behaviour while 
carrying out their duties. Per the Nolan Report (1995)18, the following are the seven 
principles put forward by the Nolan Committee for the proper conduct of public office 
holders: (a) Selflessness - public officials should take decisions in the public interest, not 
so as to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, family or friends; (b) 
Integrity - public office holders should not place themselves under any financial or other 
obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might influence them in the 
performance of their official duties; (c) Objectivity - in carrying out public business, 
including making public appointments, awarding contracts or recommending individuals 
for rewards and benefits, public office holders should make choices on merit; (d) 
Accountability - public office holders are accountable for their decisions and actions to 
the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny that is appropriate to their 
office; (e) Openness - public office holders should be as open as possible about all 
decisions and actions they take, they should give reasons for their decisions and restrict 
information only when wider public interest demands it; (f) Honesty - public office 
holders have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to 
take steps to resolve any conflicts arising so as to protect the public interest; (g) 
Leadership - public office holders should promote and support these principles by 
leadership and example19.  
                                                          
18The Committee on Standards in Public Life is an independent public body advising the government on 
ethical standards across the whole of public life in the UK (Committee on Standards in Public Life 
website).The Committee on Standards in Public Life is an independent public body which advises 
government on ethical standards across the whole of public life in the UK. 
19 The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO, 2003) in its better practice guide gives core public sector 
governance principles as follows: (a) Accountability: employees of public sector organisations are 
responsible for their decisions, actions and allow themselves to be subject to external examinations - thus, 
these individuals must know their responsibilities and a clear role must be specified; (b) 
Transparency/openness: public office holders must provide the public with timely, accessible and accurate 
information to enable the public to have confidence in their decision-making processes and their 
management of activities and individuals within the organisation; (c) Integrity: this entails straightforward 
dealings involving honesty, objectivity, high standards of propriety and probity in the management of public 
 
 
                                                                     
 
65 
 
3.5 Governance issues around the World 
The emphasis on governance in both private and public sectors has been existing from the 
time ownership was divorced from control where there are shareholders, stakeholders, 
management and board (Berles and Means, 1932; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Puyvelde 
et al., 2012). Corporate governance has become more popular in private sector and public 
sector after the scandals and corporate failures that pervaded corporations and banks in 
the late 80s and early 90s in the UK (Coombes and Wong, 2004; Wanyama, 2006; 
Solomon, 2010). Before the enactments of corporate governance codes, there were Stock 
Exchange Act and Companies Act of 1948 in the UK; Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in US and Parliamentary Acts guiding the 
establishment and running of private and public companies (Yang, 2006; Okike, 2007). 
As the winds of scandals and failures were blowing in the private sectors, parastatals were 
being hollowed out for being inefficient in developed world in the 80s and 90s – all being 
blamed on lack of good governance (Rhodes, 1997; Wanyama et al., 2009; Solomon, 
2010; Simpson, 2014). This is because the private sector and public sector have the same 
enemy, namely: corruption (Anwar and Sam, 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009). 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Anwar and Sam, 2006); Robert Maxwell’s 
scandal in UK (Melvile, 2007; Solomon, 2010); and Enron, WorldCom, and Global 
Crossing in US (Yang, 2006) had several consequences, including employees losing their 
jobs, savings and pensions; lenders not receiving their debts; loss of tax revenue by the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
funds and resources - thus, there should be effective control, relevant legislation and individual standards 
and professionalism; (d) Stewardship: public servants should know that the powers they exercise and public 
resources in their custody are not theirs - these should be exercised and held on behalf of the country; (e) 
Leadership: this involves setting the tone at the top and is critical to achieving an organisation wide 
commitment to good governance; (f) Efficiency: using the resources to achieve the organisation’s objective 
- users of public goods/resources should constantly avoid waste and carrying out public work, 
appointments, awarding contracts, promotion, rewards and benefits should be meritocratic. These principles 
are meant to be applied in the public sector.  
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government; communities losing their source of employment and shareholders losing 
their investments (Wanyama, 2006; Yang, 2006). That is why Burton et al. (2004) 
maintain that good corporate governance will safeguard the company’s assets; strengthen 
the investor’s confidence; provide greater access to funds and help reduce fraud. The 
failure of corporate governance made people, governments, markets, and corporations to 
react promptly by advocating for corporate governance reforms (Coombes and Wong, 
2004; Yang, 2006) or what Heath and Norman (2004) call “revised regulations or 
voluntary codes” (p.248) to avoid future recurrence. 
Corporate governance reforms20 are defined as “deliberate interventions in a country’s 
corporate governance tradition by the state, security and exchange commission, or stock 
exchanges” (Kim and Lu, 2013 p.236). One of the reasons for the reforms is to make 
stronger the accountability of managements and boards to their stakeholders and 
shareholders (Heath and Norman, 2004). Kim and Lu (2013) also indicate increase in 
transparent financial and non-financial information, tightening of internal control systems, 
reinforcement of effective legal system and demonstration of fairness to shareholders and 
other stakeholders as additional reasons for reforms (Coombes and Wong, 2004). 
                                                          
20 The reforms led to many codes in the UK like Cadbury Code 1992 after Polly Peck and Robert Maxwell 
scandals; with many other codes such as the Greenbury Report 1995, the Hampel Report 1998, the Turnbull 
Report 1999, the Higgs Report 2003, the Tyson Report 2003, the Smith Report 2003, Revised Guidance on 
Audit Committees 2008, Redraft of the Combined Code 2003 (revised in 2006), Pension Scheme 
Governance-Fit for the 21st Century, (a discussion paper from the National Association of pension Funds 
[NAPF]) 2005, Internal control- revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined code 2005, further 
revision of Combined Code 2008, Turner Review March 2009, and Walker review in July 1990 (see 
Solomon, 2010; Wanyama, 2006; Wong, 2012). Also the Asian financial crisis between 1997 and 1998 led 
to OECD principles of Corporate Governance 1999 which was revised in 2004 (Anwar and Sam, 2006; 
Solomon, 2010; Wong, 2012). Moreover, between the early and mid-2000s, there emerged the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the US after the financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom and other corporate failures. Also, 
around this period in Europe, there were European Union and national reforms after Parmalat, Skandia and 
other failures and scandals (Solomon, 2010; Wong, 2012). Finally, between 2008 to present the Global 
Financial Crisis led to the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and Walker Review in the UK (Solomon, 2010; 
Wong, 2012). In all, UK is leading in governance codes in the world (Yang, 2006; Solomon, 2010).  
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The Cadbury report 1992 adopted “comply or explain” principle, which many countries 
co-opted into their governance codes, others adopted corporate governance based on their 
cultural values (Solomon, 2010).  
The “comply or explain” principle means that the adoption of the codes is voluntary but 
the company should explain in their annual reports why they have not adopted the codes 
(Coombes and Wong, 2004; Solomon, 2010). While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is rules-
based pronouncement of US parliament and not a code, the UK reforms are principles-
based (Solomon, 2010). European countries adopt “comply or explain”, codes, and OECD 
principles more than any country of the world (Becht et al., 2005). Countries preference 
for codes is because of its suppleness as it is not possible to alter the law always 
(Coombes and Wong, 2004). This explains, Coombes and Wong (2004) argue, why many 
countries, including the US are embracing “comply or explain” principles-based code of 
UK. The next section examines governance in Africa. 
3.6 Governance issues arising in Africa 
Agbiboa (2012) overviews how in relation to governance in Africa and other developing 
countries there have been frequent military interventions in politics, civil wars, 
widespread poverty, unemployment, political instability, ethnic conflicts, economic 
dependence, population explosions, corruption and a low standard of living. In 1989 the 
World Bank described governance in Africa as “crisis governance” (World Bank, 1989). 
Tony Blair the former British Prime Minister in 2001 address to the Labour Party 
proclaimed Africa’s governance condition a scar on the World’s conscience (Mamah, 
2002). Similarly, Goldsmith (2007), reviewing African governance issues, lists: (i) 
employing and promoting workers based on partisan relationships; (ii) those in power and 
close to power in law courts having preferential treatment; (iii) personalities in society 
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having special laws; (iv) wealthy individuals funding campaigns and thereby capturing 
the political arena; (v) election victories being obtained by fraud, bribery, and threats; (vi) 
laws favouring individuals rather than the general public; and (vii) misappropriating of 
public goods by public managers. 
Writers have articulated that Africa had a mode of governance called Ubuntu (African 
humanism) before the advent of modern governance in the colonial era (Khoza and 
Adam, 2007; Sarbah and Wen, 2014). Governance was then based on neighbours being 
their brothers’ keepers and stewards, which promoted good governance in their daily lives 
“including the leadership of communities and commercial enterprises, long before 
corporate governance codes existed” (Khoza and Adam, 2007, p.3). Ubuntu principles for 
Khoza and Adam (2007) are “inclusivity, humility, respect, responsibility…concern for 
others, generational responsibilities, and a spirit of participation” (p. 3). Wanyama, et al. 
(2009) summarize Ubuntu as “co-existence, consensus, and consultation” (p.163), which 
parallels substantively present day governance principles. Yet, Ubuntu differs from 
modern governance given the particular emphasis on focal organizations to be run to 
ensure “vitality and stability” (Yakasai, 2001 p.239). It was after many African countries 
got their independence that a governance issue here arose: many modern governance laws 
were only practised by foreign companies operating in the colonies (Ahunwa, 2002; 
Inyang, 2009; Sarbah and Wen, 2014). Separation of ownership from control in the 
modern corporation (Berle and Means, 1923), globalisation, and business growth has 
engendered corporate governance challenges out with African culture-based governance 
(Solomon, 2010; Sarbah and Wen, 2014). Current failings leave Africa a “scar in the 
conscience of the world” (Mamah, 2002 p.1), “the Hopeless Continent” (Agbiboa, 2012 
p.326) with “crisis governance” (World Bank, 1989 p.60).  Africa has been described as 
“a continent betrayed, in chaos, in self-destruction, in crisis, existing in name only, being 
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predatory or kleptocratic, or collapsed into anarchy and viciousness” (Hope, 2002 
p.387).21  
For some, these problems have discouraged local people who do not trust or are 
suspicious of leaders only a few of whom appear to honour promises (Agbiboa, 2012; 
Gatamah, nd). Some scholars have blamed this situation in Africa on foreign aid, with its 
conditionalities or external agents, excessive intervention by the political class, 
corruption, premature transfers by colonial masters, civil wars, huge debts, and political 
instability (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Agbiboa, 2012; Sarbah and Wen, 2014). Africa 
is very rich in resources but it is argued that these are used for the benefits of a privileged 
few (Hope, 2005; Gatamah, 2008). It has been found that good governance practices and 
sound financial and regulatory structures are scarce in Africa, with bad governance 
fuelling corruption, inefficiency, poor record keeping, lack of accountability and 
transparency, greed, bad leadership and public mistrust (Wanyama et al., 2009). 
3.7 Governance issues found in studies of a number of African countries 
Many studies in the literature on African governance have focused on corporate 
governance. Ghana was a British Colony obtaining independence in 1957. It inherited the 
English common law system and her corporate governance follows the Anglo-American 
model (Christensen, 1998; Sarbah and Wen, 2014). For Sarbah and Wen, the Ghana 
Companies Code 1963 (Act 179), the Securities Industry Law, 1993 (PNDCL 333), the 
Securities Industry (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act 590), and Ghana Stock Exchange rules 
(GSE, 1990), form Ghana’s Corporate Governance legal framework. Ghana published her 
Corporate Governance Manual in 2000 (Young, 2010). Most companies listed on the GSE 
                                                          
21 Lack of good governance in Africa is seen as leading to rising unemployment, deteriorating 
infrastructure, inequality, abject poverty, persistent conflicts, political instability, destructive ethnic 
conflicts, and military intervention in politics (Agbiboa, 2012; Gatamah, nd). 
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are foreign and usually comply with international corporate governance principles of best 
practice (Sarbah and Wen, 2014). There is low awareness of corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility in Ghana (APRM, 2005). Also, per APRM (2005), 
institutions responsible for promoting governance lack funds and human resources. For 
the World Bank (2005), Ghana’s business practices do not altogether encourage an 
“ethical, responsible and transparent corporate governance environment” (p.1). There 
have been some studies on governance of state bodies in Ghana. The Ghanaian 
Enterprises Commission (GEC) developed a corporate governance code for SOEs, 
reflecting the OECD principles, Commonwealth guidelines and King reports (APRM, 
2005). Ghanaian SOEs are reported as inefficient as they are overstaffed (Christensen, 
1998) and political interference, nepotism and over-bureaucracy are found (Uddin and 
Tsamenyi, 2005).  
There have been some studies on Ugandan corporate governance. Uganda, a British 
colony obtaining independence in 1962, has ever since experienced serious political 
instability, which has entailed corruption (Wanyama et al., 2009, 2013). For APRM 
(2009), governance is still taking root in Uganda: many people are not aware of the 
notion. For Wanyama et al. (2009), all the structures for governance are in place in 
Uganda but are apparently inactive. Between 1998 and 1999, four banks were liquidated 
in Uganda due to poor governance, insider trading, lack of transparency and fraud 
(Wanyama et al., 2013).  
There have been a number of studies on South Africa, a country that experienced 
economic isolation between 1961 and 1994 as a result of racial segregation (ECA, 2007; 
Bondamakara, 2010). The King Committee was constituted in 1992 and reported in 1994 
(King Report I, revised in 2002 as King Report II and in 2009 as King III) (Institute of 
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Directors in South Africa, 2009; Bondamakara, 2010; Young, 2010). King Report II 
(2002), for Bondamakara (2010) and Young (2010), presents the following seven 
governance principles: Discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness and social responsibility. The leadership-focused King III was 
deemed necessary due to the new South African Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and 
international governance trends (Institute of Directors in South Africa, 2009). South 
Africa, Botswana, and Mauritius have been acknowledged to be the best performing 
African economies due to good governance and effective parliamentary democracy 
(Williams and Young, 1994; ECA, 2007; Young, 2010). Yet, UNECA (2002) and Young 
(2010) indicate deficiencies in making various recommendations to improve South 
African governance.22  
Nigeria obtained political independence in 1960 but had periods of long military rule until 
1999 so that its democracy is considered young (APRM, 2009). For APRM (2009), 
Nigeria has been affected by: poor governance; lack of accountability and transparency; 
lawlessness; economic instability; under-development during military rule; non-
competitive economy; the third largest population of poor people in the world; severe 
political interferences with geographical zoning in appointments and resource allocation; 
protection of law violators by political godfathers; and a culture of impunity that prevails. 
The next section will discuss parastatal organisations. 
3.8 Parastatal Organisations  
Parastatals are examples of ‘government governance’, specificities and complexities 
should be acknowledged. Parastatals are state enterprises, corporations, boards, agencies 
                                                          
22She had to: reform administrative and civil services; boost parliamentary oversight functions; promote 
participatory decision-making; adopt measures to fight corruption and embezzlement; reform the Judiciary. 
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or institutions established by Act of Parliament as autonomous or semi-autonomous 
entities with their own governing bodies to perform specific roles (ECSAFA, 2004; 
Anwar and Sam, 2006). A parastatal for the Malawi Code II  (2011) is “a public (fully 
government owned) corporate body that has been set up as a specific entity...separated 
from regular government administration and…given sufficient autonomy to 
pursue…objectives in a flexible manner” (p.8). They are autonomous to the extent they 
can hire and fire, decide emoluments and employee career advancement without civil 
service bureaucracy (Anwar and Sam, 2006). They are always to an extent semi-
autonomous as they are financially dependent on the government to finance them (Ugorji, 
1995; Babaita, 2001). They are called different names: Public Enterprises, Public 
Commercial Enterprises, Public Corporations, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
Government Owned Enterprises (GOEs), Government Businesses, Statutory Boards 
(Ihimodu, 1986; Babaita, 2001; IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 2004; Anwar and Sam, 2006; 
Mwaura, 2007; Packard, 2008; Omeleke, 2010; The Malawi Code, 2011). Parastatals, in 
many cases that have been studied, are separated from the bureaucratic civil service 
(ministry) to enable them to enjoy independence and take quick decisions (IFAC, 2001; 
ECSAFA, 2004; Mwaura, 2007).  
For Babaita (2001), ECSAFA (2004), Fischer (2006), Oruku (2006) and Mwaura (2007), 
parastatals are divided into three major types: Utility Boards, non-profit-making 
monopolies providing essential public services; Commercial Parastatals, listed profit-
making and state-owned competing bodies where profits are re-invested; Regulatory, 
Semi- or Quasi-Parastatals, semi-monopolies providing essential services and expected 
not to operate at a loss (if a loss is made, money from the state treasury fills the vacuum). 
The case focused upon in this research is a commercial parastatal. 
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3.8.1 Pillars of governance in parastatal organisations 
There are four pillars of governance in parastatals (IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 2004; HKSA, 
2004). They are: (i) standard of behaviour; (ii) organisational structures and processes; 
(iii) risk management and internal control; (iv) external and internal reporting in 
parastatals. 
3.8.1.1 Standard of behaviour  
The board and management of parastatals must establish the manner of behaviour in the 
organisation (ECSAFA, 2004). Two things are essential here, the ethical conduct of 
members within the organisation and codes of conduct of the organisation. The 
organisation itself must have rules and regulations that guide its activities and 
relationships with employees and those outside the organisation (ECSAFA, 2004). For 
effective governance and good reputation of parastatals, the people within the 
organisation must be transparent, honest and accountable (IFAC, 2001). IFAC (2001) 
emphasizes that the code of conduct of the organisation must cover “probity and 
propriety; objectivity, integrity and honesty; and relationships” (sec.115). The governing 
board and its members should display a high level of transparency, objectivity, honesty 
and generally conduct themselves as role models for the staff of the organisation to 
emulate them and the interest of the public and the organisation should always be on their 
minds at all times while taking decisions (HKSA, 2004). 
3.8.1.2 Organisational structures and processes  
There must be structures and processes in the organisation to ensure that accountability, 
communication with stakeholders, and the roles and responsibilities of top management 
and the governing board are properly and effectively discharged (IFAC, 2001). These 
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structures and processes, according to IFAC (2001), make the governing board and 
management ensure that statutory provisions are adhered to strictly; the purpose, authority 
and responsibilities of the parastatal are set out in its enabling legislation; and their 
powers and authorities are not exceeded (IFAC, 2001) and all the applicable laws, 
regulations, statutes and statements of best practice are complied with (HKSA, 2004). 
Governance mechanisms in parastatals are examined below. 
3.8.1.2.1 The governing board of parastatals 
The governing board is the highest authority in a parastatal that directs and oversees its 
activities and the members are either appointed or elected (IFAC, 2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The governing board is called different names, including Board of trustees, board of 
governors, board of managers, governing board, governing council, the board or board of 
commissioners (Kamanga Report, 2011). Governing board or the board is used in this 
thesis.  
3.8.1.2.2 Appointment and meeting of governing board members 
The appointment or election of persons to the board of parastatals should be based on 
competence, merit and skilfulness that will help them in carrying out their roles 
(ECSAFA, 2004). ECSAFA (2004) argues that these appointments of the chairman and 
members of the board are made by the country’s President on the recommendation of an 
independent appointment commission. IFAC (2001) opines that the appointment process 
should be transparent and should be based on the person’s competence, merit, skill and 
ability to carry out the defined role. On appointment, according to IFAC (2001) and 
ECSAFA (2004), the members of the board should undertake induction training to equip 
themselves with public sector values, standard of probity and accountability. 
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To be effective, ECSAFA (2004), Anwar and Sam (2006), and AONSW (nd) suggest that 
the meeting of the board should be held not less than four times in a year excluding any 
emergency meetings; and it should have a well prepared agenda.  
 3.8.1.2.3 The roles and responsibilities of governing board  
The board is not involved in managing the parastatal but provide strategic direction, 
oversight and monitoring functions (HKSA, 2004). As decision makers, the board 
members must be well experienced, possessing relevant knowledge and skills to be able 
to discharge their responsibilities and assess management performance (Simpson, 2012). 
IFAC (2001); ECSAFA (2004); HKSA (2004); and The Audit Office of New South 
Wales (AONSW, nd) put forward the followings as the roles and responsibilities of a 
board of parastatals. The board must: (i) establish and adopt strategic plans of the 
organisation; (ii) have effective communication policy with the stakeholders; (iii) ensure 
that the organisation complies with the legal and statutory requirements; (iv) identify, 
monitor and manage risks and opportunities facing the organisation and assure the 
stakeholders that appropriate systems are in place to deal with risks; (v) monitor the 
performance of the organisation and must confirm the appointment, compensation, 
training or sacking of the external auditor and other management staff; (vi) make 
arrangement for the appointment, remuneration, training and succession of the chief 
executive and the management; (vii) report to the relevant minister; (viii) keep on 
reviewing the mission and objectives of the organisation and mount up strategies to 
accomplish them; (ix) approve and adopt the financial statement and the yearly report and 
also ensure that they are honest, true and accurate; and (x) establish effective system of 
internal control. 
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3.8.1.2.4 The role of the governing board Chair 
The governing board of a parastatal must have a chairman, who leads the board, and who 
must be non-executive, independent of management, and ensures that it performs its 
functions effectively (Kamanga Report, 2011). The chairman’s role should be laid down 
in writing to see that he provides good leadership to the board and to ensure that the board 
perform its duties effectively (IFAC, 2001). 
The chairman’s roles are quite different from the roles of the CEO (IFAC, 2001). The 
chairman is responsible for the working of the board; ensures all relevant issues are on the 
agenda; ensures non-executive members receive timely, relevant information tailored to 
their needs, and the executive members look beyond their executive duties and accept 
their full share of the responsibilities of governance (Cadbury Report, 1992). IFAC (2001) 
; ECSAFA (2004); and AONSW (nd) state that the chairmen of boards of parastatals 
should ensure that: (a) on appointment, the board members should be assessed, trained 
and know their roles and responsibilities; (b)  important matters are discussed as soon as 
possible; (c) there should be good working relationships between the board, chief 
executive, the relevant minister and other stakeholders; (d) the governing board members 
are united in carrying out their decisions and roles; (e) the board members know their 
risks, liabilities and responsibilities as they carry out their duties; (f) members are 
subjected to assessment to know their performance always; (g) the minutes of board 
meetings are recorded properly and all decisions are promptly taken; (h) members have 
access to all information that will assist them to vote and take decisions; (i) the views of 
the board are implemented to the letter; and (j) the stakeholders are well informed about 
all policies taken by the board. 
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3.8.1.2.5 Non-executive members of the governing board 
In parastatals, non-executive members of the governing board are not staff of the 
organisation; they are independent of management; and should be free from any 
relationships that will interfere with their duties (IFAC, 2001). They are to review the 
performance of the board and the management and also to resolve conflicts when they 
arise as a result of their independence (Cadbury Report, 1992). IFAC (2001) notes that:  
Non-executive members of public sector governing bodies need to provide an 
independent judgement on issues of strategy, performance, resources and 
standards of conduct. Apart from directors’ fees they may receive, it is 
appropriate that they are independent of management and free from any other 
relationships which may materially interfere with their role (sec. 209). 
All governing boards must have a minimum of three non-executive members; one of 
whom must be the chairman but should not be the executive head and the other two must 
be independent of management (The Cadbury Report, 1992). The Cadbury Report (1992) 
further notes the following of non-executive members of governing boards: (i) the fees of 
non-executive members should reflect the time they spend in the organisation’s affairs but 
are not to receive pensions. (ii) they lack inside knowledge of the corporation as the 
executive members but have the same right to information as they do. (iii) their 
appointment should be on merit, without partiality or patronage and their reappointment 
should not be automatic. (iv) the non-executive members should be appointed for 
specified terms and their appointment letter should set out their duties, terms of office, 
remuneration and its review (IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 2004; HKSA, 2004). 
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3.8.1.2.6 The role of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)23 
According to ESCAFA (2004), the CEO is responsible and accountable to the governing 
board, the relevant ministry and parliament and makes sure that the policies of the 
governing board and statutory requirements of the parastatal are interpreted and 
implemented. The CEO, according to ECSAFA (2004), who must be appointed by the 
governing board or the supervisory ministry of the parastatal after a competitive 
examination, should ensure that all rules, statutes and regulations are duly followed while 
employees are carrying out their functions. ECSAFA (2004) maintains that the CEO of a 
parastatal leads directors and other staff of the organisation in planning, directing and 
controlling the daily work of the parastatal. 
ECSAFA (2004) and AONSW (nd) recognise the following as the roles of CEO: first, 
ensures that the organisation maintains a good, efficient, effective and transparent system 
of internal control; second, should make sure that all appointments are purely on merit; 
third, must make sure that appropriate disciplinary actions are taken against erring 
officers and recommendations made to the board for sanctions; fourth, creates an ethical 
working environment for workers to display their skills; fifth, develops suitable business 
plans, operational plans and budgets for the approval of the governing board; sixth, 
should ensure that the managers have access to all information; and seventh, should 
ensure that key issues are discussed with them on time and their performances are 
reviewed. Next to be examined is how risks are managed in parastatals. 
 
                                                          
23 The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the head of executive management of parastatal and is called 
different names such as Chief Executive, General Manager, Executive Director, Executive Secretary, 
Principal, Vice Chancellor, Director General, Secretary General and Managing Director (Kamanga Report, 
2011). This thesis uses the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) designation.  
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3.8.1.3.1 Risk Management in parastatals 
Risk should be expected and managed daily and should not be overlooked since it is “the 
possibility of meeting danger, suffering harm or loss” (Davies and Aston, 2011 p.127). 
IFAC (2001) defines risk as “a measure of uncertainty, and comprises those factors that 
can facilitate or prevent the achievement of organisational objectives” (sec. 239).  
Common risks that are usually encountered by organisations are fire, loss of key staff, 
terrorism, war, theft of resources, loss of information due to computer viruses, flood, 
accident, poor judgement, changes in external environment (a line of action may no 
longer be in vogue, possible or appropriate) and a host of other uncertainties (HKSA, 
2004). Since risk is everyday affairs, it is important that the management and the 
governing board of parastatals identify the risk, assess it and take decision to manage it 
(IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 2004). The governing board and the management of parastatals 
should identify risks within and without the organisation; know how to react to them; they 
should be documented and communicated to the entire organisation (ECSAFA, 2004).  
3.8.1.3.2 Internal Control System in parastatals 
The governing board and management of parastatals are expected to keep necessary 
accounting records and to do this; a good system of internal control must be installed 
(Cadbury Report, 1992). Davies and Aston (2011) define internal control as “the whole 
range of controls24, both financial and managerial necessary to protect the organisation 
against waste, mismanagement and fraud” (p. 128). According to Millichamp and Taylor 
(2008), internal control is needed in an organisation in order to ensure that business is 
                                                          
24 Financial control is divided into internal check, internal audit, budgets, financial information and 
management control is divided into strategy and objectives, responsibility area and personnel controls. 
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being “carried on in an orderly manner; to ensure adherence to management policies; 
safeguard its assets and secure the accuracy and reliability of the records” (p.92). To fulfil 
their responsibilities, the board and management must make sure that proper books of 
accounts are kept; proper systems are installed; assets and personnel are available to 
accomplish the objectives of the organisation; and laws and regulations are complied with 
(ECSAFA, 2004; Davies and Aston, 2011). Financial controls are examined below. 
3.8.1.3.2.1 Internal Check 
Internal check is when the work of one person in the organisation comes under the 
purview of another person; meaning that internal check is segregation of duties of 
personnel in an organisation so that an individual does not carry out financial duties from 
the beginning to the end (Davies and Aston, 2011).  
3.8.1.3.2.2 Internal Audit 
 Internal audit is one of the controls in an organisation and it increases the worth of 
parastatal organisations (IFAC, 2001; Millichamp and Taylor, 2008). It is defined by The 
Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA) (in Millichamp and Taylor, 2008) as “an independent, 
objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an 
organisation’s operations” (p.262). It is an “appraisal function necessary to evaluate, 
monitor, test and report on the whole range of controls to the highest level of management 
unedited” (Davies and Aston, 2011 p.130). The internal audit unit should be objective, 
independent of the management, should be respected, and accorded cooperation by the 
management, audit committee, and the board (ECSAFA, 2004). The internal auditor 
should have access at all times to the CEO, governing board, the chairman of audit 
committee and non-executive members (IFAC, 2001). The internal auditor’s major role is 
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to identify potential problem areas and recommend ways of improving risk management 
and internal control systems (Millichamp and Taylor, 2008). 
3.8.1.3.2.3 Budgeting    
In parastatals, budget helps management in the financial planning, regulation, and 
appraisal processes (ECSAFA, 2004). The parliament is responsible for authorising the 
overall public sector budget by directing the executive to acquire and use financial 
resources (IFAC, 2001). Budget is defined by IFAC (2001) as “a means of allocating 
resources to ensure the best use is made of resources”; “a management tool for planning”; 
or “a means of controlling funds to ensure that the stated objectives can be met” (sec.272 
& 273). The governing board of parastatals is responsible for approving the level of 
expenditure, supervising and checking the performance of the approved budget (IFAC, 
2001). At regular intervals the actual outcome should be compared with the plans to 
enable the differences to be spotted and dealt with by the governing board (IFAC, 2001).   
3.8.1.3.2.4 Financial Management 
The Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA) defines Public 
Financial Management  as “the system by which financial resources are planned, directed, 
and controlled to enable and influence the efficient and effective delivery of public 
service goals” ( CIPFA and IFAC, 2013 p.48). The objectives of financial management in 
parastatals are to help management in the allocation of resources; minimising and 
detecting fraud, irregularity and corruption; and promoting efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness (ECSAFA, 2004). Financial management in parastatals include daily cash 
and treasury management; formulation of medium-term and long-term financial 
objectives, policies and strategies; planning and control of capital expenditure; working 
capital management; funding and performance decisions; management accounting 
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functions; internal control environment and supporting financial information systems 
(IFAC, 2001; ECSAFA, 2004; HKSA, 2004).  
3.8.1.3.3 Audit Committee in parastatals 
Audit committee is responsible for overseeing the audit function; it acts as a middleman 
between internal and external auditors and reports its findings to the governing board on 
the sufficiency or otherwise of the parastatals’ audit procedures (ANAO, 1999).  
For the success of the audit committee established by the governing board, Cadbury 
Report (1992); IFAC (2001); ECSAFA (2004); HKSA (2004) maintain that (i) the audit 
committee must be independent of management; (ii) membership of the committee should 
be limited to non-executive members of the governing board and should have at least a 
minimum of three members; (iii) the committee should be responsible to the governing 
board which set it up and must be given a written terms of reference from which it derives 
its authority, membership and duties; (iv) the committee should meet not less than twice 
annually; (v) the audit committee members’ names must appear in the annual report of the 
organisation; (vi) the director of finance, the external auditor, internal auditor, members 
of the governing board and external professionals with relevant experience should attend 
the meetings of the audit committee.  
According to Anwar and Sam (2006), audit committee’s duties are to review the internal 
control system, financial reporting systems, internal and external auditing systems of the 
parastatal to ensure that activities of the organisation comply with laws and regulations. 
3.8.1.3.4 External Auditors’ duties in parastatals 
Parastatals which are incorporated under the companies act are required by law to engage 
the services of the external auditors to carry out audit of their financial statements 
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(HKSA, 2004). Davies and Aston (2011) opine that the financial statements of parastatals 
must be audited by external auditors to provide external accountability to the public. In 
Nigeria, for instance, the Auditor-General of the Federation is not allowed to audit the 
accounts of the parastatals and other bodies established by the Act of the National 
Assembly but may assist in recommending reputable audit firms to the parastatals 
(Section 85[3] of 1999 Nigerian constitution as amended). The aim of this is to:  
“Provide an objective and independent review of the financial reporting of the 
organisation to help promote consistency and reliability in reporting and to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the use of financial resources” (HKSA, 2004 
p.30).  
3.8.1.4 Internal and External reporting by parastatals 
Two types of reporting are recognised in parastatal organisations: internal and external 
reporting (HKSA, 2004). Committees set up within the organisation have to submit their 
reports to the board. For example, the audit committee report and financial and non-
financial performances report that management submits to the governing board on a 
regular basis are internal reporting (HKSA, 2004). While external reporting, according to 
ECSAFA (2004), are the annual reports and long-term corporate strategies submitted by 
the management and governing board to the parliament through the relevant ministry.  
3.9 Parastatal organisations’ stakeholders   
In the public sector, the owners of parastatals are the stakeholders (taxpayers) (IFAC, 
2001; International Public Sector Accounting Pronouncements, 2013). The stakeholders 
are those who affect or are affected by the positive or negative actions of corporations 
(Langtry, 1994; Philips, 2011). Freeman and Reed (1983) in Mitchell et al. (1997) 
describe stakeholder as “an individual or group who can affect the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
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objectives” (p.856). Freeman (1984) similarly defines stakeholder as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives” (p.46). Clarkson (1995) describes stakeholders as individuals or groups that 
“have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities” (p.106). 
This study focuses on the latter definition.  
Stakeholder involvement in decision making and accountability to them varies from 
parastatal to parastatal. However, parastatals are expected to promote good relationship 
with their stakeholders by engaging them through consultation in their policies; provide 
them with accurate, timely, honest and complete information about the organisation; and 
participation in policies of the organisation in addition to being a watchdog (Friedman 
and Miles, 2006). 
The stakeholders of parastatals according to IFAC (2001) and ECSAFA (2004) are: the 
President, line Minister, National Assembly (Parliament), taxpayers, lenders, 
bondholders, management, governing board, employees, contractors, consumers of the 
services that the parastatals provide, policy analysts, pressure groups, suppliers, creditors 
(IMF & World Bank), competitors, media, and the community. Each of the stakeholders25 
in the public sector has legitimate interest (IFAC, 2001). Next section examines problems 
of African parastatals.   
                                                          
25 The rights of stakeholders are vital in governance and are presented by OECD (2004) as follows: (i) The 
rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected; (ii) 
where stakeholders’ interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights; (iii) performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee 
participation should be permitted to develop; (iv) where stakeholders participate in the corporate 
governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and 
regular basis; (v) stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be 
able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and their rights 
should not be compromised for doing this; (vi) the corporate governance framework should be 
complemented by an effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor 
rights. Stakeholders have the responsibility of seeing that they conduct themselves properly in their 
relationship with the organisation (Windsor, 2002).  
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3.10 Problems of African parastatals 
This section reviews studies explicitly focusing on African parastatals. For Mwaura 
(2007), parastatals have performed below expectations despite huge sector investments. 
They: are inefficient; continue to make losses; are budgetary burdens to African 
governments; and, provide poor products and services. For Babaita (2001), several factors 
explain poor performances: parastatal size slows decision-making; those heading 
parastatals are politicians failing at general elections with little relevant experience or 
skills; inadequate funding; lack of equipment; undue control; and intervention by 
politicians. Ugorji (1995) and Etukudo (1997) criticise parastatals for inability to make 
profits while continuing to rely on government funding thus increasing state deficits. 
Again, parastatals are understood to be poorly managed leading to inefficiency in use of 
productive capital, corruption and nepotism, inevitably weakening government ability to 
perform primary duties for its people (Ugorji, 1995). Parastatal CEOs and management 
staffs are reported as using corporate opportunities and resources for personal gain at the 
expense of parastatals and their stakeholders (Ahunwan, 2002). For Uneke (2010), 
appointments into parastatals are based on “patronage, social connections, ethnic 
balancing” and “promotions are based on godfatherism or nepotism” (p.118). 
Etukudo (1997) contends that between 1960 and 1966, about 13 enquiries were made into 
the activities of Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC). A special committee, set up in 1961 
by the FGN, issued a policy statement that government should not interfere in day-to-day 
running of parastatals (Etukudo, 1997). Yet, per Etukudo, political interference continued 
unabated: governing board chairs interfered in management functions while ministers 
interfered in functions of governing boards and management, making many parastatals 
hotbeds of power struggles. There was widespread political interference at Nigerian Ports 
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Authority (NPA). E.g., a former CEO of NPA in Etukudo (1997) opines that, in 1979, 
parastatal capital development projects took several months before approval by their 
various ministries, appointments into various parastatal posts were controlled by their 
boards and all parastatal issues were dictated over by various relevant ministries leading 
parastatals to lose independence. For Ahunwan (2002), Nigerian parastatals are so badly 
affected that:  
“Appointment to the board, senior management positions and even lower cadres 
is often based on political connections, ethnic loyalty and/or religious faith as 
opposed to considerations of efficiency and professional qualifications (p. 275). 
Other criticisms of African parastatals include that they do not respond quickly to the 
changing requirements of a growing and dynamic economy and thus are incapable of 
successful commercial operation (Ugorji, 1995). For Hope (2001), government should 
return to its primary duties of creating an environment conducive for markets to thrive 
and concentrate on security, health and education (Hope, 2001).  
The hybrid nature of parastatal’s roles (i.e., the combination of corporate and political 
governance) is a major issue for many (Jones, 1991; Ramamurti and Vernon, 1991; 
Ugorji, 1995; Ahunwan, 2002; Hope, 2005). Parastatals must be established by an Act of 
Parliament, be incorporated by Company Act and have Articles and Memorandum of 
Association. For some, the parastatal’s ministry and parliament will always monitor 
parastatals thereby interfering in their affairs and ensuring poor performance (Etukudo, 
1997; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Mwaura, 2007): monitoring by politicians makes it 
difficult for parastatals to carry out the functions of a commercial enterprise (Ramamurti 
and Vernon, 1991; Ugorji, 1995). Most of those heading parastatals are appointed for 
political reasons (Mwaura, 2007). E.g., Ejiofor (1984), in Oruku (2006), thus summarised 
problems of parastatals:  
 
 
                                                                     
 
87 
 
The fundamental problems of Public Enterprises are defective capital structures, 
excessive bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross 
incompetence, mismanagement, corruption and crippling complacency which 
monopoly engenders. Public Enterprises equally served as platforms for 
patronage and promotion of political objectives and therefore even when their 
managements have the will and capability to work honestly they will still suffer 
from operational interference by political appointees (p.11).      
In Ghana, for Sarbah and Wen (2014), the roots of parastatals’ failure are: excessive 
intervention; corruption; the CEO taking decisions following ministerial instructions or 
approval; and the board chair overriding the CEO on operational decisions. Moreover, in 
Kenya immediately after independence parastatals were found characterised by nepotism, 
ethnicism, and patrimonialism and appointments and promotions were not based on the 
principle of meritocracy (Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003). Political interference, nepotism and 
over-bureaucracy for Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) have led to poor parastatal performance 
in less developed countries more generally. Corruption is one explanation in the literature 
as to why these problems persist and the chapter turns to this next. 
3.11 Corruption 
Corruption is a common and global problem not limited to developing countries or any 
group of people, rearing its ugly head in the public sector, private sector and civil society 
organisations (Dike, 2005; GOPAC, 2005; Lawal, 2007; Sturges, 2007; Agbiboa, 2012). 
For Klitgard (1997), it arises where a person has the power to monopolise public goods 
and use personal discretion to distribute these without accountability. Those defining 
corruption tend to point to conversion of public into private and personal resources at the 
expense and even impoverishment of the under-privileged majority in society. For Sohail 
and Cavill (2008), corruption is “…misuse of power for private gain either at one’s own 
instigation or as a response to inducements” (p.2). TI (2010 p.1) defines it as “…abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”. For Lawal (2007) it is: 
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“Any systemic vice in an individual, society or a notion which reflects 
favouritism, nepotism, tribalism, sectionalism, undue enrichment, amassing of 
wealth, abuse of office, position and derivation of gains and benefits” (p.2 ). 
From these definitions, corruption can be summarised as diversion of good things 
(financial or otherwise) belonging to the public to personal use. It has been understood to 
variously manifest: bribery, extortion, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, fund 
misappropriation, procurement kickbacks, money laundering, illegal arms deals, 
smuggling, human trafficking, child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal payments, 
narcotics, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractice including currency 
counterfeiting, intellectual property theft and piracy, dumping toxic wastes and prohibited 
goods, deception, rigged elections, fraudulent business deals, medical quackery, cheating 
in school and deceit in love (Myint, 2000; Dike, 2005; Zarb, 2005; Ribadu, 2006; Smith, 
2007; TI, 2010).  
Many writers delineate four types of corruption: political (grand); bureaucratic or 
administrative (petty); electoral; and state capture/influence-peddling (Myint, 2000; Shah 
and Schacter, 2004; Dike, 2005; GOPAC, 2005; Lawal and Tobi, 2006; Everett et al., 
2007). Political corruption involves the state’s leaders and their friends embezzling huge 
sums of public money from the state treasury (Dike, 2005; GOPAC, 2005).26 Dike (2005) 
and GOPAC (2005) contend that politicians and other decision-makers who make, 
execute and implement laws mould political institutions, procedural rules and institutions 
to enable them to carry out nefarious activities against the state. Bureaucratic27 corruption 
is the offering of money to the bureaucrat to make him subdue rules and regulations for 
                                                          
26For Myint (2000), roots of grand corruption are covetousness, desires to remain in office, campaign 
financing, desires to distribute favours to political friends to retain loyalty, and contributions to electing 
constituencies.  
27 For Lawal and Tobi (2006), bureaucracy is “the apparatus consisting of professional, full time officials 
subject to hierarchical supervision…carrying out their functions in a well ordered way based on rules, 
regulations and orders coming from above” (p.644). Bureaucrats, per Lawal and Tobi (2006), are those 
representing the state in performing state functions and responsibilities. 
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his personal gain (Shah and Schacter, 2004; Dike, 2005; Lawal and Tobi, 2006; Everett et 
al., 2007). This is often need-driven rather than greed-driven as in grand corruption 
(Myint, 2000). Petty corruption confronts people daily in ministries, parastatals, police 
forces, tax offices, schools, licensing offices, custom and immigration offices (Dike, 
2005). Electoral corruption involves vote buying, promises of special offices and 
contracts when elected, forcing people to vote for a particular candidate not accepted by 
the people, killing and maiming voters who do not accept unpopular candidates, snatching 
of ballot papers and boxes at gun point and judicial decisions for candidates not accepted 
by the majority of the people (Dike, 2005). State capture/influence-peddling involves 
private sector capture of state actors (legislative, executive and judiciary) for its own 
purpose (Shah and Schacter, 2004). This involves multinationals and other contractors 
greasing the hands of public actors to win contracts, a practice common in both developed 
and developing countries (The Corner House, 2000).  
Corruption was historically widespread in complex societies like ancient Israel, Egypt, 
Rome and Greece, if its extent varied across country (Dike, 2005). And developed 
countries such as Britain remain prone to corruption (Sturges, 2008). Developed countries 
where corruption is relatively unpronounced today historically had large-scale corruption. 
E.g., Britain witnessed large-scale unfairness, injustice, waste and national failure before 
the 1688 Glorious Revolution, which subjected Crown power to parliamentary control 
(Sturges, 2008).28 Corruption may be seen as an attendant evil on the way to development 
and modernization (Uneke, 2010).  
A country’s corruption per GOPAC (2005) is deeply rooted in its political and legal 
development, economic condition and policies, bureaucratic traditions and social history: 
                                                          
28 Revenue was raised by taxes approved by parliament for agreed purposes and judiciary independence was 
guaranteed. Sturges (2008) opines that these agreed constitutional arrangements helped eliminate 
neopatrimonial practices from Britain and the worst phenomena of corruption via informed public debate. 
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corruption succeeds where governance institutions are inactive, supervisory institutions 
like parliament, the judiciary and civil society are bought over and where government 
policies and regulations are weak. Drivers of corruption in more detail, as outlined by 
GOPAC (2005) are as follows: firstly, political factors such as lack of press freedom, 
obstacles to civil society group formation, lack of political competition, transparency and 
accountability and a state captured by ruling elites; secondly, bureaucratic factors, such as 
where public officials use their own judgements to corruptly control state affairs instead 
of rules and regulations guiding the institution; thirdly, a porous judicial system or a 
deficient rule of law, so that corrupt people caught remain unpunished, creating bad 
incentives and destroying credibility of judiciary and police; fourthly, economic factors 
such as petty corruption, where bribes are collected to pay for services that should be 
provided free or cheaper by the state and insider information usage by state officials for 
selfish reasons in the context of state monopoly settings; fifthly, transnational factors, 
such as where countries immersed in corruption today are so due to precedents laid down 
by colonial masters (thus the regional division of Nigeria under colonialism promoted 
ethnicism and corruption – see Agbiboa, 2012).  
3.11.1 Corruption in Africa 
There are several studies on corruption in Africa, a continent rich in human and material 
resources but with very poor people (Hope, 2005). Africa experiences widespread 
corruption (Hope, 2005; Lawal, 2007), seen as the obstacle to challenging the poverty 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Uneke, 2010).  
The extent of corruption varies from country to country (GOPAC, 2005). The following 
are the most common reported corrupt practices in Africa: public officials having full 
powers without checks and balances or accountability; offenders going unpunished and 
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enforcement is weak; great inequality in wealth distribution with very low salaries, 
limited performance rewards and no job security, while wealth is displayed by the 
wealthy; political office is a shortcut to acquire wealth, some public office holders having 
no understanding of the ethical demands of their positions, the quick settling of 
electioneering campaign promises via corruption, the functioning of the African extended 
family system, reflecting pressures to meet family and polygamous obligations, civil 
servants being owed salaries for months without payment, the malicious withdrawal or 
carpeting of personnel files, ghost worker systems, the 10% kickback syndrome, the 
transferring of public funds to private accounts, over invoicing, over-pricing of contracts, 
ill-treatment of subordinates, arson, usually to cover-up corrupt practices, embezzlement 
and misappropriation of funds, and, fraudulent distortion of statistics (USAI,1999; Shah 
and Schacter, 2004; Dike, 2005; Dandago, 2008; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008).  
In Uganda, Wanyama et al. (2009) report that (a) pressure from extended families; (b) 
respect for elders without confrontation; (c) glorifying those acquiring wealth without 
knowing the source; (d) appointment of unqualified, inexperienced, and incompetent 
individuals on tribal and political grounds; (e) demanding of bribes from private 
businesses by government officials before awarding contracts; and (f) political 
interference in parastatals are prevalent. In Zimbabwe, per Bondamakara (2010), there is 
tribalism and nepotism in appointment of even unqualified relations and friends into 
parastatals, consideration of friends and relations in awarding contracts and Shona culture 
prevents people from arguing with elders, encouraging corruption.  
Some factors have been advanced for why corruption thrives in Africa. Dike (2005) and 
Olu-Adeyemi and Obamuyi (2010) conclude the following. Firstly, lack of political will 
to change the moral tone and tame corruption allows corruption to persist: if the President 
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seriously uses the power of his office, the view is that corruption will be countered if not 
eradicated. Achebe (1983), in Agbiboa (2012), argues of Nigeria that: 
Nigerians are corrupt not because they are different fundamentally from any 
other people in the world but because the system under which they live today 
makes corruption easy and profitable; they will cease to be corrupt when 
corruption is made difficult and inconvenient (p.338). 
Secondly, Government’s domination of the economy also contributes to corruption. 
Government see the economy here as their own property so stealing from the public funds 
is seen as not so wrong (Osaghae, 1998). Thirdly, civil society’s tolerance and acceptance 
of corruption helps it persist. Corruption persists in Africa because prevailing African 
culture sanctions, condones and encourages it (Agbiboa, 2012). Sowunmi et al. (2010) 
hold that “wealthy people who are known to be corrupt are regularly courted and 
honoured by communities, religious bodies, social clubs and other private organisations” 
(p.11). Fourthly, there is the ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption agencies, out-dated codes 
of governance often not disseminated, partial and non-uniform application of sanctions, 
little motivation to perform well and lack of thorough supervision (Odhiambo-Mbai, 
2003). 
3. 11.1.1 Benefits of Corruption to Africa 
It should be noted that some see benefits to corruption in relation to Africa. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) and Uneke (2010) outline several benefits. A bureaucrat is more willing to 
help when directly benefiting, thereby lubricating wheels of rigid bureaucracy and helping 
businessmen surmount cumbrous procedures and regulations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) 
and meeting needs of clients seeking the service of parastatals (Uneke, 2010). Per Uneke 
(2010), “corruption minimises bureaucratic red tape, eliminates bottlenecks and facilitates 
a more efficient, flexible, and responsive system” (p.115). A person seeking licenses, 
permits, passports or visas may not be helped by being in a queue or passing through 
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rigorous bureaucratic rules and procedures (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Further, 
corruption may be seen as helpful given the nature of the African extended family. E.g., 
when elected or appointed into an exalted position, the expectation of kinsmen, godfather 
and friends will be that you give them jobs or contracts even if they are unqualified 
(Wanyama et al., 2009; Bondamakara, 2010). Failure to do this means being voted out in 
the next election and being treated as an outcast (Fagbadebo, 2007). For Maduagwu 
(1982), in Nigeria: 
“Any government official or politician…in a position to enrich himself 
corruptly but [failing] to do so will…be ostracised by his people upon leaving 
office. He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish, or both” (p.1). 
Also, appointments “into positions and offices are to be used to benefit people from their 
primordial public and seen as a way of sharing in the national cake or national resources” 
(Omotsho, 2006 p.337). For Omotsho (2006), grand corruption helps the children of those 
occupying exalted positions to access quality education, with such children eventually 
succeeding their parents in elected offices. Sturges (2008) summarises corruption’s 
benefits:  
“Corruption…[is]…a means by which excluded groups…gain access to 
economic opportunities; [mitigates]…rigidity of government 
planning…[breaking] open the deadening influence of unresponsive 
bureaucracies” (P.4).  
The effect of these ‘benefits’ on the overall developmental process is negative per Uneke 
(2010), resulting in “total insecurity, poor economic management, abuse of human rights, 
ethnic conflicts and capital flights” (Ribadu, 2006, p.1).  
Some factors have been advanced for why corruption thrives in Africa. Dike (2005) and 
Olu-Adeyemi and Obamuyi (2010) are of the opinion that:  
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(a) Lack of political will by the leaders to change the moral tone and tame corruption 
headlong make corruption to persist (Klitgaard, 1997). Once the president uses the power 
of his office, corruption will be minimised if not totally eradicated. For instance, Achebe 
(1983) in Agbiboa (2012) argues that: 
Nigerians are corrupt not because they are different fundamentally from any 
other people in the world but because the system under which they live today 
makes corruption easy and profitable; they will cease to be corrupt when 
corruption is made difficult and inconvenient (p.338). 
 (b) Government’s domination of economic activities also acts as a contributing factor to 
the existence of corruption. The notion that government’s property or business is our own 
and that stealing from the public funds is not wrong (Osaghae, 1998) makes corruption to 
linger.  
(c) Civil society’s tolerance and acceptance of corruption makes it to continue. Corruption 
persists in African society because the prevailing African culture sanctions, condones and 
encourages it (Agbiboa, 2012). Sowunmi et al. (2010) maintain that “wealthy people who 
are known to be corrupt are regularly courted and honoured by communities, religious 
bodies, social clubs and other private organisations” (p.11). If people are being mobilised 
to revolt against corruption, it will subside if not totally eliminated.  
(d) Ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; out-dated codes of governance and often 
not disseminated; partial and non-uniform application of sanctions; no motivation for 
good performance; and lack of thorough supervision (Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003). 
3.11.2 Corruption in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, per Fagbadebo (2007), corruption is being perfected by politicians and 
bureaucrats via contracts, public procurement, allocation of benefits, public revenue 
collection and judicial pronouncements (Fagbadebo, 2007). Corruption is here an illegal 
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tax citizens must budget for each year (GOPAC, 2005; Sturges, 2008).29 Corruption, 
economic mismanagement, financial crimes, poor governance by politicians and other 
public office holders have restrained the country, engendering poor economic 
performances, unemployment, poor execution of contracts and poverty (Eloho, 2000). 
Nigeria and her citizens have been denied development since independence. E.g., for 
Agbiboa (2012), most Nigerians’ loyalty is to their ethnic groups, especially by the 
colonially established regions, rather than the state. The popular Nigerian slogan 
manifesting under colonialism is “government business is no man’s business and so there 
was nothing seriously wrong with stealing state funds, especially if they were used to 
benefit not only the individual but also members of his community” (Agbiboa, 2012 
p.334). Thus, ethnicism, authoritarian rule, lack of integrity, poor governance, civil war, 
military intervention in politics and oil discovery are corruption’s launching pad in 
Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2012). For Agbiboa, in this respect, the Nigerian state has been 
corrupted so that opposition to the incumbent government is deemed treasonable and 
punishable by death.  
In the first Nigerian republic, core politicians were accused of diverting public money for 
their own use but corruption, typically political, was then relatively low (Omotsho, 2006). 
During military rule in Nigeria, corruption, notwithstanding it was claimed to be the 
reason for the military takeover, became institutionalised. E.g., General Ibrahim 
                                                          
29Nigeria, described as Africa’s giant, is endowed with abundant human and material resources, a solid base 
for development (Agbiboa, 2012).  Due to corruption Nigeria is: “In danger of becoming the midget of the 
world, as Africa’s Gulliver faced the threat of becoming the Lilliput of the globe, a crippled giant, a colossal 
collection of impoverished masses, a crumbling tower of Babel built on…rickety foundations of oil rents 
collected and squandered by leaders” (Agbiboa, 2012 p.325). With political stability and good governance, 
Nigeria has a high potential of becoming a great, prosperous, and powerful nation (Eloho, 2000). An Israeli 
diplomat to Nigeria once told a Nigerian head of state that Nigeria is a sleeping giant, and: “The day Nigeria 
wakes up, the western world would find itself in trouble. Nigeria’s gift of intellectualism stood the 
possibility of giving the developed world a chase with extra strength…from yet to be explored huge 
deposits of new resources” (Sunday, 2003).  
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Babangida “introduced the settlement syndrome with a view to corrupting as many 
Nigerians as possible” and General Sani Abacha “stole a lot of money from the economy 
and stashed it in foreign banks”; General Ibrahim Babangida “decentralised corruption” 
but General Sani Abacha “centralised it” (BBC NEWS, 1998; Oyediran, 1998; Obadina, 
1999; Guest, 2004; Apter, 2005; Omotsho, 2006, p.1; Ribadu, 2006 p.1; Daniel and 
Freeman, 2007; Sowunmi et al., 2010 p.8; Administrator, 2011). For Uneke (2010): 
Military juntas…were patrimonial regimes, in which the dictators 
monopolized power and used any and every means necessary to ensure their 
survival through the militarization of social life and…copious dispensation of 
public resources to reward cronies and allies and to buy off allies (p.116).   
The second Nigerian republic (October 1, 1979 – 31 December, 1983) marked significant 
growth of highly conspicuous corruption (Omotsho, 2006; Agbiboa, 2012). Politicians 
were found to be self-interested, seeing politics as an investment and profit making 
venture (Omotsho, 2006). Fagbadebo (2007) describes this period as one of “wanton 
waste, political thuggery and coercion, disrespect for the rule of law, bare faced, free for 
all looting of public funds through white elephant projects” (p.30). During the Nigerian 
third republic (1999-2007), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
recovered billions of dollars to the government treasury (Ribadu, 2006, 2009; Obuah, 
2010). For Omotsho (2006), the corruption prominent amongst other corruption in this 
period was electoral, with people of questionable character, scarcely concerned about 
people’s welfare and development, with unqualified credentials, being elected to public 
offices by all means (Omotsho, 2006). The period from 2007 to the present is a difficult 
one in Nigerian national life. Those prosecuted by the EFCC hire highly intelligent 
lawyers who continue to ask for adjournment of cases, weakening anti-graft agencies.  
In Nigeria, per Sowunmi et al. (2010), roots of corruption are: the sudden disappearance 
of good morals and ethical values;  that a man’s wealth does not concern his neighbours, 
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the public or the government; customs, family pressures on government officials and 
ethnicity; membership of parastatal governing boards and chieftaincy titles are for 
influential people in society who have ‘made it’ politically or economically which may be 
via fraud; weak enforcement mechanisms such as lack of judicial independence or weak 
prosecutorial institutions; the high incidence of poverty leading to desperation to acquire 
wealth via any means; low salaries; lack of media freedom to expose corruption; poor 
financial management; stealing with impunity and lack of political competition due to fear 
of being killed.  
Were measures adopted by the Nigeria to stop corruption? To tackle the challenge in both 
public and private sectors, two major Nigerian institutions were put in place, discussed 
below.  
3.11.2.1 Anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria  
To solve the problem of corruption in both public and private sectors in Nigeria, the 
following two main anti-corruption institutions were put in place to fight the scourge.  
3.11.2.1.1 Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission 
(ICPC) Act 2000 
The ICPC Act focuses on curbing bribery and corruption in the public service and is 
limited in time to those offences committed from year 2000. The commission enlightens 
the public about the consequences of corruption. It plays the roles of reviewing and 
modifying the activities of public bodies and institutions to expose those things that will 
lead to corrupt practices (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) write 
that the commission accused the government of starving it of funds and cited the 
limitation of time given to it which prevented it from prosecuting the oil boom corrupters.  
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3.11.2.1.2 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2004 
The EFCC is mandated to fight financial and economic crimes in all cases. The EFCC Act 
was enacted in 2004 to investigate, prevent and prosecute those who engage in: 
Fraud, narcotic drug, money laundering, trafficking, embezzlement, bribery, 
looting and any form of corrupt malpractices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, 
human trafficking and child labour, illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, 
tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of 
currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, 
dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods (EFCC Act 2004, Sec.46).  
 Ribadu Nuhu, the first chairman of EFCC, in his address to US Congressional House 
Committee on International Development, Washington DC on 18 May 2006 posited that 
Nigeria’s corruption is deeply rooted in the 29 years of military rule since independence 
in 1960:  
“..successive military regimes subdued the rule of law, facilitated the wanton 
looting of the public treasury, decapitated public institutions and free speech 
and instituted a secret and opaque culture in the running of government 
business” (Ribadu, 2006 p.1) 
These agencies are in the forefront of anti-graft campaign in Nigeria.  
Khoza and Adam (2007) maintain that “a key weapon in the fight against corruption is 
transparency” (p.251).  
3.11.3 Accounting and Transparency: means of combating corruption 
Aristotle in ‘The politics’ suggested that “... to protect the treasury from being defrauded, 
let all money be issued openly in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be 
deposited in various wards” (Shah and Schacter, 2004 p.1). Accounting is very important 
to the business world, the language of business used as a medium of communication 
(Diaconu and Coman, 2006). Accounting is here “the process of identifying, measuring, 
recording and communicating economic transactions” (Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 
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2010). It discharges three major roles. These roles per Scott (1967) are: providing 
investors with information to enable them to compare alternative investment 
opportunities; providing information to managers in an enterprise for decision-making 
and efficient operation; and providing information to government for the purpose of 
taxation and for effective use of public sector resources. Maimako (2005) advances the 
following as the purposes of accounting to the government: first, it is a means by which 
government accounts to its stakeholders; second, it is the basis for taking economic, 
political and social decisions; and third, it helps assess organisational and managerial 
performances and can be used to predict flows, balances and conditions of government 
units. 
Accounting can be used to fight corruption (Everett et al., 2007). There are two 
responsibilities: using financial statements to provide information about economic 
activities and auditing the information (Kimbro, 2002). Here, if accounting is properly 
installed in an organisation, transparency and accountability are facilitated, countering 
corruption. For the World Bank (1994), to fight30 corruption and ensure improved 
transparency and accountability, there should be in place: installation of an effective and 
integrated financial management information system; adoption and application of 
internationally accepted accounting standards; continuous training of professional 
accountants and auditors and a legal system to support modern accounting practices.  
Khoza and Adam (2007) maintain that “a key weapon in the fight against corruption is 
transparency” (p.251), which is related to accounting (above).   
                                                          
30The World Bank, Transparency International, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organisation (WTO), United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID), Human Rights Watch, United Nations and Interpol are in the forefront of the fight 
against the scourge of corruption (Everret et al., 2007) and its devastating consequences (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Uneke, 2010).   
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Transparency can help promote good governance and is deemed vital in countering 
corruption: without transparency, access to reliable information on actions and decisions 
will be difficult (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Transparency entails openness, faithfulness, 
truthfulness, sincerity, loyalty, dependability and allegiance (Oladoyin et al., 2005).  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) hold that in transparency’s absence there will be secrecy and 
wrong, biased, incomplete, irrelevant, inaccessible information (or unequal access to 
information), and information overload. Khoza and Adam (2007) see transparency as 
important in enhancing accountability; countering unethical practices like bribery and 
corruption; and heightening confidence in organisations and building trust, which 
enhances credibility of management and the governing board. For Kolstad and Wiig 
(2009), transparency is important in decisions involving public revenues, public 
expenditures, awarding contracts and licenses, public procurement, ownership interests of 
public officials, appointment to positions and promotions in the public sector, and 
regulation and facilitation of the private sector. E.g., in May 2009, the President of the 
USA, Barack Obama, launched “sunlight before signing” on a website called Data.gov, 
serving as a platform for “posting new legislation on the web for five days before the 
President signs the bill into law to allow for public comments”, following a principle of 
transparency (Etzioni, 2010 p.390).   
3.11.4 Accountability: a means of curbing corruption  
Accountability is an instrument of governance that can tackle corruption. Government 
obtains its power from the people and must be accountable through the next higher ranks 
in the civil service to the top of the hierarchy, to the legislature and thus the people 
(Mollah, 2008).  For Behn (2001), “everyone agrees that…evils of corruption, 
arbitrariness and inefficiency are inherent in government and that they can be exorcised 
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through mechanisms of accountability” (p.2). Accountability, per Aucoin and Heintzman 
(2000) (in Mollah, 2008), serves three purposes: controlling or checking misuse or abuse 
of power; providing assurance that resources are used judiciously and that the law related 
thereto is meticulously adhered to and applied; and encouraging and promoting learning 
in pursuit of continuous governance improvement.31  
In general, corruption may be seen to arise when public office holders have relatively 
unlimited powers and little or no accountability (Klitgaard, 1997). Klitgaard suggests a 
metaphorical corruption formula: C = M + D – A (Corruption equals monopoly plus 
discretion minus accountability). Klitgaard (1997) thus holds there will be corruption 
where a person has monopoly over provision of goods and services, discretion of how, 
where and when you get these and is not accountable. Thus, to fight corruption 
“monopolies must be reduced or carefully regulated, official discretion must be clarified, 
transparency must be enhanced, the probability of being caught must increase and the 
penalties for corruption (for both givers and takers) must rise” (p.500).32 Next section 
examines accountability. 
3.12 Accountability: defining Accountability 
Sinclair (1995) defines accountability as a “relationship in which people are required to 
explain and take responsibility for their actions” (p.221). Roberts and Scapens (1985) 
                                                          
31 Accountability breeds performance improvement and is a help to governance challenges: it “has been 
offered as a solution for ills ranging from past injustices and corrupt behaviour to unresponsive and 
incompetent public programs” (Dubnick and Justice, 2004 p.3). Dubnick and Justice (2004) further reiterate 
that accountability involves record keeping, reporting, auditing and oversight, which are “ingredients in the 
public and private endeavour where transparency, answerability and responsiveness are deemed necessary 
for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness” (p.2). 
 
32 In 2004, UNDP added integrity and transparency (and hence accounting is underscored) to the Klitgaard 
formula: C = [(M + D) – (A + I + T)] (corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability 
minus integrity minus transparency). 
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construe accountability as “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (p.447). Gray 
and Jenkins (1993) define accountability as “an obligation to present an account of and 
answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those responsibilities” 
(p.55). There are different names given to the two different parties to an accountability 
relationship in academic literature. One party is the principal which can be 
citizens/taxpayers, accountee, forum, shareholders, owners, audience or accountability 
holder. The other party is the agent, who can also be known as power-holders, directors, 
managers, governors, accountor, actor, steward or accountability holdee, (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1993; Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; Bovens, 2005; 2007; Sannudee, 2009; and 
Solomon, 2010). Figure 3.1 is a generalised accountability model presented in Gray et al. 
(1996).  
Figure 3.1: A generalised accountability model 
   
 
Source: Gray et al. (1996, p.39). 
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Figure 3.1 indicates a two-way contractual relationship between the accountee (Principal) 
and Accountor (Agent). Gray et al. (1996) argue that some of such relationships are 
governed by law while others are governed by ethics, values, and principles of society. 
The contract, per Gray et al. (1996), is the basis of the rights and responsibilities in the 
relationship. 
Accountability is found in relation to the Domesday Book (book-keeping) and accounting 
(Dubnick, 2002; Bovens, 2007). Dubnick (2002) states that King William I, 20 years after 
the Norman conquest of England in 1066, established rule by ordering royal surveyors to 
list and value all properties in England. This recording and assessment, per Dubnick 
(2002), was not for tax purposes but signalled to all the Kings subjects that William I had 
captured them and there was a new ruling order (see Bovens, 2007).  Dubnick (2002) 
notes that the new ruling order was that all property holders had to render account of their 
possessions in terms set by the King’s agents, who recorded the possessions in the 
Domesday Books (Bovens, 2007). Today, accountability is an emblem of good 
governance, beyond financial administration, whereby rulers give account to their 
subjects/taxpayers (Bovens, 2007).   
Accountability in the business world was highlighted by Berle and Means’s (1932) 
analysis of the separation of ownership and control, if its roots here as idea and practice 
go further back. Company law developed to make statutory reporting requirements 
(accountability) compulsory for companies (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Coy, Fischer and 
Gordon, 2001). Accountability is intended to remind rulers and custodians of power and 
resources that they do not have absolute power (Cameron, 2004; Bovens, 2007). Barberis 
(1998) (in Cameron, 2004) states that accountability: explains decisions or actions to 
stakeholders, provides further information as required, helps actors to review or revise 
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systems and practices to meet stakeholder expectations and makes redress or sanctions 
possible.   
For ECSAFA (2004), accountability is an opportunity for a parastatal to disclose to 
Parliament how it accomplished its mandate. Per ECSAFA (2004), this accountability 
should detail: parastatal assets and liabilities; appointment and treatment of employees; 
financial performance and non-financial aspects of the organisation. The accountability 
process typically in parastatals is that the staffs are accountable internally to superiors; the 
CEO is accountable to the governing board; the board chair is accountable to the Minister; 
the Minister is accountable to Parliament (Mulgan, 1997; Barberis, 1998; Parker and 
Gould, 1999). Parliament is the centre of accountability in the public sector and 
accountability to the parliament means its discharge to taxpayers and stakeholders (Sendt, 
2002).  
Kovach and Burall (2001), in defining accountability as the “process by which individuals 
or organisations are answerable for their actions and the consequences that follow from 
them” (p.5), delineate two approaches to accountability. In the traditional approach, only 
the organization’s members (e.g. shareholders, citizens as voters or the state) can hold the 
organisation to account, while third parties do not have this right. In the stakeholder 
approach, an open and participative line is followed and the right to hold to account is 
granted to any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the organisation.  
For Sinclair (1995), accountability is “a cherished concept, sought after but elusive” with 
a “chameleon quality” (p.219). Similarly, for Behn (2001) “accountability is an important 
yet elusive concept whose meaning and characteristics differ depending upon the context” 
(p.3). The literature of accountability indeed contains different types of accountability. In 
human resource management, accounting, political science, information technology and 
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public management, accountability is articulated to suit the particular circumstances (see 
Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Sinclair, 1995; Stone 1995; Scott, 2000; Mulgan, 2003; 
Scott, 2006; Bovens, 2007; Harlow and Rawlings, 2007; Hodge and Coghill, 2007; 
Lindberg, 2009). Out of this literature one can summarize different types as political, 
legal, administrative, professional peer group, societal and public accountability.  
Political accountability is where public managers, agency heads and Ministers are called 
upon to give account as in parliamentary inquiries to Parliament (Bovens, 2007). 
Ministers give account to Parliament which itself holds public officials in their various 
departments to account (Barberis, 1998).  
Legal accountability is where parastatal heads and agency heads can be called upon by 
courts to give accounts of their conduct “based on the specific responsibilities formally or 
legally conferred on authorities” (Bovens, 2007, p.456; see Ogundele, 2010).  
Administrative accountability is legal or quasi-legal, where Auditors, Inspectors, and 
Controllers who are external, independent and with financial oversight, check the 
authority, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending by public 
managers/organizations (Bovens, 2007). Professional peer review group accountability 
relates to accountability to professional bodies. Parastatal heads may also be members of 
professional bodies, e.g. as engineers, accountants, doctors, teachers and nurses, and these 
bodies have codes of ethics which guide the conduct of their members: any member 
behaving unethically may have his/her certificate withdrawn and this accountability 
especially applies to those working in hospitals, schools, psychiatric clinics, police 
departments and fire brigades (Bovens, 2007).  
Societal accountability is where government is held to account by various interest groups, 
citizens, social groups, trade unions, labour unions, NGOs, civil society, aid donors, 
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human rights activists and opposition parties. This may facilitate criticism of government 
policies, decisions and actions (Bovens, 2007).   
Public accountability assesses the fairness, effectiveness and efficiency of governance 
(Bovens, 2005, 2010; Mollah, 2008) and facilitates voting out of office non-performing 
representatives. It is seen as promoting honesty in governance, instilling a culture of hard 
work in public servants, preventing frauds, laziness and corruption, eliminating 
unnecessary public criticism, helping build trust in government, righting wrongs, leading 
individuals and governments to take decisions within the confines of relevant rules, 
regulations and working procedures (Bovens, 2005, 2010).  
Public accountability must demonstrate free flow of information on decisions, actions and 
activities from the agent to the principal in form of a ladder showing the bases of 
accountability (Stewart, 1984). Stewart (1984) gives five bases of accountability in 
parastatal organisations. The first one which is the starting point of the ladder is 
probity/legality accountability. Stewart notes that probity accountability prevents the 
agent from wrong doing and helps to show that funds given to the organisation are 
properly and appropriately used as authorised. Legality accountability, according to 
Stewart, helps to show that the agent did not go beyond the requirements of the law. This 
means that the management of the parastatals are required to ensure that the powers and 
funds approved in the budget for their organisations are not exceeded and that such funds 
are used for the purpose they were budgeted for. Stewart (1984) maintains that the 
information provided by management of public organisations does not mean that 
accountability has been fully rendered but forms the basis upon which the management 
will be judged. Secondly, Stewart (1984) defines process accountability as requirement 
for management to show proof of following the procedures set up by the law and whether 
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internal control systems are adequate and dogmatically followed with no waste of 
resources (Wanyama, 2006). Thirdly, performance accountability is to confirm whether 
the standard set by the principal is achieved by the agent, which will help the principal to 
measure the performance of management or agent (Stewart, 1984). Such measurement 
exposes the variance that may lead to passing of blames or praises by the stakeholders. 
The governing board of parastatals formulates policies and would like to know whether 
the policies, goals or objectives of the organisation are being achieved by examining the 
performances of management. Fourthly, programme accountability is carried out by 
management of a particular organisation to show their performances in a specific 
assignment (Stewart, 1984). It is similar to performance accountability except that instead 
of overall activity, programme accountability is looking at the achievement in a particular 
or specific assignment given to the management by the board (Wanyama, 2006). The 
board or other stakeholders will hold the management accountable for the performance of 
this specific assignment. Finally, policy accountability means that government or 
governing board of an organisation is responsible for setting standards and policies. It is 
responsible to account for the policies it has pursued and those it did not pursue (Stewart, 
1984). The figure below shows Stewart (1984)’s ladder of accountability.    
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Fig. 3.2 Stewart (1984)’s Ladder of Accountability.  
Source: Hannah (2003).  
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Rothschild, 1985; Rees, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Laffont, 1989): hidden 
information (related to adverse selection) and hidden action (moral hazard). Hidden 
information exists ex ante, the information becoming available post-transaction while 
hidden action asymmetries exist ex post in that an agent’s actions can affect the outcomes 
that occur but these are not observable by the principal (Broadbent et al., 1996, p.266). 
Broadbent et al. (1996) argue that in the absence of a contract an agent pursues personal 
objectives thereby abandoning the principal’s objectives.  
To resolve this accountability problem, the principal should always draw up a contract, 
including rewards and penalties, so that the agent will not shirk responsibilities and claim 
an inappropriately high payment (Broadbent et al., 1996). Further, to control the 
decisions, actions and activities of the managers, Broadbent et al. (1996) opine that the 
principal should ensure that his relationship with the agent is in written form detailing his 
rewards and punishment for doing or not doing respectively, what they have agreed in the 
covenant. That means accountability relationship can be contractual or communal. Per 
Laughlin (1990), accountability can be contractual — can be written or verbal. Tricker 
(1983) and Gray et al. (1996) argue that accountability is not discretionary but must be 
contractually binding.  
3.12.1 Transparency 
Transparency is closely linked to accountability. It emphasises openness (Oladoyin et al., 
2005; Sturges, 2007). Sturges (2007; 2008) describes transparency’s link to: open 
government (often with separation of powers between legislature, executive and 
judiciary); freedom of information (involving granting stakeholders access to official 
information);  whistle-blowing (or protecting public interest disclosure, complementary to 
freedom of information); financial accounting and audit (transparency also involving 
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financial reporting and public accounting); investigative journalism (free and independent 
journalism where a journalist can reveal illegal behaviour against public interest); and 
Civil Society Organisations (as advocates of transparency and accountability worldwide). 
For Khoza and Adam (2007), transparency entails “obligation to account in an open and 
honest manner to those with a legitimate interest” (p.209) and this clearly linked to 
accountability. Transparency here means that those who are stewards of power are 
exposed to the eyes of the world, consistent with Jeremy Bentham quoted in Etzioni 
(2010): “the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave” (p. 393). Publicity or 
disclosure is thus seen as discouraging corruption and poor performance (Etzioni, 2010). 
For Ball (2009), transparency is used to counter corruption and is closely entangled with 
accountability, is tantamount to open decision-making by government, organizations and 
civil society, promotes openness but discourages the tendency for secrecy and privacy in 
public services and is a tool of governance in programmes, policies, organisations and 
nations. Transparency can be opaque or clear (Fox, 2007). Opaque transparency is when 
information supplied by an organization is unreliable (misleading) falling short of 
revealing how organizations behave in practice, in terms of their decisions and actions.33 
Clear transparency refers to reliable information (not misleading) supplied by public 
organizations giving substantive insights into the organisation’s performance, individual 
organizational responsibilities and where public money went (Fox, 2007). Transparency is 
understood to keep government honest, enable people to participate in elective positions, 
enhance trust in government policies and decisions, help in preventing corruption, 
facilitating informed decision-making, guaranteeing accurate government information and 
providing the public, companies and journalists with substantive information (Bertot et 
                                                          
33E.g., Arthur Andersen, once a ‘big five’ audit firm was expelled from the auditing profession for 
supporting Enron’s management in efforts to keep millions of dollars of debts and losses off the books 
(Solomon, 2010). 
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al., 2010).  Transparency is deemed important to voters and investors, helping to expose 
misconduct and promote accountability (Sturges, 2007).  
3.13 Focusing on Accountability in Africa: prior studies largely indicating 
weaknesses 
Eloho (2000) and Agbiboa (2012) report deficient accountability and transparency in 
Africa and the above discussion on African governance touches on related accountability 
issues (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Okike, 2007). One characteristic of undemocratic 
government is lack of accountability as power is not from the people and this prevails in 
Africa due to long periods of military rule after independence (Yinusa and Basil, 2008). 
Opposition groups in Africa, international donor agencies and the African public 
constantly demand accountability and transparency (Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; Akokpari, 
2004), while some suggest accountability is taking root due to donor aid requirements 
(Brautigam and Knack, 2004).   
Africa’s development is limited by lack of accountability due to strict information 
controls per Brautigam and Knack (2004). E.g., in some African countries like Gambia 
“record keeping was made chaotic in order to destroy audit trail” (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 
2010, p.372). In Nigeria and Tanzania: “government has the right to withhold information 
for reasons of national security” (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010, p.372). In Uganda, 
accountability is reported as cosmetic, the record being very misleading (Wanyama et al., 
2013). African governments are accountable to aid donors but rarely directly to African 
people (Therkildsen, 2001; Akokpari, 2004; Dowden, 2011). Namibia’s Prime Minister 
refused to be assessed by his peer group: he simply sees his country having no 
governance problems (Akokpari, 2004).  
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Public accountability is necessary to ensure political, economic, financial independence, 
and to curb the abuse of power but, for Hope (2005), the patrimonial nature of African 
leaders has weakened their governance, made their accountability difficult, and delayed 
African development. Moreover, the constant placement of most African countries on the 
top of lists of the most corrupt countries in the world indicates that African countries lack 
accountability and transparency (Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; TI, 2010). The 2010 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) report of 178 countries 
shows Nigeria 134th out of 178 countries making Nigeria one of the 25% most corrupt 
countries (TI, 2010). In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is 28th out of 47 countries thereby 
making Nigeria one of the top 40% most corrupt African countries with Somalia being the 
worst case (TI, 2010). More generally, in relation to accounting, qualified accountants are 
in charge of both public and private sectors treasuries in Nigeria (CAMA, 1990 as 
amended) yet looting is carried out and reported daily without any accountant being 
prosecuted: are they observers participating in the looting or fighting against corruption 
(see Everett et al., 2007)? Olu-Adeyemi and Obamuyi (2010) found that “political 
appointees and career officers embark on a stealing spree and also use accounting 
techniques to cover up their tricks” (p.124).34  
3.14 Antidotes to governance and accountability issues in Africa 
The World Bank (1989) argues that crises in Africa and other developing countries are 
mostly due to lack of good governance and suggests state reforms through civil service 
retrenchment and privatisation. Governments as owners of state enterprises can benefit 
from adopting tools used in private sector organisations. E.g., good parastatal governance 
                                                          
34It has been argued that multinational companies in developing countries should join hands in condemning 
Nigerian corruption rather than succumb to persuasions by unscrupulous Nigerian politicians to give bribes 
before obtaining contracts, win friends or influence (Hawley, 2000; Fagbadebo, 2007). 
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is a condition for successful privatisation because it will increase its value and make the 
enterprise attractive to potential buyers (OECD, 2005).  Governance’s attention is on 
organisational structure and processes that will culminate in fairness, accountability, 
transparency and responsibility (OECD, 2004).35 The following have been advanced by 
the OECD (2005) as corporate governance guidelines for SOEs such as African 
parastatals: first, the legal and regulatory framework of parastatals should make it 
possible for parastatals and private bodies to compete without market distortions and the 
framework should build on the OECD principles of corporate governance; second, state 
ownership functions of parastatals and other state functions should be divorced and the 
state as parastatal owner should establish ownership principles ensuring parastatals are 
transparently accountable, effective, and run professionally by granting them 
independence to operate without interference; third, the state and parastatals (SOEs) 
should respect rights of all stakeholders by treating them equally, enabling them to access 
information; fourth, they should communicate and consult with them to enable them to 
participate in decisions promoting enterprise development; fifth, the policy of state 
ownership should value parastatals’ responsibilities to stakeholders by directing them to 
report accordingly; sixth, parastatals should be transparent in line with OECD principles 
of corporate governance; seventh, parastatals should establish efficient and effective 
internal control systems monitored by the audit committee and the board; eighth, the 
parastatal board should have authority, ability and objectivity to guide and monitor 
management; ninth, board members should be honest and remember their accountability; 
                                                          
35This is consistent with Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) pronouncements. GCGF’s mission 
statement stresses countries will improve governance standards of their corporations if they adopt corporate 
governance (Levine, 2003), attracting foreign and local investors promoting transparency and 
accountability, making it difficult for corruption and other vices to thrive (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 
2003). The GCGF is a multi-donor trust fund founded by the World Bank and OECD to promote global, 
regional, and local initiatives aimed at improving the institutional framework and corporate governance 
practices. Its role is to “help countries improve standards of governance for their corporations, by fostering 
the spirit of enterprise and accountability, promoting fairness, transparency and responsibility” (Levine, 
2004 p.44) 
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tenth, the board chair should be separate from the CEO who is appointed and removed by 
the board.36  
To tackle governance problems in Africa, the African Union (AU) summit in 2002 
approved the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) “to monitor 
and assess the progress made by African countries in meeting their commitment toward 
achieving good governance, social reforms, and sustainable development” (Hope, 2005 
p.289). APRM, a voluntary association of AU members, is Africa’s self-assessment 
mechanism for good governance (APRM website; NEPAD, 2007). If there is no formal 
punishment for perceived governance failings, negative reviews stain the image of the 
country concerned (Hope, 2005). Peer Review is defined by OECD in Hope (2005) as 
“the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a State by other States 
(Peers)” (p. 290). For Hope (2005), the APRM’s remit is not to punish poor governance 
performance but to correct weaknesses identified by the APRM panel. Yet, there are 
criticisms of APRM. It is voluntary and there is lack of follow-up to make members 
comply with the APRM panel’s recommendations (Hope, 2005). Some best performing 
countries like Botswana refused to join APRM as they believe good governance should be 
apparent to everyone (Dowden, 2011). Theo Ben Gurirab, Namibia’s Prime Minister, 
argued that Namibia need not join APRM: “…we do not need external auditors, we have 
our own auditors...our constitution and electorates, we do not have a problem with good 
governance” (Akokpari, 2004 p.256). Another criticism is that APRM is included in the 
AU to satisfy international creditors’ requirements and not necessarily to promote good 
governance or democracy (Akokpari, 2004). APRM is also criticised on the grounds that 
Africa is politically independent from but economically dependent on the former colonial 
                                                          
36These OECD guidelines, per OECD (2011), were followed by thirty-four member and non-member 
countries in connection with their SOEs’ corporate governance.  
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masters. Consequently, Africa has dual accountabilities: to aid donor nations and to her 
countries (Dowden, 2011). Another criticism is that it is not compulsory for AU members 
to join the APRM (Hope, 2005) and some with “dubious governance records” have 
refused to join (Akokpari, 2004 p.254). Despite criticisms, some acknowledge that APRM 
assessment has assisted African countries in political, economic, and corporate 
governance and socio-economic development. E.g., it has led to greater transparency, 
improved accountability, enhanced policy coherence and strengthened capacity 
development (Hope, 2005). APRM “presents fresh opportunities for strengthening 
democracy to ensure that the basis of governance transcends the narrow confines of 
personal rule, patron-client relations or ethno-religious politics” (Akokpari, 2004 p.253). 
Another governance check put in place in Africa is the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG), established in 2007 to “provide an assessment of governance in 
every African country” (MO Ibrahim Foundation, 2013 p.3). The areas of assessment by 
IIAG, per the foundation, are: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, 
sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Out of 52 countries assessed 
in 2013, IIAG ranks Mauritius, Botswana, and Cape Verde in the top three while Eritrea, 
Congo Democratic Republic and Somalia rank 50th, 51st and 52nd respectively (MO 
Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). Other rankings of good governance and sustainable 
development indicators in Africa are prepared by the World Bank and Transparency 
International (NEPAD, 2007). Sustainable development and implementation of good 
governance in Africa are reported as having been slow and weak, with the exception of 
South Africa (Okike, 2007; Okpara, 2010). However, NEPAD (2007) argues that African 
governments signing up to the 2001 AU/NEPAD Foundation Document on conditions for 
sustainable development in Africa agreed to provide good governance to their people by:  
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The creation of the conducive socio-economic, legal, political and institutional 
environments to foster the state’s material strength; to free people from the evils of 
abject poverty, preventable diseases, ignorance, squalor and idleness; to provide the 
citizenry with the voice to choose those who rule over them, to hold those in power 
accountable when they do not work for the greater good, to demand transparent 
structures and to fight down socially regressive policies, and to treat every citizen 
equal without regard to gender, race, ethnicity, religion and creed (Section 13 p.6).   
To tackle governance weaknesses in public and private sectors, the Committee on 
Corporate Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria (CCGPCN) was formed. It 
produced a corporate governance code in 2003, adapting principles in OECD guidelines 
and the Cadbury and King reports (APRM, 2009). APRM (2009) also notes that the 
Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced a code of conduct for 
capital market regulators and employees37.  
Bad governance has affected both public and private sectors in Nigeria. E.g., in the public 
sector a Presidential Projects Assessment Committee (PPAC), set up by the Nigerian 
President in 2011, discovered about 11,886 projects abandoned by successive Nigerian 
governments (El-Rufai, 2012). This is understood as because Nigerian parastatals are 
used for patronage and political reasons (Nworji et al., 2011). In the private sector, about 
34 banks failed between 1991 and 1994 (Lindgren et al., 1996); 26 banks went into 
liquidation in 1998 during bank consolidation in Nigeria (Ogowewo and Uche, 2006); the 
CBN withdrew Savannah Bank’s licence in February, 2002; Onwuka Interbiz, a company 
incorporated in 1991, was delisted and failed after six years; Peak Merchant Bank’s 
licence was revoked in February, 2003 by the CBN; in July 2004, the reformation of 
                                                          
37 Nigeria has also enacted other laws or structures dealing with illegal acts: the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (1990 as amended); the Audit Ordinance (No 28) Act, 1956 [as amended 1988]; Finance 
(control and management No 33) Act 1958 (as amended); Independent Corrupt Practices and other related 
offences Commission (ICPC) Act 2000; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2004; 
Acts supporting professional accounting bodies like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN) and Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN); Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB); 
Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU); and the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM). Yet most of these regulations have been observed to be outdated, revealing legislative gaps and 
ineffective implementation, leaving Nigeria engulfed in systematic corruption (APRM, 2009).  
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Nigeria’s financial system led to bank mergers and acquisitions, reducing the number of 
Nigerian banks from 89 to 25 (Nworji et al., 2011). The consolidation led to development 
of a post-consolidation corporate governance code for Nigerian banks in 2006 (Nworji et 
al., 2011). Nigeria appears to have enough and effective laws to promote good 
governance: for Okpara (2010), the problem lies with weak mechanisms for monitoring, 
enforcement and implementation. Next section will examine privatisation. 
3.15 Privatization 
Parastatal performance in developing countries, like the developed world equivalent prior 
to the hollowing out of the 1980s and 1990s, fell below expectation in terms of 
investment returns and service quality as well as corruption (Nwoye, 2005). And the 
spectre of privatization has been proposed and implemented as another way forward. 
Needle (2004) defines privatisation as “the government policy of selling off public assets 
to private ownership and control, usually by share issue” (p.220). Zayyad (nd) describes it 
as the “transfer of government-owned shareholding in designated enterprises to private 
shareholders, comprising individuals and corporate bodies” (p.4). Parastatals, enterprises 
where the state holds most of the capital (Adeyemo and Salami, 2008), for some have 
been deemed inefficient with much to learn from the private sector (Anwar and Sam, 
2006). Parastatal problems in developing and developed countries are lack of profits, low 
efficiency, extensive corruption, nepotism, poor accountability, poor accounting and 
reporting systems, poor management due to bureaucratic management structures and 
political interference – reasons for mass privatisation in many countries (Rohdewohld, 
1993; Hope, 2001; Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Anwar and Sam, 2006; Adeyemo and 
Salami, 2008). From an economic perspective the criticisms were that government 
ventured into the private sector but could not provide the same sort of efficient and 
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effective service, employees could not properly yield to the people’s quest for 
satisfaction, and government invested too much in parastatals, affecting other areas and 
economic growth (see Ugorji, 1995).  
For some, there is a great difference between trading and sovereignty: their duties, 
functions and characters are different (Ugorji, 1995). Ugorji (1995), basing his argument 
on Adam Smith’s C18th work (Smith, 1937), asserts that a sovereign ruler cannot at the 
same time be a trader and that parastatal management and staff are wasteful and negligent 
as the outcome of their actions does not directly affect them. For Rhodes (1994) and 
Ugorji (1995), for there to be competition, profit, productivity, effectiveness and efficient 
service, government should leave the market system to the trader who is capable in her or 
his field and should concentrate on protecting lives and properties, and providing health 
services and quality education.  
Needle (2004) and Josiah (2010) highlight claimed benefits of privatisation as follows. It: 
reduces state deficits and borrowing requirements, raises cash via sale of state owned 
enterprises, creates competition leading to increased efficiency, promotes productivity, 
quality and service improvement, growth and profit, reverses capital flight, encourages 
domestic investment, attracts foreign investment and new technology, encourages 
competitions thereby reducing costs, increases jobs, increases exports, reduces the state’s 
roles in the economy, focuses on customer care, ensures managers’ performances are 
closely monitored and controlled via staff incentives, encourages managers via incentives 
to be more innovative and proactive, and leads to “more transparent accounting and 
improved economic performance” (Uddin and Hopper, 2003 p.740). 
Britain’s Thatcher government of the 1980s made it compulsory for many services to be 
privatised, its view being that: “government had to get out of the business of telling 
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people what their ambitions should be and how exactly to realise them” and “…put faith 
in freedom and free markets, limited government and strong national defence and in the 
creative capacity of enterprise” (Rhodes, 1994, p.140). For Rhodes (1994), to reduce state 
expenditure, governments all over the world are transferring the assets and liabilities and 
ownership and control of parastatals to the private sector. For Zayyad (nd), privatization 
was implemented to encourage competition and emphasise the role of market forces to 
replace statutory restrictions and power of monopoly. The main aim of privatisation in 
developed economies was ostensibly to increase economic efficiency, raise money for the 
government by reducing subsidies, increase productivity and reduce production cost: the 
aim is to improve economic performance which includes obtaining maximum output from 
scarce resources, poverty reduction and sustained economic development (Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2005). Privatization38 has become one of the major economic adjustment 
policies required by the World Bank and IMF for aids and loans (Ariyo and Jerome, 
1999).  
3.15.1 Privatisation in Africa 
For Urgoji (1995), the lack of governance, accountability and transparency, inefficiency 
and loss making led to calls for privatization of parastatals in Africa. Also, for Hope 
(2001) in this context, African parastatals were used as a conduit pipe for siphoning 
public funds. For Ariyo and Jerome (1999), African countries pursued privatization due to 
public discontent with parastatal performance, deteriorating economic conditions, IMF 
and World Bank loan conditions and an acute economic crisis widespread in many 
African countries. For Ariyo and Jerome (1999) and Nellis (2005), efforts were made to 
                                                          
38 Hope (2001), Pamacheche and Koma (2007) and Zayyad (nd) outline different forms of privatization: 
management contract, concessional agreement, lease agreement, joint venture, sale by public offer of 
shares, commercialisation, management buyout, private share placement, and outright asset sale. 
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reform parastatals to no avail before privatisation was embarked upon as an alternative. 
Thus, per Ariyo and Jerome (1999), Tanzania began privatization in 1985; Ghana in 
1996; Cote d’Ivoire in 1977; Senegal in 1988; Kenya and Togo in 1979; Nigeria in 1981 
and 1984; and South Africa in 1985.  
Yet commercialisation or reforms and privatisation in African countries have been 
deemed failed (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005) as they were donor-driven privatisation 
(Uddin and Hopper, 2003) that Africa was unprepared for (Etukudo, 1997). For Etukudo 
(1997), apart from aid donor requirements, the US state secretary, George Shultz, sent a 
message to USAID African field offices in 1985 that “parastatals are generally an 
inefficient way of doing business…In most cases, public sector firms should be 
privatised” (p.36). However, African bureaucrats were not prepared for privatisation 
(Etukudo, 1997) and African privatisation was controversial (Josiah et al., 2010). There 
are many reasons why privatisation is seen as sudden and controversial in Africa, as 
Nellis (2005) highlights. First, privatisation is seen as empowering and enriching 
foreigners.39 Second, African workers are unhappy as privatisation is seen as entailing job 
losses and aggravating already deteriorated job conditions. Third, politicians and 
bureaucrats are seen as acquiring wealth and prestige from privatisation. Fourth, the 
private sector is seen as losing friendly relationships with parastatal officials. Fifth, as per 
Uddin and Hopper (2003), privatisation is seen to lead to “massive transfers of public 
wealth into private hands” (p.746). For these reasons, according to Nellis (2005), 
Zambians, four years after successful World Bank and IMF imposed privatisation of their 
small parastatals in 1998, thought of reversing it. Sixth, it is seen as promoting inequality 
and poverty. Seventh, many firms privatised were closed. Eighth, revenues from sales of 
                                                          
39 Africans believe parastatals were established to promote and defend their interests (Nellis, 2005).     
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privatised parastatals were suspected as being corruptly misused and unaccounted for. In 
Uganda, privatisation has lacked transparency and accountability and is flawed by 
corruption (Wanyama, 2006). Other problems militating against commercialisation or 
reforms and privatisation in Africa are lack of developed capital markets; government not 
willing to give up profitable parastatals and unprofitable ones do not attract buyers; lack 
of support of professionals; lack of suitable legal and judicial framework (see Ariyo and 
Jerome, 1999; Mwaura, 2007); and lack of “technical infrastructure and organisational 
capacity” (Uddin and Hopper, 2003 p.739). All these make commercialisation and 
privatisation controversial in Africa (Josiah et al., 2010), done grudgingly (Uddin and 
Hopper, 2003), with little preparation (Etukudo, 1997) and delayed, diluted and sabotaged 
(Nellis, 2005).  
3.15.2 Privatisation in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, in the 1970s, government participation dominated the economy (Omeleke and 
Adeopo, 2005; Zayyad, nd). Zayyad (nd) states further that from the late 1980s, a working 
party on parastatals recommended that government should release businesses and 
concentrate on providing the enabling environment for businesses to thrive. Nigeria’s 
privatisation and commercialisation programme began with Decree No. 25 promulgated 
on 6 July 1988 with an implementation agency, the Technical Committee on Privatisation 
and Commercialisation (TCPC) (Ahunwa, 2002; Omeleke and Adeopo, 2005). The 
programme was reinvigorated in 1999 by the privatisation and commercialisation Act No. 
28 of May 1999, which established the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) with the 
Vice President of the FRN as Chair: the Council is the policy-making body during 
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programme40 implementation, while the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), formerly 
TCPC, is charged with operationalising these policies and providing secretarial support to 
the Council (Omoleke and Adeopo, 2005).  
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian president, listed benefits of privatisation at the 
inauguration of the NCP in 1999 as: helping government focus resources on its major 
duties and responsibilities; making government enforce the rules of the game by enabling 
markets to function efficiently and effectively; enabling government to provide enough 
security and necessary infrastructure to ensure access to basic services like education, 
health and environmental protection; removing the financial burden of parastatals from 
government’s shoulders; aiding socio-economic recovery; ensuring competition, 
regulating the market for fairer pricing, providing quality services and enjoying 
globalisation’s benefits via technology, managerial competence and capital from the 
developed world (Mohammed, 2008). 
Ariyo and Jerome (1999) contend that commercialisation failed due to political 
interference in parastatal management, privatization being largely of smaller parastatals, 
the big ones continuing to draw off government resources, shares of privatised parastatals 
being held only by the rich, and the privatisation programme being poorly executed. 
 
                                                          
40The stated objectives of the programme as per the Council’s 2001 handbook (3rd edition) are to render 
Nigeria’s private sector an engine of economic growth, to send a clear message to local and international 
communities that a new transparent Nigeria is now open for business, to restructure and rationalise the 
public sector so as to substantially reduce dominance of unproductive government investment in the sector, 
to re-orient all public enterprises engaged in economic activities towards a new horizon of performance 
improvement, viability and overall efficiency, to raise financing for socially-oriented programmes in such 
areas as poverty eradication, health, education and infrastructure, to ensure positive returns on public sector 
investments in commercialised enterprises, through more efficient private sector-oriented management, to 
check the present absolute dependence on the treasury for funding by otherwise commercially-oriented 
parastatals and so encourage their approach to capital markets to meet funding needs, to initiate the gradual 
transfer to the private sector of public enterprises better operated in that sector and to create jobs, acquire 
new knowledge, skills and technology, and expose Nigeria to international competition. 
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3.16 Governance and accountability in the Nigerian context 
The review of literature revealed that there are few studies carried out on corporate 
governance of parastatals in Nigeria. One of the scholars who carried out a study on 
privatization/commercialization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Nigeria, looking at 
the strategies for improving the performance of the economy in 1995, was Ebenezer C. 
Urgoji (Urgoji, 1995). He examined Nigerian’s privatization and commercialization 
program-focusing on the development and performance of Nigeria’s parastatals; the 
criteria, nature, objectives and implementation process of Nigerian’s privatization and 
commercialization program. The result shows that Nigerian government economic 
activities are inimical to economic growth; also there is excessive mismanagement of 
public resources; low returns on public investments and high level of corruption are 
common features of Nigerian parastatals; and therefore, there is a great need for the 
government, according to Urgorji, to denationalize.  
Etukudo (1997) examines privatization and restructuring of State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) in sub-Saharan African countries. The findings show that parastatals do not make 
returns on investment but continue to draw from government purse; they are overstaffed 
and with high public debt and unsustainable public expenditure. For these reasons, the 
Nigerian government needs to privatize parastatals. 
Ahunwan (2002) investigates the nature of corporate governance in Nigeria and prospects 
of reforms contributing to responsible governance. The result shows that for Nigeria and 
other developing countries to compete in the global economy, they have to introduce 
programs of economic liberalization and deregulation, introduce reforms that will 
strengthen their governance, liberalize their capital markets, and privatize their 
parastatals. The result also shows that for corporate governance to succeed, the Nigerian 
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government should embark on broader governance reforms encompassing entire Nigerian 
State. 
Okike (2007) looks at the mechanism for corporate governance including the 
requirements of the established code of best practices for Nigerian public companies and 
the roles of the government, the Corporate Affairs Commission, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and the representatives of the 
shareholders of the companies (directors, Auditors and the Audit committee) in the 
governance process. He also examines in the study whether the governance mechanisms 
in Nigeria are adequate in the face of the changes and challenges in the global corporate 
scene. The result shows that the Nigerian code does not identify corruption as an issue. 
Moreover, the findings reveal that enforcement mechanisms are weak and ineffective, and 
no penalties exist for companies that flout the company legislation. Another finding 
shows that appointments into leadership positions in Nigeria, which are important for 
good corporate governance, are highly questionable because of what is called “Nigerian 
Factor” and therefore subject to further investigation.  
Inyang (2009) investigates the history of corporate governance system and the 
mainstream issues in nurturing corporate governance in Nigeria. The findings reveal that 
there is dearth of literature on corporate governance in Nigeria. He notes also that 
corporate governance issues began in Nigeria when Companies and Allied Matters Act of 
1990 (CAMA 1990) was enacted. The result shows also that corporate governance 
principles are not directed at parastatals despite the fact that parastatals are the “worst 
abusers” (p.10) of corporate governance principles in Nigeria. The result further reveals 
that parastatals are bedevilled with corruption, deliberate accounting fraud, poor 
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managerial capacity, and lack of market discipline in relation to transparency and 
accountability.  
Nworji et al. (2011) examine the issues, challenges and opportunities connected with 
corporate governance and banks failure in Nigeria in order to see if there is significant 
relationship between corporate governance and banks failure. 11 commercial banks in 
Lagos were randomly chosen for investigation. Data were collected from the staff of these 
banks using a structured questionnaire. The result shows that the new code of corporate 
governance for banks has all it takes to curb banks failure. The result of the findings also 
reveals that the main reasons for Banks failure are because of inappropriate risk 
management, corruption of banks staff and over expansion of banks.  
In general, these studies lacked a proper theoretical base. Moreover, many of the 
published materials on governance and accountability so far have concentrated on 
corruption41 and inefficient performances of parastatals, and have called for simple 
solution of privatisation for parastatals without looking in more holistic detail the root 
cause of parastatals’ failure (Urgoji, 1995; Etukudo, 1997; Mwaura, 2007). From the 
above literatures examined, both private and public sectors in this respect have the same 
problem of corruption (see also Klitgaard, 1997; Anwar and Sam, 2006; Wanyama, et al., 
2009). This thesis argues that if appropriate and meritocratic appointments are made at the 
leadership levels of parastatals, there might be no need for privatization. Here, through an 
in-depth analysis, a simple perspective is replaced by a complex one, taking into account 
an array of contextual and historical factors and dimensions. 
                                                          
41Corruption is a common feature of both private and public sectors (see Ugorji, 1995; Klitgaard, 1997; 
Anwar and Sam, 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009).  
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The current study is the first that focuses on governance and accountability issues in 
Nigerian parastatals as there are paucity of literatures in the subject area. The paucity of 
studies examining parastatals is related to the notion of many researchers in this area that 
governance and accountability are areas meant for the private sector (IFAC, 2001; 
ECSAFA, 2004). The empirical findings in this study using case study interviews, semi-
structured interviews and questionnaires (case analyses being previously under-utilised); 
contribute in filling this gap as do the theoretical framework (see chapters 4, 6 and 7).  
This present study dwells holistically on governance and accountability issues in 
parastatals as a basis for an in-depth study of why ASCL has not been completed after 
three decades of its establishment, how governance and accountability are executed in 
Nigerian parastatals, and how they can be enhanced.  Also, this present study concentrates 
on governance and accountability issues in Nigerian parastatals and uses an interpretive 
theory with a critical orientation, concerned to advance governance and accountability in 
relation to an appreciation of neopatrimonialism (explained in the next chapter).   
Finally, since the parliament is the centre of accountability in the public sector (Mulgan, 
1997; Sendt, 2002; ECSAFA, 2004), this present study on governance and accountability 
issues in parastatals fills the gap of accountability between the parliament and the 
taxpayers/stakeholders.  
3.17 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter prior studies on governance and accountability were reviewed. The 
defining of governance (especially with consideration of parastatals) and accountability 
was reviewed. A key definition of governance was that of Hope (2005): governance as 
discharging responsibility acquired through appointment or election in the public domain 
or in the area of commerce. Issues of governance and accountability articulated in 
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mainstream theory were reviewed. Theory highlights that parastatal managers are self-
interested individuals who promote their cause at the expense of the owners. Politicians 
and Bureaucrats in parastatals pursue their personal interest thereby abandoning 
stakeholder interests. Prior studies on Africa, focusing in on Africa and Nigeria, were 
reviewed.  
The literature implies that good governance, accountability and transparency in a 
country’s parastatals will lead to maximisation of value for the stakeholders. Bad 
governance does not. The principles of good governance in the public service which 
include: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and 
leadership are crucial to good governance in parastatals and will benefit all stakeholders if 
consistently followed with other laws. While these principles are fairly entrenched in the 
private sector, their adoption in parastatals is limited. One of the reasons for this in 
African countries is neopatrimonialism. This concept is discussed in the next chapter in 
order to provide a theoretical framework for the examination of the case of Ajaokuta Steel 
Company as a parastatal in Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Developing the Theoretical Framing: an Interpretive Theory with a 
Critical Orientation inform by Insights from Neopatrimonialism 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter elaborates the theoretical framing (see Sinclair, 2007; Sekaran and Bourgie, 
2013) of the study. An open and interpretive theoretical perspective with a broadly 
conceived critical orientation is articulated. This perspective is concerned to develop a 
contextual and in-depth appreciation of the issues at ASCL and the governance and 
accountability manifestations at ASCL, thus providing for a deeper appreciation of 
possible ways forward. The critical orientation within the interpretive and open framing 
encompasses gaining insights into the problematics of governance and accountability at 
ASCL in relation to a broad vision of how governance and accountability are supposed to 
work – this is because, if one is developing a critical theme about practices one has an at 
least implicit vision of their better state. Hence, part of this framing here is concerned to 
elaborate or provide an outline of key aspects of such a broad vision of principles of 
governance/accountability. In relation to theorizing problematics of governance and 
accountability in the case, some emphasis is placed here on the concept of 
neopatrimonialism.42  
In chapter five, the theoretical framing, understood to be positioned in the interpretive 
paradigm of Burrell and Morgan (1979), is then translated into a methodological 
                                                          
42Slevin and Basford (1999, p. 298, in Sinclair, 2007) note that the following questions should be borne in 
mind when one wants to carry out research: what do I know about what I want to study? What appropriate 
theory is there to guide me? A theory gives new insights and broadens one’s understanding of a 
phenomenon (Anfara and Mertz, 2006).  
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perspective and the actual methods used in the study are then discussed and justified. The 
structure of the chapter here is thus as follows: Section 4.1 gives an outline positioning of 
the theoretical perspective. Section 4.2 examines an overview of neopatrimonialism in 
relation to the critical orientation of the study. Section 4.3 explores the theory of 
neopatrimonialism. Section 4.4 outlines how neopatrimonialism undermines good 
governance and accountability. Section 4.5 explores why neopatrimonialism is considered 
for this study; and section 4.6 provides a summary and conclusion of the chapter.  
Here in relation to a key dimension of Laughlin’s (1995) overview of approaches to 
theory construction or development; an overview of neopatrimonialism in relation to the 
critical orientation of the study and the concern to provide an in-depth account of the 
Ajaokuta case. 
4.1 An outline positioning of the theoretical perspective 
Laughlin (1995) outlines theory construction and development and gives some emphasis 
to a continuum or spectrum that contrasts approaches that tend to work with a loose 
openness with those concerned to build upon or simply try to support or refute a tightly 
defined prior theoretical position. Like Laughlin, who advocates ‘middle-range’ theory, 
this researcher occupies a position somewhere around the middle of this outlined 
continuum. There is no naïve commitment here to a pure openness, as if one could 
approach research with no pre-conceptions. On the other hand, this researcher is 
committed to a non-dogmatic approach that is open to refining outline positions through 
openness to theory development via empirical research and a spirit of interest in finding 
things out: there is a great deal of detailed empirical analysis in this study. In outline, the 
theory here is interpretive (and in the next chapter, discussing the methodology and 
method of the study, the approach is positioned in the interpretive paradigm of Burrell 
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and Morgan, 1979) although within this the theory has, again in terms of the spectrum of 
possibilities within that paradigm, a critical orientation.  In broad terms, the researcher 
means by this critical orientation here that his prior theoretical conception is that 
parastatal governance and accountability in Nigeria is that it is problematic and that it can 
be substantively changed for the better.  In turn, this prior conception implies on the one 
hand a view of good (better) governance and accountability principles for the public 
sector (considered to have been broadly elaborated through prior work in the previous 
chapter) and on the other an understanding of outline critical themes in terms of the 
problematic. Regarding the latter, the researcher finds it especially useful to draw from an 
appreciation of neopatrimonialism as a way of characterising governance.  
4.2 An overview of neopatrimonialism in relation to the critical orientation of the 
study 
A good situation for parastatals to operate is to follow the principles of good governance 
as examined in sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this study. Nigeria, as enumerated in section 3.14, 
has on the face of it many laws to strengthen good governance but the suggestion here is 
that substantively neopatrimonialism has made this difficult. In appreciating practice the 
study draws from an understanding of the neopatrimonialist context. Agency and 
accountability theories are frequently given emphasis in corporate governance studies 
(Wanyama, 2006; Bondamakara, 2010; Fox, 2010; Solomon, 2010). The theory of 
neopatrimonialism is drawn upon here to substantively inform the theoretical lens for this 
study. 
Neopatrimonialism is a theory which is used to explain why there are under- 
development, economic, and socio-political problems facing society (Roth, 1968; 
Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992; Barton and Martin, 1998; Erdmann and Engel, 2007). The 
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seal of African regimes is neopatrimonialism where administrators govern by personal 
(discretion) patronage rather than using rules and regulations or ideas; people have respect 
for a person rather than the office he/she occupies; and leaders occupy offices to acquire 
personal wealth and status rather than performance (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 
Wren and Bedeian, 2009). These characteristics of neopatrimonialism are not limited to 
African countries but neopatrimonialism is a generic issue affecting both developing and 
developed world (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). 
Organizations must be managed on rationality and not on the arbitrariness of owners and 
managers (Bartol and Martin, 1998). This, according to Bartol and Martin (1998), led 
Max Weber to react to the “norms of class consciousness and nepotism” (p.43). Weber, 
Bartol and Martin (1998) saw that only persons from aristocratic birth can become 
officers in the Prussian Army and they are the only persons who are qualified to be given 
higher positions in the industry and government establishments, which was considered by 
Weber as partiality and making other intelligent human resources non-participative and 
dormant. In addition, Weber’s belief is that managing an organisation by employing those 
the managers know and not having regard to what the potential employees know and 
engaging in nepotism affect the organization negatively (Bartol and Martin, 1998). 
Weber notes also that people in the organization carry out their tasks in two ways: 
namely, by power or authority (Ivancevich et al., 1994). Weber, per Ivancevich et al. 
(1994), describes power as when people are forced to obey while authority is when people 
are persuaded to obey voluntarily. In organizations, subordinates consider authority to be 
legitimate and it can be used through example and practice (Ivancevich et al., 1994). Max 
Weber, per Hellriegel and Slocum (1992), Cole (1993) and Erdmann and Engel (2007), in 
his work recognises three types of legitimate authority while giving analysis of 
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organization. They are: Charismatic authority, traditional authority and legal-rational 
(bureaucratic) authority.  
4.2.1 Charismatic authority 
Charismatic authority means obedience that comes as a result of a ruler’s personal special 
qualities other people see in him which make him to be outstandingly different from 
ordinary people (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992; Ivancevich et al., 1994). According to 
Hellriegel and Slocum (1992), subordinates will comply without question to the authority 
of a charismatic leader. This is when an individual has exceptional personal supernatural 
endowed qualities rendering them naturally leaders, “the gift of grace” (Wren and 
Bedeian, 2009, p.230), the qualities of people like Joan of Arc, Gandhi and Martin Luther 
King (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992). Political power (authority) in terms of charisma in 
Africa was not successful (Le Vine, 1980; Erdmann and Engel 2007).43  
4.2.2 Traditional authority (Patrimonialism) 
Traditional authority means obedience to those in authority that emanates from tradition 
and custom (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992). Traditionalist and personal dominations 
(authorities) are collectively known as patrimonialism (Roth 1968), where traditional 
domination means “traditionalist legitimation and hereditary succession to the throne” 
(p.196) and personal rulership domination means “loyalties that do not require any belief 
in the ruler’s unique personal qualification, but are inextricably linked to material 
incentives and rewards” (Roth, 1968 p.196). Under this system of authority 
(patrimonialism), there is no differentiation between private and public realms; 
government is based on a personal ruler; political offices are regarded as fiefdoms and 
                                                          
43In business organizations, charismatic authority is not equally relied upon but managers like Steven Jobs, 
Mary Kay Ash and Walt Disney used their charisma to motivate and influence those that they worked with 
(Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992).  
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patronage by state officials; the system operates through patron-client networks and the 
exercise of public authority is to serve the personal pleasure of those in authority (Ikpe, 
2000; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Wren and Bedeian, 2009). Nawaz (2008) argues that 
patrimonialism is “a social and political order where the patrons secure the loyalty and 
support of the clients by bestowing benefits to them from own or state resources” (p.2). 
Under patrimonialism authority, obedience is to the person occupying the position of 
authority and not to the constitution or any rules and regulations (Erdmann and Engel, 
2007). 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) summarise the following as the characteristics of 
patrimonialism: (i) bureaucrats are employed or appointed, promoted as reward for having 
good relationship with political leaders and can be dismissed without reason; (ii) there is 
no spoken or written hierarchy of authority and no reporting channels; (iii) important 
orders are not documented but given verbally; (iv) there is no distinction between the 
public and private realms; (v) the salaries of bureaucrats are augmented by bribes and 
kickbacks; (vi) the organisation is  decentralised making administrators to take personal 
discretion on the job; (vii) personal judgement and subjective reasoning are allowed to 
permeate through all the procedures; (viii)  rules and regulations are partially applied with 
some citizens going scot-free without being punished for breaking the law; (ix) no 
documents to support government contracts, procurement and sales; (x) internal controls 
are neglected; (xi) documentations are spotted with important matters omitted from the 
records; and (xii) customers have no alternative for poor service. 
4.2.3 Legal-rational (bureaucratic) authority   
The third type of legitimate authority identified by Max Weber is legal-rational authority. 
It is obedience not to a person but to an office as spelt out in the rules and other 
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procedures governing an organisation in the pursuit of its objectives and goals (Wren and 
Bedeian, 2009). This is where the chief executives of parastatals and other organizations 
“interpret and enforce these rules and other controls by virtue of their position” (Wren and 
Bedeian, 2009 p.230). Weber calls this bureaucracy and it is defined as  “a management 
approach based on formal organisational structure with set rules and regulations that relies 
on specialization of labour, an authority hierarchy, and rigid promotion and selection 
criteria” (Ivancevich et al., 1994 p.49).  
Under legal-rational bureaucracy or modern authority (domination), “formal structures 
and rules do exist” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007 p.105) that prescribe how organization 
should operate (Heriegel and Slocum, 1992). Under Weber’s bureaucratic arrangements, 
per Ivancevich et al. (1994), organizations will be characterised by “efficiency, precision, 
speed, unambiguity, continuity, unity, and strict subordination” (p.49). Legal authority 
(bureaucracy) was intended by Weber to give protection to organization’s workers, give 
them equal treatment and opportunity, and end their exploitation (Wren and Bedeian, 
2009). Bureaucracy is per Eisenstaedt “neo” or “modern” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, 
p.97).  
Weber identified six features of ideal bureaucracy. First, bureaucrats are employed on the 
basis of technical qualifications examined by tests, education or training; and employees 
are appointed and not elected (Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Wren and Bedeian, 2009). 
Wren and Bedeian (2009) argue that employees are engaged and continue to enjoy 
promotion based on merit, experience, expertise. Employment is not based on patronage 
and promotion is only approved after the bureaucrat has proved that he can handle the 
competence required of the next rank (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992). What organisations 
should take into consideration before employing a bureaucrat are his physical, mental, 
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moral capabilities and also his general education, special knowledge and experience 
(Wren and Bedeian, 2009).  
Second, bureaucracy as given by Weber is division of labour. Division of labour is where 
duties and responsibilities are clearly defined; jobs are divided into simpler and areas of 
specialisation; and proper trained persons are assigned duties based on area of 
specialisation (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992; Wren and Bedeian, 2009). The employment 
of persons into their areas of specialisation will lead to efficiency (Wren and Bedeian, 
2009). Unskilled labourers will be given jobs that are easy to learn and do (Hellriegel and 
Slocum, 1992). 
The third feature of Weber’s bureaucracy is formal rules and procedures. Rules are to 
guide bureaucrat’s behaviour while on the job (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992). In the 
performance of their tasks in the organisation, the bureaucrats are to obey the rules and 
regulations to ensure proper direction and uniformity of procedures and operations which 
will lead to organisation’s stability and success (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992). 
Fourth, Weber gave impersonality as one of the features of bureaucracy. Rules are to be 
applied uniformly to all no matter the status of any person in the organisation and 
obedience is owed to the rules and procedures and not to personality (Wren and Bedeian, 
2009). This will eliminate personal bias, personal preferences, and arbitrary behaviour of 
the superior towards their subordinates (Wren and Bedeian, 2009). 
The fifth characteristic of bureaucracy is hierarchical structure. A hierarchical structure 
“ranks jobs according to the amount of power and authority” (Hellriegel and Slocum, 
1992, p.42). Hellriegel and Slocum (1992) note that a hierarchical structure helps in the 
control of the behaviour of bureaucrats. This is because they know that the lower rank 
employees are controlled and directed by the higher level positions.  
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The sixth characteristic of bureaucracy per Weber is career orientation. Employees are 
professionals and not politicians and expected to be trained and pursue careers in their 
fields (Wren and Bedeian, 2009). It is a lifelong career commitment; they obtain fixed 
salaries and have right to pensions (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992; Erdmann and Engel, 
2007). 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) give the following as the features of rational-legal 
Bureaucratic authority: (i) officers are appointed on merit, experience, and professional 
basis and cannot be dismissed without a cause; (ii) authority is based on hierarchy which 
is on division of labour and a clear reporting channels; (iii) all important decisions and 
orders are documented; (iv) there is complete separation between the public and private 
realms; (v) bureaucrats are not allowed to supplement their salaries with kickbacks and 
bribes; (vi) bureaucrats are not allowed to take personal decision while performing their 
duties; (vii) bureaucrats’ decisions are predicable since he has to be objective and follow 
normal procedures; (viii) there is no preferential treatment as everybody receives equal 
treatment; (ix) all government procurements and sales are based on legal binding 
contracts; (x) internal controls are dogmatically followed; (xi) records are properly 
recorded, maintained and regularly audited; and (xi) should there be poor service, there 
are channels to appeal by citizens. 
Bureaucratic authority encourages efficiency and consistency as many routine duties are 
to be performed (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1992). Bureaucracy is however criticised for 
rigid adherence to rules making it difficult for bureaucrats to innovate (Hellriegel and 
Slocum, 1992). 
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4.3 Neopatrimonialism 
As noted earlier while discussing legal-rational authority, Eisenstadt called legal-rational 
(bureaucracy) authority “neo” or “modern” and added it to patrimonialism to form what is 
known as neopatrimonialism (Erdmann and Engel 2007). Neopatrimonialism is the 
joining together of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic authority (Erdmann and 
Engel 2007).  Under “neo” or “modern” authority, there is complete distinction between 
public and private realms but not always observed; under patrimonialism there is no 
distinction between private and public realms; and also under neopatrimonialism there is 
no distinction between public and private realms (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Erdmann and 
Engel 2007). Erdmann and Engel (2007) maintain:  
The patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, 
functions and output, but does not take exclusive control over the legal-
rational logic. That is, informal politics invades formal institutions. 
Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in various 
ways and varying degrees; and this mix becomes institutionalised (p.105).  
Erdmann and Engel (2007) argue that neopatrimonialism is characterised by 
insecurity and is a term that is used to explain a danger to peaceful development of 
the society. Under neopatrimonialism the exercise of power is erratic and 
unpredictable; public norms are formal and rational; and it is related to authoritarian 
politics (Erdmann and Engel 2007). 
Clapham (1985) defines neopatrimonialism as: 
A form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type 
pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on 
rational-legal lines and officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with 
powers which are formally defined but exercise those powers so far as they can, 
as a form not of public service but of private property (p.48).  
Nawaz (2008) argues that neopatrimonialism is “a system of governance where the formal 
rational-legal state apparatus co-exists and is supplanted by an informal patrimonial 
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system of governance” (p.2). Nawaz maintains that it is a system of governance where 
state functions especially as regards resource distribution rests with the politicians, their 
friends and others who are not part of state structure but take decisions about the state. 
Neopatrimonialism has elements of clientelism, patronage, presidentialism, nepotism, 
prebendalism, bribery, corruption, favouritism, and ethnicism which are the 
characteristics of African leaders (Roth, 1968; Lemarchand and Legg, 1972; Ikpe, 2000). 
These characteristics of neopatrimonialism are explained in the order in which they 
appeared above.   
First, clientelism is a relationship that exists between the big man and small man that 
result in give and take of public resources for their personal benefits (Le vine, 1980). 
Erdmann and Engel (2007) describe clientelism as one involving personal network of a 
politician and transferring of public goods and services by the big man (patron) to the 
small man (client) for favours based on personal relationship. Ikpe (2000) defines 
clientelism as: 
A system in which state officers (patrons) distribute benefits to strategically 
placed individuals lower than themselves (clients) in returns for support, 
service and loyalty, and to those higher than themselves (patrons), for the 
continuous protection of their positions and tenures (p. 148). 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) give the following as the features of clientelism: (i) 
authority is personal who exercises it without using the law; (ii) leader self-importance; 
(iii) leaders wield much influence and accountable to no one; (iv) leaders are unfaithful to 
their promise and unreliable; (v) leaders replace themselves with their children, relations 
or friends; (vi) leaders hold onto power by providing personal favours that secure loyalty 
of key followers; (vii) policy decisions are taken in secret without public discussion or 
involvement; and (viii) political parties are formed around personalities (ix) political 
parties are formed around individual; (x) there are no laid down procedures to replace 
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leaders; (xi) decision making procedures are opaque and without the involvement of 
stakeholders; and (xii) clientelism makes leaders to personally enrich themselves. 
Second, patronage is politically motivated distribution of favours to groups as distinct 
from individuals and is “mainly ethnic or sub-ethnic groups” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007 
p.107). It is a relationship, according to Erdmann and Engel (2007) that exists between 
leaders and a bigger group. The difference between clientelism and patronage is that 
clientelism deals with individual while patronage deals with wider community 
(ethnic/tribal group) (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). Example of patronage are supply of 
water, electricity, provision of scholarship to persons from a community, distribution of 
ministerial position, and other political and administrative posts like board membership 
((Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Nawaz, 2008).   
Third, another characteristic of neopatrimonialism is presidentialism. Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997) describe presidentialism as when a leader delegates only trivial decision-
making duties. Neopatrimonial states avoid parliamentary system of government and 
adopt presidential system of government, which according to Van de Walle (2003), is to 
enable them take the advantage of the rules that: 
Weaken the hand of the legislature and allow the president to make the key 
decisions without legislative approval. Power is highly centralised around the 
president, he is literally above the law, controls in many cases a large proportion 
of state finance with little accountability, and delegates remarkably little of his 
authority on important matters (p.309 &310). 
  
Fourth, nepotism is where appointments and elevations are given because of relationship 
or familiarity (Erdmann and Engel 2007). For instance, it is where favouritism is shown to 
relatives or friends by giving to them jobs or contracts (Dike, 2005). Dike (2005) defines 
nepotism as “bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit” 
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(p.1). Nepotism is a state where the public office holder excludes his or her kinsmen and 
family from certain laws in order to allow them to have access to state goods and services 
(Dike, 2005) 
Fifth, prebendalism is another element of neoptrimonialism. Ikpe (2000) notes that 
prebendalism is when politicians take their political offices as inheritance and have 
discretion to use it as they want and for the benefit of those who support them.  
Sixth, bribery is the use of a reward to pervert judgement by a person in a position of trust 
(Dike, 2005). Bribery is prevalent in neopatrimonial countries as a result of rigidity of 
bureaucratic procedures and wide powers given to a single person to take decisions and 
also due to lack of reward for honesty and competence (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 
2002). 
Seventh, corruption is the violation of rules and regulations in order to acquire wealth for 
oneself, friends, and family through illegal means at public expense (Dike, 2005). Dike 
(2005) maintains that corruption involves misusing of authority given to someone for 
personal gain. Corruption, per Kale (2001): “Threatens the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts 
competition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability of democratic 
institutions and the moral foundations of society” ( p.28). Corruption makes the rich 
richer but the poor poorer leading to underdevelopment of many countries (Englebert and 
Tull, 2008; De Maria, 2009). It poses a threat to national security, facilitates international 
crimes and constrains free trade and foreign investment (Leiken, 1996). Corruption has 
been defined by Everett, et al. to “distort standards of merit, erode the respect of law and 
result in higher public investment and lower quality of infrastructure” (p. 513).  
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For Sturges (2008, p. 4): “Corruption can inhibit national development by removing 
wealth from the economy by those with offshore accounts; lower national morale; divert 
energy from productive economic activities and discourage outside investors, lenders and 
donors”. GOPAC (2005) and Uneke (2010) group corruption’s effects into four areas: 
administrative consequences - entailing loss of professionalism, discouragement and 
frustration of the few honest civil servants; political consequences whereby the legitimacy 
of the political process is undermined, political opponents are repressed, national 
development is hindered due to political instability and uncertainty, government is 
prevented from implementing laws and policies, the image of politicians is damaged and 
people enter politics to amass wealth while qualified people are dissuaded, trust of 
politicians is rendered difficult, international communities lose confidence in a 
government, political instability, coups and civil wars are rendered more probable; 
economic consequences, such as inefficiencies in market operations, a focusing of 
government expenditure on spending that will bring in large bribes, increases in costs to 
direct foreign investment and project costs (Uneke, 2010, here cites African steel projects, 
stating that many are re-awarded two or more times); social consequences such as 
separation of poor from rich and observers from the players, division of ethnic groups and 
communities and promotion of rivalries and jealousies, enhanced distrust, suspicion, 
selfishness and a breaking down of social cohesion and discouragement of collective 
action.  
Government resources are spent on projects offering abundant corruption opportunities 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Uneke, 2010). In Africa, public projects are awarded to the 
same contractor or its parent company two or three times or to new contractors without 
completion (Uneke, 2010). ASCL, the focus here, is a case in point: industrialisation and 
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jobs have been held back since the 1990s.44 While African countries are busy borrowing 
money for development and keep on repaying the debts, the money is laundered back to 
the developed world (Uneke, 2010): e.g., in 1991, the United Nations published in its 
report that $200 billion was swindled out of African treasuries by the ruling class to the 
developed world, while African debt stood at $300 billion (Lawal, 2007). Lawal notes 
that this money taken from Africa is more than the money coming in as foreign aid. 
Eighth, favouritism is partial distribution of state resources to friends, families, and others 
who do not merit them (Dike, 2005). Dike (2005) states further that favouritism is abuse 
of power which involves biased distribution of public goods and services. 
Ninth, ethnicism involves being loyal to one’s ethnic group than one’s country (Agbiboa, 
2012). This is where there is high demand from one’s ethnic group for “gifts of money, 
for jobs and for securing the provision of amenities for his area” (Agbiboa, 2012 p.334).  
In Nigeria, political parties are formed on ethno-regional lines (Akinola, 1988; Salawu 
and Hassan, 2011). For instance, in the 1979 federal election, the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN) was a northern based political party; the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) 
was a south-eastern based political party; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was south-
western based political party and so “ethnicity is the hub around which political support 
revolves” (Akinola, 1988 p.444). 
The major reasons put forward by Salawu and Hassan (2011) for ethnic rivalry in Nigeria 
are (i) competition for power and wealth; (ii) mutual suspicion and fear of domination by 
one ethnic group; (iii) monopolisation of power by the major ethnic group, which results 
in the marginalisation of the minority groups; (iv) poverty and unemployment; (v) lack of 
                                                          
44 20,000 workers would have been employed at the upstream sector, 30,000 workers at the downstream 
sector and 10,000 workers employed directly to work in the steel (Mohammed, 2002b). 
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good leadership to unite the ethnic groups; and (vi) competition for employment and 
political manipulation by politicians using ethnic rivalry to win at polls. This ethnicism 
influences the location of projects and ultimately results in the neglect of projects in 
Nigeria, including ASCL (Agbu, 2007; Okafor, 2007).   
Iyoha (2008) argues that many Nigerian leaders from 1960 to 2000 have diverted 
government projects, jobs and improvement in infrastructures to their ethnic base. This 
action, according to Iyoha (2008), promotes ethnicism, political patronage, nepotism and 
other neopatrimonial acts. Iyoha (2008) contends that the siting of industries is often 
based on ethnic considerations, which have led to neglecting of many investment projects 
when a new government comes to power.  
4.4 How neopatrimonialism undermines good governance and accountability: 
developing a framing for the analysis 
In 1999, Kofi Annan (then UN Secretary-General) argued that good governance means: 
Promoting the rule of law, tolerating minority and opposition groups, transparent political 
processes, an independent judiciary, an impartial police force, a military that is strictly 
subject to civilian control, a free press and vibrant civil society institutions, as well as 
meaningful elections. Above all, good governance means respect for human rights 
(United Nations, 1999).  For Leftwich (1993), good governance entails:  
An efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal 
framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public 
funds; an independent public auditor responsible to a representative 
legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of 
government; a pluralistic institutional structure and a free press (p.610). 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR) presented the following as how good 
governance should be as per Graham et al. (2003):  
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Participation: everyone, both men and women, should have opportunity of being heard in 
a decision-making that involves collective action, either directly or through anybody that 
represents their interest and this involvement in decision-making is based on freedom of 
association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively (UNDP, 1997). 
UNDP argues that such involvement in all matters that concern everyone is the 
foundation of good governance. UNUDHR states that everyone has the right to opinion 
and expression, peaceful assembly, be part of government and has duties to their 
communities.  
Consensus Orientation: good governance helps to achieve consensus agreement in the 
best interest for the attainment of the goal of a group or community (UNDP, 1997). 
People will be the authority of the government and people shall only be limited by law 
(UNUDHR).  
Strategic vision: leaders and the public should have idea of the meaning and importance 
of what good governance and human development are (UNDP, 1997). Political leaders 
and managers of organisations should establish a motivating and reliable vision, persuade 
people to uphold the vision and provide the needful resources to make the vision to 
succeed (UNUDHR).  
Responsiveness: institutions and processes must respond positively to all stakeholders 
without prejudice (UNDP, 1997). Tolerance must be exercised in dealing with people’s 
complaints and criticisms (UNUDHR). 
Effectiveness and efficiency: institutions and processes must produce outcome that will 
meet the needs of all stakeholders making the best use of available resources (UNDP, 
1997).  
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Accountability: those who take decisions in government, the private sector and civil 
society organisations are to give account of their stewardships to the taxpayers, 
shareholders, or institutional stakeholders as appropriate (UNDP, 1997).  
Transparency: transparency is based on the free flow of information. Processes, 
institutions and information must be accessible to those who need and use them; and the 
information must be clearly presented for the stakeholders to understand (UNDP, 1997). 
Equity: everybody must be given equal opportunities to improve or maintain their well-
being (UNDP, 1997). All human beings have equal rights and dignity (UNUDHR). 
 Rule of law: legal and regulatory frameworks should be fairly and impartially enforced 
(UNDP, 1997). All human beings are equal before the law; should be protected by the 
law; have right to fair hearing before an impartial tribunal and should not be deprived of 
their properties (UNUDHR). 
The dominance of neopatrimonialism in Africa affects African development, good 
governance and accountability (Akokpari, 2004). Neopatrimonialism is a threat to African 
governance and accountability and even a threat to the society in general (Erdmann and 
Engel, 2007). Neopatrimonialism creates fiscal crises making development problematic 
and also creates personal loyalty that leads to undue favour to ethnic and sub-ethnic 
groups at the expense of the general public (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) thus leading 
to bad governance. This means that the state will transfer public resources partially to its 
supporters leaving other people in the country in want and poverty (Nawaz, 2008).  When 
governance is built on personal loyalty rather than on rules and regulations on which good 
governance stands, it will lead to societal crises or collapse (Bratton and Van de Walle, 
1994). Another consequence of neopatrimonialism is that leaders will starve opponents 
resources and therefore “lack of resources often prevents honest and capable leaders from 
coming to power” (Nawaz, 2008 p.5). Note also that:  
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“Not only do neopatrimonial systems provide limited accountability for 
resource distribution to a small group of constituents, it also damages the 
development of democratic accountability mechanisms in the long run” 
(Nawaz, 2008 p.1).  
Another way in which neopatrimonialism undermines good governance is that in 
neopatrimonial state the government in power monopolise the government power, 
control the Judiciary and the law enforcement agencies, limit access to resources thereby 
making voters to have no choice but continue to vote them in  (Nawaz, 2008). All these 
will lead to failure of the rule of law and lack of access to information-which are 
governance issues (Nawaz, 2008).  
Further, neopatrimonialism undermines governance and accountability by preventing the 
state to collect its full revenue (Soest, et al. 2011). In neopatrimonial countries, the 
appointments of tax officers are patronage appointments who are only accountable to 
their patrons and will be protected from prosecution if they are caught (Soest, et al. 
2011).  
Moreover, a military regime which means a strong man appears to rule without 
charismatic authority or traditional authority is a personal rule – because in a military 
rule, there is no separation between the public and private realms; there is corruption; 
military rules by decrees while constitution is suspended; military promotes ethnicism 
and patron/client relationship; and military oppresses opposition and violates human 
rights – and ultimately military rule leads to bad governance and lack of accountability 
(Ikpe, 2000). Military regimes’ demand total obedience and veneration from the citizens 
without argument is a characteristic of neopatrimonialism (Ikpe, 2000). E.g General 
Abacha regime was said to be neopatrimonial in that he: 
 “Used everything against Nigeria interest, against the Nigerian 
people, and only for himself, his family and his cohort. Not just the 
security apparatus, even the political system, the economic system, 
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everything that was there was used for him, his family and 
accomplices” (Obasanjo, 1998 p.10 in Ikpe, 2000 p.158).   
Another way in which neopatrimonialism compromises governance and accountability is 
where a president is above the law and controls the state resources with little 
accountability (Van de Walle, 2003). In this case, according to Van de Walle, 2003, even 
the middle level bureaucrat in the presidency controls the permanent secretary. The next 
section will consider the reasons for using neopatrimonialism as the theoretical lens for 
this study. 
4.5 Why the theory of neopatrimonialism is drawn upon in this study 
The two common theories used in corporate governance are agency theory and 
accountability theory (Wanyama, 2006; Bondamakara, 2010; Fox, 2010; Solomon, 2010), 
mainly based on the notion that ownership of organisations is separate from the 
management (Berle and Means, 1923; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
Although in the public sector, those managing the affairs of parastatals are assumed to be 
doing that on behalf of taxpayers it is helpful to think of them managing the State goods 
and services as if they were their personal properties. This is because those in government 
erroneously reason that government and whatever it has are “ours and private sector 
theirs” (Etukudo, 1997 p.1). This means that since there is no requirement to give account 
of what one possesses; those that are occupying governance positions in parastatals may 
see they owe no accountability to anyone. Neopatrimonialism is a theory giving insights 
in this context. 
Neopatrimonialism involves personalising public affairs (Medard, 1982); government is 
based on personal ruler; State officials personalise State goods and services; State 
officials take political offices as personal fiefdoms and patronage; State jobs operate 
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through patron-client networks; and public office serves the purpose of the person 
occupying that office (Ikpe, 2000). In this regard, neither agency theory nor 
accountability theory is appropriate for this study but neopatrimonialism is capable of 
giving insights to what is going on in ASCL and other parastatals in Nigeria and beyond. 
Neopatrimonialistic State provides little accountability (Nawaz, 2008) and if given, it is 
cosmetic (Wanyama et al., 2013).  
Moreover, the main reason for this study is to investigate the reasons why ASCL which 
was established in 1979 and substantially complete in the 1990s has not started producing 
steel. The theory of neopatrimonialism is found suitable to be used as search light to bring 
out the reasons why ASCL has not been completed after three decades of establishment 
and then to realise the objectives of this study. The theory of neopatrimonialism is mainly 
used to know why there is under-development in developing countries and therefore 
suitable for unveiling the reasons behind ASCL’s problems.   
Finally, neopatimonialism provides for substantively critical framework for the analysis 
of governance and accountability practices as some previous studies have articulated 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Ikpe, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002; 
Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Nawaz, 2008).  Particular features of this theorising promise to 
add to our appreciation of the governance and accountability practices in Nigerian 
parastatals and beyond. In this respect, the emphasis of neopatrimonialism on leader 
patronage and leader personal interests in governance are important as well as the focus 
on ethnicism and corruption. At the same time the thesis seeks to develop upon the 
generic framework through a contextual and historical analysis using a case study to 
explore the detail of processes. 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter explores theoretical frameworks used to explain or bring to light why ASCL 
has not been completed since 1979. Section 4.1 outlines the positioning of the theoretical 
perspective. Section 4.2 gives an overview of neopatrimonialism in relation...to the 
critical orientation of the study. Neopatrimonialism relates to a situation where officer of 
a state uses personal discretion instead of rules to administer, people in positions use their 
offices to acquire wealth thereby leading to under-development, economic and socio-
political problems bedevilling a society. It is divided into charismatic authority, legal-
rational authority and traditional authority (patrimonialism). Section 4.3 analyses the 
word “neopatrimonialism” which is the combination of patrimonialism and legal-rational 
bureaucratic authority. The section also lists the characteristics of neopatrimonialism to 
include clientelism, patronage, presidentialism, nepotism, prebendalism, bribery, 
corruption, favouritism, and ethnicism. Section 4.4 explores how neopatrimonialism 
undermines good governance and accountability. Neopatrimonialism is a threat to good 
governance and accountability. In a neopatrimonial State there is disrespect for the rule of 
law; intolerant of minority and opposition groups; lack of transparent political processes; 
judiciary is not independent; the law enforcement agents are obedient to government in 
power and lack of free press. Section 4.5 explains why the theory of neopatrimonialism is 
drawn on this study. Neopatrimonialism involves personalising public properties and 
goods. In the public sector, those managing the affairs of parastatals believe that 
government and whatever it has belong to them. This then makes them to take their 
positions and public goods as their personal possessions and owe no accountability to 
anyone. Neopatrimonialism is a theory giving insights in this context. 
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This chapter has in broad terms articulated an open and interpretive theoretical position 
with a critical orientation (see Laughlin, 1995). This chapter has presented a framework 
of neopatrimonialism informed by Weber’s work on legitimate authority. The legitimate 
authority was originally intended by Weber for good governance of organisations and 
society. Bureaucratic arrangements propounded by Weber have the benefits of leading to 
efficiency, precision, speed, unambiguity, continuity, unity, and strict subordination.  
Neopatrimonial rule, which is the combination of patrimonial authority and legal-rational 
authority, is the legacy that the colonial masters left for Africans who were ruled by 
kings, chiefs and elders before the advent of colonialism (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). 
Africans were ruled through intermediary system known as indirect rule (patrimonial 
rule); legal-rational dimension was limited to the centre of power in the colonial capital; 
Legal-rational bureaucracy was extended to Africa after Second World War (Erdmann 
and Engel, 2007). The combination of Weber’s traditional authority and legal-rational 
authority makes neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism hinders the vulnerable in the 
society, limits access to public resources, leads to insecurity, and is a danger to peaceful 
development of a society.  
The neopatrimonial approach provides a basis for studying ASCL that has the capability 
of exposing some of the primary problems veiling the steel project. The theory of 
neopatrimonialism used in this study is to shed lights and answer the following research 
questions: 
• Why has ASCL experienced serious delays in steel production over the period 
from 1979 to date in relation to practices of governance and accountability? 
• How are governance and accountability executed in Nigerian parastatals?  
• How can governance and accountability of parastatals be enhanced in Nigeria? 
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 The next chapter explains the study’s design by examining research methodology and 
methods.  
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Chapter Five 
Research Methodology and Methods: The Design 
   
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter articulated at a broad level the commitment of this study to an open 
interpretive theory (see Laughlin, 1995). The critical orientation was articulated in terms 
of a theoretical framing drawing from neopatrimonialism as a way of gaining insights into 
what is happening in parastatals in Nigeria. Neopatrimonialism, which highlights the 
combination of Weber’s traditional authority and legal-rational authority, is a theory that 
blurs the distinction between the private and public realms. 
The broad interpretive theory is located in the interpretive paradigm of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). This is elaborated here to articulate the methodology and methods of the 
study. This chapter thus outlines the research approach adopted in this study in terms of 
methodology and methods. The four paradigms of Burrell and Morgan (1979) will be 
explored. Along with contextual appreciation, a case study is used as a research strategy 
to answer the key question with some support from a questionnaire. 
Kerlinger (1986) argues that research design is a plan of what the researcher will do to 
obtain answers to his research questions and problems or evidence to support an 
argument. Research design assists the researcher to know what, whom, how, and why to 
observe, how to record and analyse observations and what inferences can be drawn 
(Cauvery, 2005; Kumar, 2011).  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 explores basic beliefs in social science 
research; section 5:2 looks at perspectives for accounting research; section 5.3 outlines 
 
 
                                                                     
 
155 
 
the paradigm and methodology underpinning the present study; section 5.4 explores the 
research methods; section 5.5 examines triangulation; section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.1 Basic beliefs in social science research 
Some phrases like “how things really are,” “how things really work” or what is the nature 
of the “knowable?” Or, what is the nature of “reality?” are basic ontological beliefs and 
questions (Guba, 1990 p.18-19). On the other hand epistemological beliefs address the 
question “what is the nature of the relationship between the knower (the investigator) and 
the known (or the knowable)?” (Guba, 1990 p.18). The ontological and epistemological 
principles of an investigator guide the approach to investigations (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Hannah, 2003). Paradigm (worldview) is “a basic set 
of beliefs45 that guide action” (Guba, 1990, p.17; Creswell 2007, p.19; Collis and Hussey, 
2009). One’s belief and experience guide one’s actions and one’s attitude to life may be 
as a result of one’s experiences, background and upbringing which guide and direct how 
one conducts oneself (Creswell, 2007).  These assumptions are related to the nature of 
reality (ontology); the relationship of the researcher to that being researched 
(epistemology); the role of values in a study (axiology); and the process of research 
(methodology).  
It is important to note that “all theories of organisation are based upon a philosophy of 
science and the theory of society” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p.1). The assumptions about 
the nature of social science are the issues relating to ontology, epistemology, human 
nature and methodology.  
 
                                                          
45These beliefs are called different names by different scholars such as paradigms, philosophical 
assumptions, epistemologies, ontologies, research methodologies, and alternative knowledge claims (Crotty, 
1998; Mertens, 1998; Neuman, 2000; Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Creswell, 2007).  
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5.1.1 Assumptions about the nature of social science 
Ontology deals with objects or beings to be investigated, their nature, how they really are 
and how they work (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Epistemological assumption is a 
philosophical assumption that investigates the nature, origin, methods, validity and the 
limit of the knowledge of human beings (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In general, 
epistemology deals with how you understand the world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Crotty (1998) declares that “epistemology is a way of understanding and explaining how 
we know what we know” (p.8). Associated with ontological and epistemological views is 
the assumption of human nature which is the relationship of human beings with their 
environments (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Does the environment in which he domiciles 
control him or does he control his environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979)? 
Finally, the researcher’s ontology, epistemology and human nature affect his 
methodology. Methodology according to Taylor and Bogdan (1984) is “the way in which 
we approach problems and seek answers” (p.1). It is a process of developing knowledge 
(Berry, 1983). Methodology concerns itself with the way in which one attempts to 
investigate and obtain knowledge about the social world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) divide different theories relating to the nature of social science 
and nature of society into two dimensions. The nature of social science has a subjective-
objective dimension; and the nature of society has a regulation-radical dimension. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the subjective-objective dimension of the nature of social science. 
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Fig. 5.1: The Subjective-Objective dimension 
 
    
         The Subjectivist              The Objectivist  
          approach to                         approach to 
          Social Science                         Social Science  
 
              Ontology        
 
 
                  Epistemology 
 
 
                Human nature  
 
 
                Methodology 
          
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) appreciation of the subjective–objective 
divide. Nominalism, to individual understanding is that the social world is just names, 
concepts and labels that are used to structure reality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 
names are artificial creations used as tools for description, sense making and to negotiate 
the outside world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). On the other hand, realists believe that 
there is real structure in the external world which comprises hard, tangible and 
unchangeable structures (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This reality exists externally 
independent of human beings and is powered by unchangeable natural laws (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). It is the duties of the “scientists to discover the true nature of reality, how 
it works, then predict and control natural phenomenon” (Guba, 1990 p.19).  
Moreover, positivism describes what happens regularly or causally and that will help to 
explain or predict the outcome of the phenomenon, which will enable scientists to 
Nominalism 
Realism 
Anti-positivism Positivism 
Voluntarism Determinism 
Ideographic Nomothetic 
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logically prove or verify something scientifically (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Senik, 
2009). Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that positivists “seek to explain and predict what 
happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between 
its constituent elements” (p.5). Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that under positivist 
epistemology, growth of knowledge is enhanced by addition of new knowledge to prior 
knowledge cumulatively with false knowledge excluded. The anti-positivist believes that 
knowledge can only be gained through active participation, experience, and interpretation, 
rather than the separated analysis of positivism. For instance, Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
maintain that “the social world can only be understood from the point of view of the 
individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied” (p.5).  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue regarding human nature46 that the determinist position 
regards man as a product of the environment in which he stays and the voluntarist views 
man as independent of his environment and self-willed. The voluntarist view, according 
to Burrell and Morgan (1979), sees man not tied down by his environment and in this 
regard to some extent controller and master and not a puppet of the environment in which 
he stays unlike man in the determinist view who is controlled by his environment. 
Finally, there are methodological tendencies associated with the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. An ideographic methodological or typically qualitative 
approach to social science entails getting close to or getting inside the object being 
investigated to get first-hand knowledge, detailed background and life history of the 
subject under investigation by using observation, in-depth interview, document diaries, 
biographies, journalistic records and newspapers (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) maintain that the ideographic method “stresses the importance of letting 
                                                          
46 Human nature and activities can be deterministic in that his experience and activities are products of his 
environment; depends on his environment; and submissive (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
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one’s subject unfold its nature and characteristics during the process of investigation” 
(p.6). On the other hand, the nomothetic methodological or typically quantitative 
approach to social science “lays emphasis on the importance of basing research upon 
systematic protocol and technique which focus upon the testing hypotheses in accordance 
with the canons of scientific rigour”(Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p.6). Nomothetic 
methodological or quantitative approach to social science is typically followed in natural 
sciences where surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and standardised research 
instruments of all kinds dominate (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
5.1.2 Basic beliefs about the nature of society 
Lockwood (1956) and Darendorf (1959) propounded an order-conflict theory of society. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) transformed this into a theory articulated in terms of 
regulations and radical change. Table 5.1 below overviews Dahrendorf’s (1959) order-
conflict theory. 
Table 5.1 Order-Conflict of Dahrendorf 
Two theories of society: ‘order’ and ‘conflict’ 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.13)  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest regulation-radical change rather than this to enable a 
clearer understanding of order-conflict distinction between the research interests of those 
investigating social sciences. For Burrell and Morgan (1979), those researchers who adopt 
the sociology of regulation perspective are of the opinion that there should be regulation 
The ‘order’ or ‘integrationist’ 
view of society emphasises: 
             The ‘conflict’ or ‘coercion’ 
             view of society emphasises: 
                    Stability 
                   Integration 
           Functional co-ordination 
                   Consensus 
                      Change 
                      Conflict 
                   Disintegration 
                      Coercion 
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of human activities to ensure stability, maintenance of the accepted social order (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). On the other hand, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979), those 
researchers who adopt the sociology of radical change position want to set man free from 
the oppression, depression and structures which limit and restrict his growth materially, 
mentally and spiritually and for this reason reject the status quo. The difference between 
the two sociologies is illustrated in a format as shown in table 5.2 below: 
Table 5.2 The regulation-radical change dimension 
 
The Sociology of Regulation is  
Concerned With: 
 
The Sociology of Radical Change is 
Concerned with: 
a. The status quo                                                            a. Radical change 
b. Social order                                                                 b. Structural conflict 
c. Consensus      c. Modes of domination 
d. Social integration and cohesion                              d. Contradiction 
e. Solidarity     e. Emancipation 
f. Need satisfaction                                                         f. Deprivation 
g. Actuality     g. Potentiality 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.18). 
Laughlin (1995) translates this dimension of Burrell and Morgan (1979) in a way that 
facilitates understanding. He suggests a continuum between conservative and critical 
positions. Burrell and Morgan (1979) combine the two dimensions of the assumptions 
about the nature of social science (subjective-objective dimension) and the assumptions 
about the nature of society (regulation-radical change dimension) to form four paradigms 
in social science research. The four paradigms are in quadrants of a matrix as shown 
below. 
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Fig. 5.2 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory  
                  THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
                 
                                                                                                                                                                       
SUBJECTIVE                                                                                     OBJECTIVE                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                       
                           THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
                             Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.22). 
 
The four paradigms show four views of the social world. To be in a particular paradigm 
means you view the social world in a particular way (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 
four paradigms provide a map for negotiating one’s subject area and help the social 
theorist to know where he is and provides a tool for mapping intellectual journeys in 
social theory (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). One can move from one paradigm to another 
but cannot operate in more than one paradigm at the same time and a movement from one 
paradigm to another over time is seen as something of a conversion experience (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Given the nature of the dimensions as setting up a continuous field, 
being in the same paradigm does not mean that the theorists agree on everything. There 
are more or less extreme positions within a paradigm. For instance, two researchers could 
be in the interpretive paradigm but one could be more critical than the other, i.e. one 
could have more of a critical orientation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Note that Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) see the paradigms as mutually exclusive, which reflects that the 
scheme is a classification scheme. Below each paradigm is reviewed. 
In the radical humanist paradigm, theorists’ intellectual foundation can be traced to some 
of the same source as that of the interpretive paradigm. The main aim of the radical 
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humanists is to free humanity from limitations that inhibit his true fulfilment, criticise the 
status quo, overthrow the existing arrangement, and transcend the spiritual bonds and 
fetters (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It places emphasis upon human consciousness and 
freedom to enable him realise his full potentials (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
There is a belief in the radical structuralist paradigm that there are structures in the society 
which oppose themselves and the pursuit of members and different interests lead to 
conflict (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). These conflicts generate radical change through 
political and economic crises and the crises, criticisms, conflicts and the change lead to 
freedom of men from the social structures which have held them captive (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The paradigm has the same view with the radical humanist (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). 
The functionalist paradigm’s main aim is effective regulation and control of social affairs 
and applying the models and methods of the natural science to study human affairs 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It is pragmatic in orientation and concerned with providing 
practical solutions to practical problems; it entails reasoned human action and accepts that 
organisational behaviour can be understood by testing hypothesis; it encourages social 
engineering as a means of change and considers understanding, order, equilibrium and 
stability in society as very important and ensures that this is maintained; and it uses 
quantitative method to explain the phenomenon under study (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986). 
The theorists in the interpretive paradigm are interested in understanding the social world 
as it is and try to explain the regulation and order of society from the standpoint of 
subjective experience (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
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The main focus of interpretive paradigm is to understand the phenomenon under 
investigation. To have a deeper understanding of the social world, one must have first-
hand, detailed knowledge to gain insight into the situation that is being explored (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Interpretive researchers try to immerse themselves in on-going 
activities to understand human behaviour and the spiritual nature of the world (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). 
The interpretive paradigm is considered the best approach to provide a better 
understanding of the socio-political and economic influence in parastatals in Nigeria 
including ASCL. To explore the behaviour of individuals in a human organization like a 
parastatal requires a subjectivist approach by the researcher. 
5.2 Perspectives for accounting research 
Hopper and Powell (1985), Chua (1986), Laughlin (1995), and Ryan et al. (2002) built 
upon Burrell and Morgan’s general sociological research framework. They depended on 
Burrell and Morgan’s works to build alternative methodological approaches from an 
accounting research point of view. Chua (1986) identified three alternative approaches 
that provide a foundation for accounting research. These are mainstream accounting 
research, interpretive accounting research and critical accounting research. Chua (1986) 
combined the radical humanism and radical structuralism paradigms of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) to form critical accounting research because their separation “is not well 
supported within sociology itself, being based on a contentious reading of Marx’s 
arguments” (Chua, 1986 p.627). Chua (1986) criticises Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
transplanting of a substantively unmodified framework from sociology (see also Ahrens, 
2008). Chua (1986) labelled mainstream accounting research, critical accounting research 
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and interpretive research as accounting perspectives instead of Burrell and Morgan’s 
paradigms.  
Laughlin’s (1995) reasoning is consistent with Chua (1986), although he adds the 
continuum, discussed in the previous chapter, related to the degree of openness of the 
prior theory. He also emphasises the sense in which the dimensions categorising different 
perspectives or paradigms are continuous dimensions, so that a continuous field is 
constituted.  
5.3 Paradigm and methodology underpinning the present study 
This study is situated within the interpretive paradigm of Burrell and Morgan (1979) and 
Chua (1986). In Laughlin’s (1995) terms, as we have already discussed, the position 
adopted is more subjectivist than objectivist and is an approach very open to finding new 
things out (it is anti-dogmatic). Within the interpretive paradigm (a continuous field of 
possibilities in terms of the above logic), the perspective does have a critical emphasis or 
critical orientation. The methodological positions of this study tend, then, to nominalism, 
anti-positivism, voluntarism and gives preference to an ideographic methodology.  
The aim of this study is to investigate governance and accountability issues in Nigerian 
parastatals with the case of Ajaokuta Steel through an interpretive lens with a critical 
orientation drawing from appreciation of good governance and accountability and an 
appreciation of neopatrimonialism in the theoretical framework to guide the research. 
Parastatals are here seen as human organisations that can be better understood by a more 
subjectivist approach to research. Human behaviour cannot be predicted or generalised 
(Puxty, 1998), so there is a need to understand individual’s views of societal order in the 
organisational situation. To gain appropriate insights, the researcher has to visit the site he 
is investigating in order to have first-hand knowledge of what he is investigating. This 
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study entails visiting ASCL and other parastatals in Nigeria several times before approval 
for interviews was granted. The researcher went to ASCL for interviews and the 
distribution of questionnaires twice. A questionnaire was also distributed (providing some 
space for general comment) to support the interview/case study methods, as the researcher 
sought to extend and triangulate certain aspects of the analysis. Some of those who 
declined to be interviewed were prepared to complete the questionnaire.  
Case study reflects the strong commitment to interpretive and qualitative research because 
obtaining the views of those inside the organisation is the key part of this study.  The 
study also reflects that qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined (Creswell, 
2002; Tashakkori & Tweddie, 2003; Roberts, 2004; Johnson and Christensen, 2012) to 
tap the advantages of both to unravel the veil behind the reason why ASCL which was 
incorporated in 1979 and yet to commence production despite substantive investment.  
As Morgan (1983) himself acknowledges, location in a particular paradigm does not 
determine in a strong sense choice of method but rather influences the researcher’s 
preferences over method and how the researcher values different methods. Further, there 
are arguments for mixed methods research and triangulation in terms of adding further 
evidence and insights.  
5.4 Research methods 
In order to obtain knowledge, one has to be actively involved in the phenomenon under 
investigation to enable one to have first-hand knowledge of what is being investigated 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The current study used many methods to gather data. These 
are observations, semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, case study and documents 
analysis which are explained below. 
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5.4.1 Observation 
Sekaran (1992) defines observation as “the application of the sense of the vision to gather 
information about people in their natural work environment” (p.215). It can be participant 
observation when the researcher participates in the activities of the group being observed 
or non-participant observation when the researcher does not participate in the activities of 
the group (Kumar, 2011). Observation is used in a sense in this study as heads of 
departments and administrative staff were seen busy in their offices with paper work and 
were interviewed by the researcher. In contrast, there was little to see on the production 
line and many workers were sitting idle in their offices. 
5.4.2 Interviews 
Burgess (1982) notes that “an interview is the opportunity for the researcher to probe 
deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, 
accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience” (p.107). Interview 
enables the researcher to probe further to get clarification on answers given and sensitive 
questions can be asked using interview but may be costly47 (Umoru, 2005). Interview is 
considered important and very appropriate for this research given access opportunities 
and the possibilities. Interviews could be structured, semi-structured or unstructured 
(open-ended) (Hannah, 2003). 
5.4.2.1 Structured interviews 
In a structured interview, “the researcher asks a predetermined set of questions, using the 
same wording and order of questions as specified in the interview schedule” (Kumar, 
2011 p.145). The tone is not conversational as the interviewee is typically only allowed to 
                                                          
47The interview may be costly when the cost of transportation, coverage and time are put into consideration. 
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respond yes, no or a limited set of phrases compiled by the researcher (Hannah, 2003). It 
has the advantage of uniformity facilitating the collection of data with high comparability 
(Kumar, 2011). A highly structured interview was deemed not suitable for this study 
given the concern to interact with interviewees to access deeper insights consistent with 
an interpretive approach. 
5.4.2.2 Unstructured interviews 
In this type of interview, the interviewee enters into conversation with the interviewer 
about the topic with little direction (Hannah, 2003). Here the interviewer asks question in 
which the interviewee is then “allowed to respond freely, with the interviewer simply 
responding to points that seem worthy of being followed up” (Bryman and Bell, 2007 p. 
474). This type of interview is important if the interviewer is interested in eliciting 
detailed information about someone’s life history from the interview (Hannah, 2003). The 
advantage, according to Hannah (2003), is that the interview is adjusted to the level and 
condition of the interviewee but it is time consuming and expensive. It is also known as 
uncontrolled, unguided or undirected interview (Mishra, 1986). It is not used, appropriate 
or adopted for this study. 
5.4.2.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that a semi-structured interview is when: 
“…the researcher has a list of questions on fairly specific 
topics to be covered, often referred to as an interview guide, 
but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to 
reply. Questions may not follow on exactly in the way 
outlined on the schedule (p.474)”. 
Some questions that may not be in the interview guide may be asked if the interviewer 
wants to pick up on things said by the interviewee and this therefore allows flexibility and 
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can give rise to more personal and in-depth answers from interviewees (Hannah, 2003). 
This makes this type of interview suitable, important and appropriate for this study. The 
interviewer used this method of interview to elicit responses from politicians, journalists, 
academics, medical doctors, civil servants, lawyers, members of the labour union, and 
members of the management staff of ASCL. They were interviewed because of their 
experience and knowledge of parastatals in Nigeria. The interviewer found it relatively 
easy to proceed with this type of interview because respondents were eager to use it as a 
medium to elaborate their views. Most of the interviewees agreed that their voices should 
be recorded. The researcher recorded their voices using a digital recorder.  
Data for this research were collected in two phases. After the approval was given by 
ASCL to conduct interview, ASCL was visited twice because of the sensitive nature of 
the steel company. The first time was December 2010 to March 2011; 16 people were 
interviewed: 13 stakeholders and 3 ASCL management staff. The second phase of data 
collection was in December 2011 to February 2012; 17 people were interviewed: 10 
stakeholders and 7 ASCL management staff. In all, 33 people were interviewed apart 
from informal discussions with several people that were not recorded. The breakdown of 
the interviews is as shown in the table below. 
Table 5.3 List of Interviewees (first phase) 
Interviewees ( December, 2010 – March 2011) 
Number 
 
Journalist 2 
Civil servant 5 
Politician  1 
Political commentator, analyst and academic 1 
Chamber of Commerce (DG) 1 
Academic 3 
ASCL Management Staff  3 
Total 16 
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Table 5.4 List of Interviewees (second phase) 
Interviewees ( December 2011 – February 2012) Number 
Academic 2 
Human right activist 1 
Legal practitioner 1 
Representative of UNDP, World Bank and non-governmental 
Organisation 
1 
Civil Servant 2 
Politician 1 
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) 1 
Journalist 1 
ASCL Management Staff 7 
Total 17 
 
In the first phase, the interview schedule was divided into three sections. The first section 
deals with questions for politicians, specifically members of parliament from Kogi state 
where ASCL is sited; the second section deals with questions for the taxpayers/public48 
and the third section deals with questions for the management of ASCL.  
In the second phase, the interview schedule is divided into two parts: the first part is a 
semi-structured interview for other stakeholders who are journalists, academics, 
politicians, labour unions and lawyers. This first part is further divided into five themes 
which are: (a) Governance and Accountability in Nigeria; (b) Governing Board of 
Parastatal organisations; (c) Stakeholders; (d) Perspective on accountability and 
neopatrimonialism; (e) Ajaokuta Steel Complex. The second part of the interview 
schedule is the semi-structured interview prepared for the management and staff of 
ASCL. This part is further divided into four themes and they are governance and 
accountability in ASCL, governing board of ASCL, privatisation and the ASCL 
stakeholders. Both parts of the interview were brought to an end by the question “what do 
you think should be done to bring the needed change?” 
                                                          
48 The taxpayers/public in this case are the civil servants, journalists, lawyers, academicians, doctors, and 
others who know much about parastatals. 
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The interviewees gave the researcher considerable time and supplied the researcher with 
relevant documents. The interviews lasted for approximately 45 minutes each and were 
recorded after the consents of the interviewees were sought. These were transcribed and 
analysed in the next chapter.  
5.4.2.4 Documents analysis 
Documents analysis which is secondary data/second hand information is relevant to every 
case study topic because it corroborates and adds evidence from other sources, thereby 
increasing validity (Yin, 2009). The use of documents is very vital to this study. This is 
because ASCL has not started producing steel and therefore various documents relating to 
what is happening needed to be obtained. Many documents were collected from ASCL. 
The documents collected from ASCL for this study are letters from the Ministry of Iron 
and Steel Development to ASCL, government policies and pronouncements on ASCL, 
parliamentary debates on ASCL, progress reports, accounting statements, CEO’s 
presentation to the governing board, Memorandum and Articles of Association, internal 
and external documents, labour union documents as regards ASCL, newspapers reports 
and the company’s website. 
5.4.3 Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire contains a list of questions prepared by a researcher to elicit information 
from respondents and is meant to answer research questions which originated from theory 
and after a careful review of literature (Umoru, 2005). Since questions in the 
questionnaire are to be interpreted and completed by the respondents themselves, the 
researcher should ensure that the questions are clear; easy to understand and read; 
questions should be ordered sequentially and developed in interactive style (Kumar, 
2011). 
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A survey questionnaire is cheaper to administer than interview because the cost of time 
and monetary value that it will take the interviewer to travel from one place to another 
will be more than using postal questionnaires; and it provides a greater anonymity than an 
interview (Kumar, 2011). This becomes important if sensitive questions are to be asked to 
the respondents. ASCL has become sensitive because of the time it is taking to complete 
the project. The researcher used questionnaires in addition to interviews and a case study 
approach in order to elicit in-depth insights from those who did not want to say something 
that would endanger their jobs and personality. Some of the respondents who completed 
the questionnaires refused to complete the demographic aspect of the questionnaire in 
order to hide their identities and also refused to be interviewed.  
There are different ways of administering questionnaires (Umoru, 2005; Falgi, 2009): (i) 
self-completing questionnaires- respondents complete the questionnaires themselves; (ii) 
postal questionnaires - the questionnaire is sent to the prospective respondent by post; (iii) 
telephone questionnaire- this is a form of structured interview where the respondent gives 
his response through the phone; (iv) face-to-face questionnaire where the interviewer will 
be present when the respondent is completing the questionnaire to clarify issues that the 
respondent may not understand. The one adopted by this researcher is the self-completing 
questionnaire. 
Questionnaires can be structured or unstructured (Umoru, 2005). In a structured 
questionnaire, according to Umoru (2005), the respondent is given a list of questions and 
options to tick or circle one of the options given. An unstructured questionnaire is one in 
which the respondent is given the opportunity to explain his position after choosing from 
the options given (Umoru, 2005). It means that the respondent will be given opportunity 
to raise further issues that he considers necessary for the interviewer to know (Umoru, 
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2005). The present study asked respondents to comment on other issues in questions K 
and L that were not mentioned in questions D to J.  
The researcher decided to adopt mixed methods of research in order to gain the 
advantages of qualitative and quantitative methods of research and to support in-depth 
and triangulated research. The questionnaire recipients are ASCL staff, politicians, 
lawyers, medical doctors, civil servants, Ajaokuta community, academics, labour unions, 
managing director of a private company, journalists and human rights activists. Table 5.5 
below shows those who completed the questionnaires. 
Table 5.5 Respondents of the questionnaire.     
Respondent Number 
ASCL Staff 18 
Academics  8 
Journalists  4  
Civil servants 12 
Managing Director of a private company  1 
Politician  1 
Lawyer  1 
Human right activist  1 
Labour union members  2  
Others  2 
Total  50 
 
Questions A to C are for the respondents to provide their personal details. Questions D to 
J used 5 point Likert scale in which the respondents ticked their answers to the extent that 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement. The 5 point Likert-scale is 1: Strongly agree; 
2: Agree; 3:  Undecided; 4: Disagree; 5: Strongly disagree. Questions K and L asked 
unstructured questions in which the respondents were asked what they think could be 
done to bring the needed change (K) and any other comments (L). The questionnaire was 
piloted on PhD students in Accounting and Finance within the School of Business, 
University of Dundee and all errors were corrected at this stage before being administered 
to the stakeholders as shown in table 5.5 above.  
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5.4.4 Case study 
In this study, a case study research approach was used to analyse the governance and 
accountability issues in Nigerian parastatals with Ajaokuta Steel as the case. Yin (2009) 
defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p.18). Creswell (2007) 
believes it is: 
…a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded 
system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information 
(e.g., observations, interviews, audio-visual material, documents and 
reports), and reports a case description and a case-based theme (p.73). 
ASCL is one of the parastatals owned by the FGN which was established in 1979 to 
produce steel but has not produced steel since its establishment. It is a parastatal believed 
to be almost complete by the 1990s but has since been neglected. Case study research was 
considered to be the best approach to gain an in-depth understanding of what is happening 
in ASCL over three decades.  
A case study is, according to Yin (2009), preferable when why or how questions are to be 
asked and answered; when the problem is currently an on-going event which allows the 
use of different evidence like documents, artefacts, interviews and observations for an in-
depth investigation (retrieving data in their natural settings); the event in which the 
researcher has little or no control; and where there is a well-contrived theoretical 
framework. A case study is appropriate when the problem involves actions of human 
beings (Yin, 2009). For instance, the remaining uncompleted components of ASCL is due 
to human action, which needs to be investigated using interviews, documents, 
questionnaires and observations to unearth the mysteries behind its non-completion. A 
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key point is that it allows in-depth findings, through an intensive focus on a particular 
case. 
Case studies are however said to be not as rigorous as scientific experiments; procedures 
are not systematically followed; and a case study findings cannot be used to generalise 
about the population except to expand and generalise theories (analytical generalisations) 
(Yin, 2009). A case study is also criticised for taking a long time to come out with data 
and for producing too many documents that are often difficult to read (Bryman and Bell, 
2007; Yin, 2009). Access to the chosen case will not be easy and the interpretations of the 
information and facts supplied by respondents may be misleading or misinterpreted by the 
researcher (Yin, 2009). Access was given to interview ASCL management staff and other 
informal interviews with other staff, the steel workers’ union chairman and other 
executive members. Approval for the interviews was given by ASCL management in 
response to a letter written by the researcher’s supervisor. The approval letter given by the 
ASCL is attached to this study as appendix 1. 
A case study can be single case study or multiple-case studies; use quantitative evidence; 
use the mixture of qualitative and quantitative evidences; have a place in evaluation 
research; and can be conducted and written with diverse motives (Yin, 2009). This study 
is a case study and used the mixture of interviews and questionnaires. Stake (1995); Ryan 
et al. (2002); Creswell (2007); and Yin (2009) detail the following as the procedures for 
carrying out case study research: 
The first step the researcher of case study will take is to ascertain the research problems, 
aims and questions and then the decision to use the case study. The researcher should 
review some case study literatures and examine some studies on case studies to serve as a 
model. 
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The next step is to arrange for access to the case which may be individual, organisation, 
event, behavioural condition, ailment or anything dealing with human beings promising to 
keep confidential any data collected. At this stage it will be necessary to choose the theory 
which will guide the researcher in data collection and analysis. The investigator is to 
decide whether to use a single case or multiple case studies in which he may decide to 
keep in his case holistic or embedded sub-cases.49 A visit was made to ASCL to seek for 
access in June 2010 and the approval was received in July 2010. The study should be well 
designed to achieve reliability and validity. In quantitative research, reference is made to 
reliability, validity and generalizability but in a case study, reference is made to 
procedural reliability, contextual validity and transferability.50 
The next step is the training and skill of the investigator. The investigator must have good 
skills in asking questions, ability to listen carefully to the respondents and must be 
flexible.  
The fourth stage of conducting case study research involves the collection of data. The 
researcher must show evidence for his work. These sources of evidence are documents, 
direct or participant observation, archival records, physical artefacts and interviews. The 
evidence that was used for this study is collected by semi-structured interviews, direct 
observation, questionnaires and documents from within and without ASCL, including 
newspapers and the company’s website. Research questions, theoretical frameworks and 
the review of relevant literature will help direct which evidence the researcher will have 
                                                          
49 If you are conducting a research on an individual or organisation, you are engaging on single/embedded 
case study but it becomes multiple/embedded study when two or more individuals or organisations are 
being studied (Yin, 2012). Holistic study is taking the whole case as a unit of analysis - that is when logical 
subunits cannot be identified (Yin, 2012).  
50 Procedural reliability means the adoption of appropriate and reliable research methods and procedures; 
contextual validity means the credibility of the case study evidence and conclusions that are drawn from 
there and transferability means transferability of the findings from one context to another (Ryan et al., 
2002). 
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to collect. The researcher should tape-record his interviews if agreed by the respondents 
and should take note while the interview is going on because memories fade quickly. 
Informal interviews help to corroborate the source of information and records; notes and 
all the evidence collected should be kept in a safe place for consultation if it becomes 
necessary. 
The next step in a case study research is the analysis of evidence from data collected. 
Data analysis “consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing, or otherwise 
recombining evidence to draw empirically based conclusions” (Yin, 2009 p.126). In 
analysing data, interpret the data collected, analyse according to subject (theme) of 
discussions (issues), put up provisional conclusions and arrange for final report.  
The final stage of the case study research is to report the results and findings. It is the 
phase at which the researcher reports the knowledge gained from the case. This stage will 
identify the audience and display enough evidence for readers to reach their own 
conclusions. The researcher should take the report as if it were a story, look for ways in 
which the story is incomplete and discuss the work with people.   
In conclusion, the depth and the richness of a case study make it possible to be used in 
this study in order to take a holistic approach to unravel the mysteries behind an 
organisation which was substantially complete in the 1990s (more than two decades ago) 
but is still not functional. From this, ways forward might be better suggested. 
5.4.4.1 Generalisation of a case study 
Generalisation is not the main objective of this study but to examine ASCL that was 
established in 1979, which has not started production of steel three decades after. This 
view is acknowledged by Punch (2005) that the objective of research projects should not 
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necessarily be to generalise. A case because it is interesting, unusual, unique, important or 
misunderstood can be studied in-depth in its own right (Punch, 2005). This is done to 
clear the coast of our shallow, fragmentary and incomplete knowledge of the situation of 
things (Punch, 2005). This is applicable to the case of ASCL which was established in 
1979 and was substantially complete in 1990s but a shadow of its potential. Secondly, 
according to Punch (2005), a case study can also be undertaken where it becomes 
necessary to study a negative case. Negative in the sense that the case is completely 
opposite or the general pattern of the case is significantly different from other cases 
thereby giving rise to investigating the reasons why the case is different from others. 
Besides, multiple case studies dilute the overall analysis in that the more the cases to 
study the less in-depth the study, unlike one case study where a full and holistic study will 
be carried out (Creswell, 2007). That is there are great in-depth insights possible from the 
focussed study of a particular case. 
Researchers like Lincoln and Guba (1985), Roslender (1992), Ryan et al. (2002), and Yin 
(2009) argue that the findings of a case study cannot be used to generalize to a population, 
replicated or used for prediction for the reason that the data is not statistically 
representative of the universe or population. However, case study can be used to 
generalise findings if evidence from similar studies agree with the findings (Hammersley, 
1992). Findings of a case study can be generalised to existing theory (Yin, 2009).51 Other 
researchers can replicate the pattern found in the case study, if the theory from the 
original case study is strong and acceptable to be used by other researchers (Yin, 2009). 
In this study a loose generalisation (Hannah 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2009) may be made 
by transferring what is happening in ASCL to Nigerian parastatals and beyond including 
                                                          
51 It is often called theoretical or analytic generalization (Yin, 2009). 
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with the use of mixed methods which combine qualitative and quantitative methods thus 
deriving advantages of both.  
5.5 Triangulation 
Triangulation here means using several methods and sources of data to confirm research 
findings (Denzin (1970) (in Bryman and Bell, 2007). Collis and Hussey (2014) define it 
as “the use of multiple sources of data, different research methods and/or more than one 
researcher to investigate the same phenomenon in a study” (p.71). These multiple results 
strengthen confidence or credibility to research findings (Johnson and Christensen, 2012). 
Where many methods are used, the advantages of one method or source will counteract 
the disadvantages of another (Ryan et al., 2002). For instance, those who were afraid to 
comment verbally through interview on the reasons for the serious delays in producing 
steel at ASCL preferred to tick the option given in the questionnaire. In addition, 
triangulation makes research findings from a case study more generalizable (Normann, 
1970; Hammersley, 1992; and Scandura and Williams, 2000). Case study findings or 
conclusions can be more reliable and credible if they are based on many sources of 
information (Yin, 2009). In this study, the literature review, documents analysis, case 
study, survey questionnaires, theoretical framework and interviews confirm that data, 
theory and method triangulations have been accomplished. 
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the philosophical assumptions of the study as a way of introducing 
the research methodology and methods adopted. This study follows a perspective within 
the interpretive paradigm that is critically oriented. The study uses observation, 
interviews, questionnaires, case study and document analysis. The interviews, 
questionnaire and case study are presented and elaborated in the next two chapters.                                                             
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Chapter   Six 
Findings: Semi-Structured Interviews with Stakeholders in Nigeria 
6.0 Introduction 
Chapter five examined the philosophical assumptions underpinning this study. 
Interpretivism with criticism and case study method were adopted for this study. The 
present chapter details the findings of the semi-structured interviews52 conducted in 
Nigeria from December 2010 to March 2011 and the second interviews53 which were 
conducted from December 2011 to February 2012. The interviews were conducted two 
times because of the sensitivity of ASCL. The objective of these interviews was to obtain 
the reasons for persistent governance and accountability issues in parastatals in Nigeria 
with the case of ASCL in particular; which was established in 1979, substantially 
complete in the 1990s, but has not produced steel products to date. Interviews were 
conducted in English language as this is the official language of Nigeria. All interviews 
with those outside ASCL are outlined in this chapter while the next chapter discusses the 
interviews with the management staff of ASCL and questionnaire survey. Interviews were 
highlighted, presented and analysed based on the issues that emerged out of the interviews 
and documents collected from interviewees.  
Table 6.1 below contains the list of participants from outside ASCL numbering about 13 
interviewees from December 2010 to March 2011 for the first interviews. Table 6.2 
shows the list of 10 interview participants between December 2011 and February 2012 for 
the second interviews. Interviewees were investigated with the understanding that they 
were in the best position to give unbiased account of what they know about governance 
                                                          
52 See appendix III and IV for interview guide (first phase of interviews) 
53 See appendix VI for interview guide (second phase of interviews) 
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and accountability issues in parastatals in Nigeria and ASCL. Interviews were reported 
anonymously to protect the identities of the interviewees. Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below 
show the list of stakeholders interviewed in the first and second phases. 
 
Table 6.1 List of interviewees outside ASCL-for interviews conducted from 
December 2010 to March 2011 (first interviews)       
Code Interviewee Years of experience Remarks 
A1 Journalist              28 Radio House 
A2 Journalist              26 Newspaper 
A3 Civil Servant              25 Nigerian Television Authority                          
(NTA) 
A4 Civil Servant              28 Min. Of Trade and Industry. 
A5 Civil Servant              27 Chambers of Commerce, Industry, 
Mines and Agriculture (CCIMA) 
A6 Politician 
 
             30 Government Investment Company 
A7 Civil Servant              27 Ministry of Finance 
A8 Academic              28 Tertiary Institution 
A9 Academic              22 Tertiary Institution 
A10 Non-academic              34 Tertiary Institution 
A11 Civil Servant              31 Ministry of Information 
A12 Academic              24 Tertiary Institution 
A13 Academic/ Political 
commentator/analyst 
             26 Tertiary Institution, Management 
consultant 
Note: Table 6.1 shows the stakeholders interviewed from December 2010 to March 2011 (first interviews).  
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Table 6.2 List of interviewees outside ASCL-for interviews conducted from 
December 2011 to February, 2012 (second interviews). 
Code Interviewee Years of 
experience 
            Remarks 
 
B1 Academic       27 Former head of a parastatal, 
present chairman of a board of a 
parastatal and an academic. 
B2 Academic      25 Management staff of a tertiary 
institution. 
B3 Human right activist      15 A private company 
B4 Civil servant 
             
     21 Chamber of Commerce,  
Industries, Mines and 
Agriculture (CCIMA) 
 
B5 Academic, Management consultant, 
Policy analyst, Representative of             
non-governmental org., UNDP, 
World Bank. 
      15 Academic and management 
consultant. 
B6 Civil Servant      31 Former  head of a parastatal and 
presently a director in a ministry 
B7 Politician      15   Chairman, board of a parastatal 
 
B8 Civil Servant      20 Director of a parastatal 
B9 Civil Servant      21                                                                                          Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC)
B10 Journalist      25                         Radio House 
Note: Table 6.2 shows the stakeholders interviewed from December 2011 to February, 
2012 (second interviews).  
Code A indicates those who were interviewed in the first phase of the interviews. Code B 
indicates those who were interviewed in the second interviews.  
The key issues identified from the semi-structured interviews are outlined in this chapter 
as follows: section 6.1 examines lack of political will; section 6.2 looks at international 
and local politics; section 6.3 analyses military interventions in politics; section 6.4 
examines corruption; section 6.5 explores location of ASCL; section 6.6 examines the 
dissolution of NSDA; section 6.7 examines ASCL technology, considered to be an out-
dated technology; section 6.8 examines lack of consistency in government policies; 
section 6.9 assesses appointments in parastatals based on political inclination; section 
6.10 examines lack of accountability to all stakeholders; section 6.11 examines the 
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ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; section 6.12 looks into privatisation of 
parastatals and section 6.13 gives the summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
6.1 Lack of political will 
The majority of interviewees attributed the non-completion of ASCL to lack of political 
will54. They argued that the Nigerian government has the political power and resources to 
complete ASCL if it chooses to. This is because, according to the interviewees, Nigeria is 
rich in oil and mineral resources55 that can be used for the completion of ASCL. For 
instance interviewee A13 stated that “the revenue realised from the excess crude oil can 
be used in the completion of ASCL.”  Excess revenue from crude oil that has not been 
part of the budgeted revenue can be used to complete the project. Interviewee A1 stated 
that it is one thing to have a desire and another thing to implement that desire and that 
“lack of political will, patriotic zeal, and commitment on the part of the government has 
stalled the completion of ASCL.” These interviewees argued that if ASCL is completed it 
will be a source of employment to Nigerians. For instance, interviewee A12 explained 
that:  
ASCL is a source of employment; a source of income to people in terms of 
salary, petty trading, and a lot of other commercial activities; a source of social 
activities; a source of social integration to all Nigerians; and other nationalities 
coming from all over the world. On my own part lack of political will is 
fundamental, ordinary people may say it is corruption but my own stand is lack 
of political will.  
Interviewees B2, B3, B5, B6, B8, and B10 maintained that it is political will that has kept 
ASCL from being completed. For example, according to interviewee B10, “it is lack of 
                                                          
54Political Will is defined as, “sustained commitment of politicians and administrators to invest political 
resources to achieve specific objectives” (Rose and Greeley, 2006 p.5). The argument here is that political 
will is tied to outcomes and it is the political power and resources that will be used to achieve these 
outcomes (Post et al. 2010).  
  
55 Nigeria is very rich in human and natural resources but “one of the poorest in terms of human 
development and poverty” (Okafor, 2007 p.124). Okafor (2007) further argues that Nigeria is a “country 
which has everything and produces nothing, and Japan which has nothing produces everything” (p.124).  
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political will on the part of the government for the uncompleted part of the project is too 
insignificant for ASCL to remain uncompleted.” The remedy to lack of political will as 
asserted by Mohammed and Yusuf (2004) is that Nigerians and those who govern her 
should rank their love for the country higher than themselves, families and friends. This, 
according to Mohammed and Yusuf (2004), will hasten the completion of ASCL. 
Interviewees A1, A6 and A13 identified lack of political pressure to stir up the political 
will of the government as one of the reasons why ASCL has not been completed. The 
question is, who is to mount up the political pressure that will result in political will? For 
example, interviewee A6 contended that “protest is done to achieve result but if it cannot 
yield result, you don’t need to use it because if you are not lucky it will consume you. 
Instead use peaceful and appropriate channels.” Interviewee A13 suggested mobilisation 
of traditional rulers in the 3 Senatorial Districts, the 3 Senators, the 9 members of the 
House of Representatives from Kogi State and other prominent sons and daughters of 
Kogi State to mount up the political pressure on the government to get ASCL on the path 
to completion.  
6.2 International and local politics 
International and local politics have been identified by the interviewees as other reasons 
for the non-completion of ASCL. Interviewee A6 argued that “the issue of international 
conspiracy is out of place because if there is a strong political will, the FGN doesn’t need 
to pay attention to international or local politics.” This interviewee stated further that what 
is needed is a strong political will and patriotism because competition exists in all areas of 
life both locally and internationally. The world powers like USA and other European 
countries will not like other products to compete with theirs in African markets 
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(interviewee A1). But interviewee A13 asked, “were there not international conspiracies 
before the company was 98% complete?”  
International conspiracies, interviewees insisted, are among the strong reasons why ASCL 
has not been completed. They maintained that countries with steel industries that export 
their steel products to Nigeria are not in support of Nigeria completing her own steel 
industry because they want to fill African markets with their own products. These 
countries divert Nigerian leaders’ attention by directing her to other areas of development. 
For example, this was the case when Nigeria decided to establish steel in 1958 but was 
advised to concentrate on agriculture (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007).  
Interviewee A5 referred to Nigeria as the most populous country in Africa and every 
household in Nigeria must use steel products. He asked that if Nigeria completes her steel 
company, Nigeria being a big importer of steel products, where will those other countries 
sell their steel products?  Interviewee B9 gave example of international trade that was 
held during Shagari’s administration. According to interviewee B9, ASCL went there 
with white cables and iron rods and buyers started abandoning China’s and Japan’s 
products for ASCL’s products. Interviewee B9 stated further that it was then said that if 
ASCL is allowed to be completed, then they will be thrown out of business and since then 
ASCL’s completion became a figment of the imagination.  
Interviewee B9 asked the interviewer, did you hear anything about ASCL from IMF or 
the World Bank? This is because they advised Nigeria initially not to build integrated 
steel but a rolling mill but Nigeria went ahead to invite the Russians who built integrated 
steel for her and now they are advising Nigeria to dispose it (interviewee B9). For 
example, the World Bank in 1987, according to Mohammed Sanusi, insisted that Nigeria 
should carry out the assessment of its steel companies and also suggested to the 
 
 
                                                                     
 
186 
 
government the company that will carry out that assessment. Hacht Associates, according 
to Mohammed, a Canadian firm did the assignment and came up with the report that it is 
cheaper for Nigeria to import steel products than to use Ajaokuta steel technology to 
produce steel (Ayorinde, 2012). In 2001 again the same Hacht Associates, Mohammed 
maintained, was invited through a privatisation agency and reported again that Ajaokuta 
Steel was not worth it and that ASCL should be turned to a power generating plant 
(Ayorinde, 2012). In the same vein the United Kingdom Department For International 
development (DFID) evaluated the economic viability of ASCL as marginal (Chukwu, 
2013). In 1990, according to the interviewee A1, Japanese experts were invited to assess 
the viability of ASCL. Interviewee A1 stated that the experts suggested that the company 
should be dismantled for it to be revived. Another discouragement came when the World 
Bank Chief, Nicholas Stern, visited Nigeria in July 2002. He said during his four-day 
official visit to Nigeria that the Soviet-era (1970s) technology is a drain on a nation’s 
resources. He maintained that most countries that produce steel have changed their 
technologies. He stated further that if Nigeria should continue with ASCL, she should be 
ready to spend more money (Botha, 2002). 
 Some of the interviewees attributed ASCL stalled state to the politics between Western 
bloc and Eastern bloc. This, according to some of the interviewees, is making the World 
Bank and other Western agencies to describe ASCL technology as drains on resources 
and its economic viability as minimal. For instance, the former Soviet Ambassador to 
Nigeria, Vladimir Snegirev, in 1983 declared that, “we agreed to build this project for 
your country at a time when no other country in the world wanted to” (Alli-Ballogun, 
1988 p.623).  
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Interviewees also mentioned local politics as another reason for non-completion of ASCL. 
For instance, interviewee B4 opined that those importing steel products connived with the 
minister of the Mineral and Steel Development and the chairman of the committee in 
charge of steel industry in the National Assembly to kill the bill of completing ASCL and 
advised that ASCL should be sold as scrap. The reason, according to interview A5, is that 
“what will those importing generators do if ASCL starts working?” Interviewees A1 and 
A2 advanced internal conspiracy as another reason for non-completion of ASCL. This, 
according to them, is the invitation of GIHL, a great competitor of ASCL, to run ASCL. 
Interviewee A1 further remarked that “the company removed equipment running into 
billions of Nigerian Naira from ASCL under the guise of replacing them with modern 
ones.” Some of the interviewees asked during the interviews, what is withholding 
Nigerian government from inviting Tyazhpromexport of Russia that built ASCL to 
complete it? Interviewees A6 and B10 contended that government should invite the 
builder of Ajaokuta (Tyazhpromexport of Russia) to complete it, for they know where 
they stopped (Interviewee A6).  
6.3 Military interventions in politics 
Moreover, military intrusions in Nigerian politics have been identified by interviewees 
A13, B1, B5 and B9 as a core reason for non-completion of ASCL. These interviewees 
argued that majority of the work done at ASCL was done by a civilian administration of 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari who ruled Nigeria from 1979 to 1983. He took ASCL, according 
interviewees A13, B1, B5 and B9, to the presidency where he was overseeing the steel 
company directly and visited ASCL regularly. He was overthrown in a military coup on 
31 December 1983 by Major-General Muhammed Buhari. Interviewees A1, A5 and A9 
insisted that military incursions in politics in Nigeria destroyed ASCL. Interviewee A9 
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said, “they took over; they did not pay attention to Ajaokuta Steel Company; and they did 
not contribute anything to ASCL except the administrative block they built”. Interviewee 
B8 argued that there was no improvement to what President Alhaji Shehu Shagari did. 
Interviewee B5 contended that “military regime is illegitimate” since they don’t have the 
mandate of the people. Interviewee A13 maintained that various military regimes in 
Nigeria are responsible for ASCL problems as they do not give representation to any 
people. For instance, “A military regime is not good at governing and whatever they do is 
grace and favour because in a military regime there is no voice for the voiceless” (P13). 
General Ibrahim Babangida “decentralised corruption” but General Sani Abacha 
“centralised it” (Ribadu, 2006 p.1; Sowunmi et al., 2010 p.8) thereby making ASCL “a 
conduit pipe through which resources allocated to ASCL in the budget to be siphoned” 
(Interviewee A13). For instance, between 1988 and 1994, a dedicated and special account 
with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) amounting to $12.4 billion56 depleted to $200 
million in June 1994 (Apter 2005; Agbiboa, 2012). The fund, according to Apter (2005) 
and Agbiboa (2012), was meant for three major special development projects which are 
the Shiroro Hydro-Electricity project, ASCL and National Iron Ore Mining Company 
(NIOMCO), Itakpe. The account and its contents were discovered when the FGN set up a 
panel headed by Dr Pius Okigbo in 1994 to investigate the activities of the CBN and to 
recommend measures for the re-organisation of the apex bank (Nnochiri, 2012; Tsa, 
2012). General Ibrahim Babangida, however, said that the $12.4 billion meant for ASCL 
and others was not stolen but used for “regenerative investment and critical 
infrastructure” such as building of Abuja City and Lagos Third Mainland Bridge (Daniel, 
2015). 
                                                          
56 This $12.4 billion being the excess revenue from the crude oil sold during the Gulf War in 1991 
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General Abacha “paralysed the machinery of governance and pauperized the citizenry in 
five years of dictatorship and frenetic looting” (Fagbadebo, 2007 p.31). For instance, 
Abacha, according to scholars, fronted a debt buy-back involving ASCL. In 1996, he 
withdrew the sum of $2.5 billion from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) meant to settle 
the debt owed the Tiazhpromexport of Russia for building ASCL. But he negotiated with 
the Russians for a debt buy-back in which he gave $500 million to the builders of ASCL 
and took $2 billion (BBC NEWS, 1998; Oyediran, 1998; Obadina, 1999; Daniel and 
Freeman, 2007; Agubamah, 2009; and Administrator, 2011). This action by General 
Abacha, according to interviewees, affected the completion of ASCL. 
6.4 Corruption 
Interviewee B8 defines corruption as “the conversion of government properties into one’s 
own while performing one’s normal duties.” Interviewee B5 defines it as “any inordinate 
thing” or where “people are not doing the right thing.” Interviewee B7 argued that: 
Corruption has to do with man, material and money. Anything done that is 
inconsistent with normal thing is corruption. Corruption is not limited to 
money or Nigeria. It is practised all over the world except that it is rampant in 
Nigeria. If you are corrupt you are bad. You are doing a wrong thing in a 
wrong place. 
The majority of the interviewees affirmed that corruption is on the higher side in Nigeria. 
Interviewee B1, who was a former CEO of a parastatal and at the time of the interviews a 
chairman of a parastatal, acknowledged that corruption is the major problem of 
parastatals. This is because corruption of parastatals can be likened to “a tap that is always 
open” (interview B1). Interviewee B1 further stated that “I agree that the major problem 
of parastatals is corruption; our leaders are corrupt and the followers are also corrupt”. 
Interviewees B1, B2, B5, B9; and B10 described Nigerian environment, lack of value 
system, Nigeria uncontrolled population, illiteracy, greediness, and poverty; and also 
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eagerness to employ relations; ethnic inclination and indoctrination; and the urge to 
secure positions for themselves, their children and children's children as drivers of 
corruption. 
One of the interviewees (B8) stated that the fundamental problem of Nigerians is 
corruption. He further stated that corruption runs down from the top to the bottom. For 
instance, according to interviewee B8, corruption runs down to the extent that a trader 
disguises the instrument of measurement in the market places. This instrument which 
appears fine as you behold it is devoid of just weight and balances for underneath is full 
of weighty materials.  
Interviewee B5 opined that there is corruption everywhere in the world but its level in 
Nigeria is very high. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Anwar and Sam, 2006); 
Robert Maxwell’s scandal in UK (Melvile, 2007; Solomon, 2010); and Enron, 
WorldCom, and Global Crossing in US (Yang, 2006) are examples of corruption in other 
parts of the World. Interviewee B7 argued that: 
Corruption is practised everywhere in the world and not only in Africa or 
Nigeria. Nigerians used to excel in whatsoever they do. Though it is true that 
corruption is rampant in Nigeria it is not limited to Nigerians but inherent 
disease in human body like sin which is inbred affecting the whole human 
race. 
Corruption manifests itself in different ways. Interviewee B3 stated that corruption is 
perpetrated in four different ways - through inflation of contracts; lack of transparency 
and accountability; due process covered with favouritism; and the norm of uncompleted 
projects in order to be re-awarded. Interviewee B2 opined that it is not easy to re-award 
ASCL, the reason it has not been completed. Interviewee B4 argued that “it costs more to 
construct a road in Nigeria than to construct the same road in Ghana.”  
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Asked how corruption can be linked to non-completion of ASCL, some of the 
interviewees could not identify any type of corruption that can specifically be linked to 
ASCL. However, interviewees A1, A2, A6, and B1 pointed out that the process of 
concession of ASCL to GIHL is fraudulent and GIHL manifested that fraud through the 
cannibalisation of the company’s equipment. For instance, interviewee A6 contended that 
“I went to India to investigate whether Global Infrastructure Holdings Limited (GIHL) is 
a genuine organisation and discovered that GIHL is a genuine organisation but was 
surprised at its failure and the cannibalisation of ASCL’s assets.”  
As corruption is a human trait that has defied human most severe laws, and all efforts at 
combating it using western ways have failed in Nigeria, a professor of political science, 
Professor Chinedu Nwolise has suggested that African ways of fighting corruption should 
be adopted. This he said will lead to a fatal consequence should a leader failed to abide by 
the oath he took during the swearing-in ceremony before entering his office. He 
contended that: 
We need to apply efficacious oath, not with just the Bible and Quran used 
during swearing in ceremonies but a Bible or Quran blessed by a real man of 
God or a machete taken straight from the shrine of Ogun. The stereotypical 
words in the oath should be changed to words which would include curses; in 
case such a leader dabbles in corruption (Falayi, 2012).  
However, one of the interviewees remarked that corruption is good for Africa. For 
instance, interviewee B7 opined that it was said that “the more the stealing the more the 
development.” 
6.5 Location of ASCL 
An industry is always located in a place where it can have access to raw materials, labour, 
land, power and capital. For this reason, the location of ASCL was carried out after 
feasibility studies were carried out by the Russians (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). 
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Interviewee A6 argued that “because government saw Ajaokuta’s potentials: 
environmental factors, rivers, large land and accessibility to raw materials favoured the 
siting of the integrated steel company at Ajaokuta.” Another interviewee, A5, confirmed 
that all the relevant natural resources for the siting of a steel industry are available in Kogi 
State. 
However, Agbu (2007) argues that ASCL was located at Ajaokuta by political 
permutation of politicians. For this reason, interviewees A1, A2, A3, A5, A7, A8, B1, B2, 
B3, B6, B7, B9 and B10 considered the location of ASCL as one of the reasons for its 
non-completion. These interviewees argued that, if ASCL were to be located in one of the 
three major tribes, it would have been completed long ago. This is because of the political 
heavy weights of the major tribes which would have been brought to bear in facilitating 
its completion. For example, interviewee A1 contended that, “the site of the company acts 
as its drawback because Kogi State is not one of the favoured states in Nigeria.”  
6.6 Dissolution of Nigeria Steel Development Authority (NSDA) 
NSDA was established in 1971 on the advice of the Russian experts (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 2008). The duties of NSDA was to plan, construct and operate the steel plants; 
carry out geological surveys, study market, metallurgical research and training of staff 
overseas (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). NSDA was dissolved in 1979 and gave birth 
to ASCL thereby having the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development as ASCL’s 
supervisory ministry (Mohammed, 2002b). For instance, Mohammed (2002b) opined that: 
Unfortunately the Federal Government dissolved NSDA; the only viable 
agency that could have scientifically managed the situation. Their functions 
were returned to the non-technical bureaucrats of a new ministry of steel. A lot 
of activities were then haphazardly embarked upon; lots of inflated subsidiary 
projects were being simultaneously chased (p.1). 
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NSDA is similar to Temasek Holdings Limited (THL) owned by Singaporean 
government (Anwar and Sam, 2006). Its duties are to maximise the social benefits for the 
government and the citizens of Singapore but it is independent of government control 
(Anwar and Sam, 2006). THL has made Singaporean parastatals to be successful and they 
are inviting other countries to come and learn from their success, though cultures are 
different and one size does not fit all (Anwar and Sam, 2006). 
6.7 ASCL technology, considered to be an out-dated technology 
There seemed to be a mixed reaction of interviewees as to out-dated Russian technology 
of ASCL. While some interviewees said Russians were looking for a place to dump their 
obsolete equipment, others said no, that they are happy with what is on ground and that 
government should complete ASCL. For example, interviewee A12 claimed that people 
appeared to suggest that the Russians were looking for a place to dump their out-dated 
machines. Also interviewee B10 argued that “the machines are obsolete; supposed to be 
upgraded; and we don’t need such gigantic or massive technology.” In addition, the 
World Bank Chief, Nicholas Stern, in July 2002 said, Soviet-era (1970s) technology is a 
drain on a nation’s resources (Botha, 2002, see section 6.2).  
However, interviewee A13 said that no technology is old or obsolete that cannot be 
improved upon. “No country in the world has ever closed down her technology instantly 
to get another one but a gradual process and through feasibility studies” (P13). He went 
further to ask the question that, if Soviet-era technology is an out-dated technology, why 
then did GIHL in 2004 produce iron rods and cables using the machines installed by the 
Soviet experts in the four completed rolling units? He maintained that technology is being 
improved or built upon and not that it is old or obsolete. Interviewee A13 argued that no 
technology is obsolete, it must be modernised to suit the need of the present. He stated 
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that the Russians who installed those machines have not gone to seek for other 
technologies for their country and are considered to be one of the powerful nations in the 
world using their own technology.  The Russians themselves, according to interviewee 
B4, declared that Nigeria should not discard ASCL because she “can still excel with 
ASCL technology.” Moreover, Nigerian Association of Technologists in Engineering 
(NATE, 2009) gave assurance to Nigerians that ASCL technology is a rugged installed 
technology which was confirmed sound after repeated examinations. Interviewee A9 
argued that there can be improvement instead of abandoning the Russian technology. 
 6.8 Lack of consistency in government policies 
Governance should be seen as a system that continues from government to government in 
a democratic society. However, the spate of project abandonment in developing countries 
when a new government comes in is alarming. For example, there are about 11,886 
neglected projects in Nigeria according to the reports of the Presidential Projects 
Assessment Committee (PPAC), set up in March 2011 by President Goodluck Jonathan to 
look into the cases of neglected federal government projects in Nigeria since 
independence in 1960 (EL-Rufai, 2012). Interviewee A1 argued that “lack of political 
will, lack of patriotic zeal, or lack of commitment to achieve a goal lead to inconsistency 
in government policies.” Some of the interviewees were of the opinion that lack of 
consistency is common in public ownership than with private ownership. A new 
government, according to interviewee B8, may not like to continue or improve on what 
the previous government did. Interviewee B10 declared also that “when an individual set 
up a steel company it will function but ASCL’s government owned steel refused to 
function.” New governments, according to the majority of those interviewed, should 
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continue with the projects embarked upon by their predecessors. Interviewee A7 argued 
that:  
In Nigeria, what a new government used to do is to neglect the previous 
government’s initiated policies and projects and start its own projects as if 
government business is a personal project. Dangote Cement PLC started 
producing cement at Obajana when it was 75% complete while ASCL was 98% 
complete but could not produce steel, why? This is because Nigerian 
government is merging politics with policies and becoming inconsistent. Other 
countries’ new government build on the policies of their predecessors but 
Nigerian leaders come and draw another line because of selfish interest as if 
government policies or businesses were personal affairs.   
Interviewee A8 maintained that, “governments should be sincere in their pronouncements 
and execute their policies, programmes, and projects”. Interviewee B7 stated that the 
problem with Nigerian politicians is that they don’t always honour their promises. This is 
because, according to interviewee B7, when they are voted in they will forget their 
promises and do a different thing. 
One of the reasons put forward by some of the interviewees as the reason why projects are 
abandoned by a new government is the belief that there will be no benefit accruing to a 
government that completes an old project. Interviewee A2 remarked that:  
The new government’s attention will be drawn from the old projects since 
kickbacks cannot be given from the old projects if they were to be continued by 
the new government. The old projects can only continue if they can be re-
awarded and the new government can be assured of getting kickbacks.     
The majority of the interviewees gave another reason for neglecting projects as locating 
the project in their ethnic origin by leaders in order that the contract for the project to be 
re-awarded to their relations, children, friends or classmates.  Other reasons, according to 
El-Rufai (2012), Olalusi and Otunola (2012), & Ubani and Ononuju (2013), include non-
continuation of policies and priorities as occupiers of political offices change; nepotism; 
corruption; re-awarding of projects to political supporters as generous campaign gifts at 
inflated prices; paying contract sum to political big-wigs; frequent changes in 
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government; environmental degradation and devastation due to wrong location; and lack 
of skilled personnel and technical experts among others. 
6.9 Appointments in parastatals based on political inclination 
Interviewees B1, B3, B7, B8, and B10 described the roles of the boards to include: 
formulation of policies; approving the promotion of staff; considering and approving 
budgets of parastatals; awarding contracts; approving the disciplines of staff; suing and 
being sued and generally regulating the activities of parastatals. The board, by the above 
roles, governs parastatals. Governance is defined by interviewee B10 as “a process of 
administering organisations, people or society using the resources available to ensure that 
the resources are properly used” Or simply put “administering people and resources to 
achieve certain results.” 
The members of parastatals governing boards are appointed by the government of the day 
(interviewee B5 and B7). However, all the 10 interviewees in the second interviews 
declared that the appointments of members of parastatals governing boards are politically 
motivated. Their appointments, according to the interviewees, are based on political 
patronage, tribal sentiment, religious bigotry, ethnic balancing, party strongman, and 
political rewards for their active participation in political campaigns. For instance, 
interviewee B3 argued:  
“It is a political patronage. It is a winner takes all. You cannot be appointed into a 
board without being a party member. It is not based on merit. It is based on 
ethnic, religious and party considerations.” 
The appointment of members of boards is politically motivated. For example, according 
to interviewee B6 who was a former head of a parastatal: 
You must be a party strongman before you are appointed to a position in a 
parastatal. All board members are political appointees. The appointment is used 
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to compensate them for campaigning for their master. How do you think they will 
perform? They are there to serve their godfathers who recommended them to that 
position and to make returns to them. 
Interviewees B5 and B8 contended that, there is complete disregard for integrity, 
character, professional competence and qualification, values, years of experience, and 
track records of antecedents of the person being appointed.  
Parastatals’ success in Singapore is traced to capabilities; the best person for the job 
notwithstanding the person’s background and nationality; the high calibre of people on 
the board and the strength of people in-charge of parastatals (Anwar and Sam, 2006)57.  
Equally, the appointment of the CEO of parastatals may be politically motivated. 
Interviewee B3 and B8 confirmed that the appointments of the chief executive of 
parastatals are politically motivated; based on political party or on ethnic balancing. 
Interviewee B3 contended that “the appointment of chief executives of parastatals is not 
based on merit but on ethnic balancing and at the discretion of the President or a State 
Governor”.  
The majority of the interviewees appeared to suggest that one of the reasons for non-
completion of ASCL is that those appointed members of ASCL board and CEO are 
politicians or their agents. For instance, interviewee B1 who is a former CEO of a 
parastatal for years and a chairman of the board of a parastatal at the time of interview 
stated that a historian was made CEO of ASCL. He argued that an engineer who knows 
much about steel or engineering/metallurgy should have been a better choice and regarded 
                                                          
57 Dhanabalan in Anwar and Sam (2006) suggested that for a parastatal to succeed, the character of the 
political leadership; appointment of people of honesty, probity, and meritocracy; and the character of people 
and the competence of the people who lead the organisation at the board and management levels must be 
put into consideration.       
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the appointment of a non-professional person to head a steel company as a politically 
motivated appointment.    
6.10 Lack of accountability to all stakeholders  
Accountability means giving explanation for actions taken on behalf of people on their 
resources. For instance, interviewee B5 argued that accountability means you are holding 
an office or resources for others and you will be called upon to explain while you are in 
that office and after you have left that office. He further stated that accounting for your 
stewardship does not involve only money but also how you tackled the matter of 
deregulation, poverty, welfare, rule of law and fundamental human rights. Interviewee 
B3, a human right activist, argued that “accountability is giving account of your service, 
giving report of your stewardship or feedback to the people who gave you the opportunity 
to serve”. 
Accountability to the National Assembly means accountability of parastatals has been 
discharged to the taxpayers (Sendt, 2002). However, interviewee B8 contended that 
government must be accountable to the people because “it is the government of the people 
for the people and by the people.” Therefore, for this reason, the accountability of the 
government, according to some of the interviewees, should be made public through the 
media for people’s consumption and not only to the National Assembly. Interviewee B8 
argued that even the accountability to the National Assembly is not altogether complete. 
This is because, according to interviewee B8, “accounting books are not properly kept in 
parastatals.” 
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) mandates the National Assembly to 
monitor parastatals for the purpose of accountability. Section 88(1&2) of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution (as amended) provides that the National Assembly shall cause 
 
 
                                                                     
 
199 
 
investigations to be made on any person, authority, ministry, or government department 
(parastatal) charged with disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be 
appropriated by the National Assembly to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the 
execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the 
disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it. However, accountability to 
the National Assembly is flawed with fraudulent manoeuvres. For instance, a committee 
of the Nigerian House of Representatives on capital market headed by Representative 
Herman Hembe is being accused of corruption. The committee was investigating the 
reason for the near collapse of the capital market when it was accused of demanding for a 
bribe amounting to N44 million from the Director-General of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The Director-General of SEC argued: 
Hembe is corrupt and lacks credibility. For instance, he collected estacode and 
other travel allowances from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
travel to the Dominican Republic on a capacity enhancement conference for 
capital market regulators. He did not go neither did he returned the money 
collected. Also, he asked the commission to contribute N39 million towards the 
on-going charade of a public hearing and demanded another N5 million cash on 
Tuesday, march 13, 2012. He made both demands by proxy (Agande and Eboh, 
2012). 
Section 88(1&2)  of the constitution mandates the National Assembly to investigate to 
expose corruption but the same National Assembly that supposed to expose corruption is 
demanding for bribes making accountability system difficult. 
The majority of the interviewees complained about lack of accountability. For example, 
interviewee B4 remarked that “they supposed to organise a forum where they can explain 
to people yearly or half-yearly what has happened to their resources but nothing like that 
comes from them.” Interviewee B7 argued that they are only accountable to the “Cabal” 
who put them there and that the general public don’t know how their resources are being 
managed. According to some of the interviewees, even if there is no forum or media in 
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which to give account, the seller/buyer good relationship of parastatals/stakeholders can 
be taken to be accountability. For instance interviewee B8 stated that: 
“There is no forum to give account. If a parastatal organisation is going on 
holiday or electricity is going off the next five days, people should be informed 
but people are not given such information before electricity goes off and even 
after it goes off.”  
6.11 Ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies 
There are two main anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria. They are Independent Corrupt 
Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) established in 2000 and 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) established in 200458.  
Majority of the interviewees argued that these anti-corruption agencies are weak as a 
result of government intervention. For instance, interviewee B1 pointed out that: 
Corruption is still there with EFCC and ICPC. They are not effective. Those                  
former governors who were accused of corruption and arrested were released 
without being brought to book. The judicial system is weak. The law is there 
on paper and okay but implementation is poor. 
Some of the interviewees maintained that these anti-corruption agencies teach people how 
to put across their cases to gain their freedom and also hire senior lawyers to defend them 
in courts. For instance, interviewee B10 contended that: 
We have EFCC, Code of Conduct Bureau and ICPC. They are more corrupt 
than any other person in Nigeria. When there is a fraud, they raise alarm and 
after, sometimes, the case is dropped. Another thing is that these people who are 
indicted, hire Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) as their lawyers who represent 
them in courts against the junior lawyers recruited by these institutional 
agencies that are shouted down by the senior lawyers in courts. They continued 
to ask for adjournment of cases in courts. These actions by the senior lawyers in 
courts incapacitate the junior lawyers’ defences. 
                                                          
58 ICPC Act focuses on curbing bribery and corruption in the public service; enlightens the public about the 
consequences of corruption; reviews and modifies the activities of public bodies and institutions to expose 
corruption and prosecute offenders (ICPC Act 2000; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). The EFCC is mandated to 
fight financial and economic crimes; investigate, prevent and prosecute those who engage in any corrupt 
malpractices (Sec.46, EFCC Act 2004).  
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Interviewees B2, B3, and B10 stated that these prosecuting agencies are weakened by 
lack of finance; interference by the government; lack of manpower especially in recruiting 
capable hands like experienced senior lawyers and other technical staff; fear of being 
killed by hired killers; lack of protection for whistle blowers; they cannot prosecute 
anybody except somebody initiates a case against another person; and no special court to 
try these cases. Interviewee B5 remarked that these weaknesses are there because of 
“partial treatment, impunity and lack of political will to tackle corruption headlong”.  
These weaknesses lead to miscarriage of justice in favour of those who are prosecuted by 
the EFCC or ICPC. The very good example is James Ibori’s case who ruled Delta State 
from 1999 to 2007 as a governor. Ibori who was acquitted by a Nigerian court was 
convicted by Southwark Crown Court in London on 17 April 2012 on charges of 
corruption and money laundering to 13 years in prison. Retired Justice Mustapha Akanbi 
who was the first chairman of ICPC argued that: 
It was puzzling that Ibori, who was acquitted of all the corruption and money 
laundering charges by a Nigerian judge, pleaded guilty and was sentenced by 
a British court. The conviction of Ibori is a challenge to Nigerian Judiciary. 
We must be able to make sure that we really fight against corruption and 
corrupt practices so that once we resolve the problem of corruption, a lot of 
problems would have fizzled out. I am happy that at least, Ibori has been 
convicted and hope that other corrupt people will also be dealt with 
accordingly (Aboluwade et al., 2012 p.11). 
6.12 Privatisation of parastatals 
Interviewees argued that political interference in awarding contracts and politically 
motivated appointments into parastatals affect their performances. For example, 
Mohammed (2002b) noted that after the dissolution of NSDA, ASCL was returned to the 
Ministry of Mines and Steel Development where “a lot of activities were haphazardly 
embarked upon and lots of inflated subsidiary projects were being simultaneously chased” 
(p.1). He further stated that parastatals fail as a result of:  
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“Ministerial strangle-hold and insincere directives; under funding; misuse of 
scarce fund; over-costing of inputs; under-costing of products; and the general 
attitude (or lack of it) towards government-owned enterprises” (p.8). 
The political interference through appointments on political patronage, according to 
interviewee B3, leads to corruption; inefficiency; lack of accountability; lack of 
transparency; and lack of political will, which affect the performances of parastatals. 
Some of the interviewees contended that the non-performance of parastatals may be 
linked to lack of funds. This is because they may be financially starved by the 
government, or allocated money in the budget may not be released to parastatal and if 
released, it may be late. For instance, interviewee B1 who was a head of a parastatal and a 
chairman of a board of parastatal at the time of interview argued that: 
The major problem of parastatals is that they are not financially autonomous. It 
is when you request for money before you get it even when it was allocated to 
the parastatal in the budget. It takes political manoeuvring to get what you want 
as a head of a parastatal. There is no deliberate attempt to release the money 
allocated to them in the budget.     
Interviewee B4 noted that another problem affecting parastatals is their wasteful nature. 
For example, he cited the example of road maintenance agency where there are engineers 
and other staffs but when work is to be done, government will engage consultants and 
contractors from outside the organisation instead of their own workers. Interviewee B4 
further stated that this action makes the workers to be redundant and leads to increase in 
government overhead expenditure. Similarly, the former CEO of ASCL, Kola Belgore, 
declared that 6000 employees of ASCL are currently receiving N3.4bn monthly salaries 
without working (Akinyemi, 2014). 
Interviewees B2, B3, B4, B5, B8, B9 and B10 contended that they are not satisfied with 
the services of parastatals but are willing to pay extra money in order to have a constant 
supply of parastatals’ services. For instance, interviewee B10 argued that: 
 
 
                                                                     
 
203 
 
Nobody is satisfied with the services rendered by parastatals. There is 
inefficiency and therefore, people are not satisfied. The railway transport 
services, electricity supply, water supply are in a bad state. We are ready to pay 
whatever amount to make these services available to us at all times.  
Interviewee B5 contended that no parastatal is satisfying its stakeholders in Nigeria. 
Interviewee B8 confirmed that people are not satisfied because they are not getting what 
they want. However, Interviewee B1 argued that the satisfaction of stakeholders depends 
on what they want. He claimed that if stakeholders are not complaining it means they are 
getting satisfaction.  
The majority of the interviewees welcomed privatisation but not full privatisation of 
parastatals. For instance, interviewee A6 argued that “government has no business in 
business; I don’t believe in outright sale either; but complete the project and privatise it.” 
Interviewees A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A9, and A10, and all the interviewees in the second 
phase subscribed to privatisation by way of Public Private Partnership (PPP) of 
parastatals. Interviewee B2 described privatisation as the transfer of ownership and 
management of public organisation to a private company. He further stated that 
government interference in public organisations will stop if parastatals are privatised and 
more so that in private organisations, there will be no political patronage or interference 
but efficiency and the employment of experienced, qualified, skilled staff.  
Interviewee B5 contended that what we need now in Nigeria is a mixed economy or 
PPP59. As regards ASCL, interviewees A6, A13, and all the 10 interviewees in the second 
phase of the interviews suggested that the project should be completed and privatised. The 
reason for the completion of ASCL before privatising, according to the interviewees, is 
that the company will be privatised at a reasonable value. According to interviewee A13, 
                                                          
59 Public Private Partnership (PPP) is where ownership, management and risks of a business enterprise are 
shared between the government and a private investor (Pamacheche and Koma, 2007).  
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“even in developed capital economies, a steel company will have to be completed before 
privatising it, if not you will be selling a sick product.”  
However, interviewee B9 posited that privatisation by PPP may not work after all. This is 
because, according to him, Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) was 
functioning well before it was privatised by PPP but after privatisation, it stopped 
functioning and thereafter sold by Bureau for Public Enterprise (BPE). Interviewee B3 
affirmed that PPP is what can help our economy now because some private companies are 
not effective as well. He cited the cases of Hamdalla Hotels and Volkswagen companies 
that have folded up as examples. 
6.13 Summary and Conclusion 
 The semi-structured interviews from the two phases of interviews were reported in this 
chapter. The following were themes that emerged from the interviews and on which basis 
the interviews were discussed. They are as follows: lack of political will, international and 
local politics, military intervention in politics, corruption, the location of ASCL, 
dissolution of the Nigeria Steel Development Authority (NSDA); ASCL technology, 
considered an out-dated technology; lack of consistency in government policies; 
appointments in parastatals is based on political inclination, lack of accountability to all 
stakeholders; ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; and privatisation of parastatals. 
In all, the weight of political will to the completion of ASCL is considered by the 
interviewees more than any of the causes of ASCL not being completed. This is because 
despite the advice given to Nigeria to concentrate on agriculture or building rolling mills, 
Nigeria was able to complete ASCL substantially. That strength can be used to complete 
ASCL if it is removed from the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development to the 
presidency as did by Shagari administration before the coup of 1983 (see section 6.3). 
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Interviewees suggested that the appointments of persons of integrity and merit into 
boards, CEO and staff of parastatals will do much. If all these fail, then parastatals should 
be privatised. Interviewees suggested that privatisation of Nigerian parastatals should be 
based on PPP so that government should participate in the ownership. The interviewees 
maintained that privatisation will ensure that government will not interfere in the 
activities of the privatised parastatals thus leading to independence, efficiency of the 
privatised organisation and satisfaction of the Nigerian public. The next chapter presents 
the findings of interviews for the case and questionnaire survey.      
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Chapter Seven 
Findings: Interviews for the Case and Questionnaire Survey 
 
7.0 Introduction 
Chapter six presented the results of the first and second phases of interviews conducted in 
Nigeria from December 2010 to March 2011 and between December 2011 and February 
2012 respectively, to assess the perception of stakeholders. This chapter discusses the 
findings of the initial interviews60 conducted at ASCL and its environs during the same 
period at Ajaokuta to seek the views of the management staff of ASCL and questionnaires 
administered from December 2011 to February 2012.  
ASCL management staffs were interviewed with the aim of knowing why the project has 
not been completed after three decades of establishment. The question is, why is ASCL 
experiencing serious delays in steel production since 1979 to date in relation to practices 
of governance and accountability?  The historical overview of ASCL was given in chapter 
one and this chapter seeks to explore the governance and accountability considerations 
from the responses provided by the management of ASCL.  
Table 7.1 List of interviewees for the case (first interview) 
Interviewee 
       M1             M2                M3 
Note: The table shows the members of management staff of ASCL that 
were interviewed between December 2010 and March 2011. Their 
identities have been kept secret because of the sensitive nature of ASCL. 
All the interviews were conducted in ASCL. 
                                                          
60 See appendix II for the interview questions (the first phase of interviews). 
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The second phase of interviews61 took place in ASCL from December 2011 to February 
2012 with the management staff of ASCL. The list of those who participated in the 
second phase of interviews is tabulated in table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2 List of interviewees for the case (second interview) 
Interviewee 
 
    N1 
 
    N2 
 
    N3 
 
     N4 
 
    N5 
 
    N6 
 
   N7 
Note: The table shows the members of management staff of ASCL that were interviewed from December 
2011 to February 2012. Their identities have been kept secret because of the sensitive nature of ASCL. All 
the interviews were conducted in ASCL. 
Interviews in some cases were conducted in interviewees’ home to avoid distractions and 
also to enable them speak freely. The interview’s time per interviewee lasted for about an 
average of 45 minutes.  
The respondents from whom questionnaires62 were received (Table 5.5) have been 
grouped into three according to their careers and status in the society for the purpose of 
analysis. The first group is the staff of Ajaokuta Steel Company limited (18 respondents 
representing 36%) and given the name - Group ASCL. The second group is academics 
and journalists (8 + 4 = 12 respondents respectively representing 24%) and given the 
name - Group ACAJO. The third group is made up of civil servants (12), managing 
director of a private company (1), politician (1), lawyer (1), human rights activist (1), 
labour union (2), traditional chief ruler (1) and other (1) = (20 respondents representing 
40%) and given the name - Group CISOT.  The groupings are represented in the chart 
below: 
 
 
                                                          
61 See appendix VI for interview questions (second phase of interviews) and appendix V for accompanying 
letter. 
62 Appendix VIII contains the copy of the questionnaire and for accompanying letter see appendix VII 
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Figure 7.1 Groups of respondents for the questionnaire 
 
 
Source: The chart shows the groups of respondents for the questionnaire 
          and the percentage of each group from the field work.  
 
 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse the data obtained from 
the questionnaires received from the respondents. The statements in the questionnaire 
were on a 5 point Likert-scale. This allowed for the extraction of relevant descriptive 
statistics of the responses. Standard deviation was used to assess the difference in 
responses; group means were used to reveal the behaviour of respondents towards 
different statements; Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test was used to discover whether there are 
differences in responses given by the three groups for each statement and Mann-Whitney 
(MW) test was used to show the difference between the responses of two groups in order 
to discover if they are significantly different from each other. All tests and decisions in 
this study were based on 95% confidence level. Also a t-test63 was carried out to discover 
                                                          
63 For results of t-test, see appendix IX 
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the level of significance of the difference between the overall mean value and the mid-
point at 5% significance level. 
Apart from the 5 point Likert-scale in the questionnaire, there is one open-ended question 
(Question K) and one open statement (Statement L) for the respondents to respectively 
answer and comment on. Question K asked respondents what other things they think 
should be done to bring the needed change? Statement L requested the respondents to 
provide any other comments.   
The key issues identified from the case interviews and questionnaires are discussed in the 
remainder of this chapter as follows: Section 7.1 describes steel, the key to 
industrialisation and development; Section 7.2 explores lack of political will; Section 7.3 
elucidates ASCL technology, considered to be an out-dated technology;  Section 7.4 
assesses international and local politics; Section 7.5 examines lack of consistency in 
government policies; Section 7.6 assesses appointments in parastatals based on political 
inclination; Section 7.7 presents the analysis of ethnicity; Section 7.8 examines 
corruption; Section 7.9 explores patronage; Section 7.10 examines punishment for 
offenders; Section 7.11 examines lack of accountability to all stakeholders; Section 7.12 
analyses the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; Section 7.13 looks into 
privatisation; and Section 7.14 provides the summary and conclusion. 
7.1 Steel, the key to industrialisation and development 
Two views of the interviewees are noted here. Some of the interviewees described ASCL 
and what has happened so far since its establishment while others gave the reasons why 
ASCL was established. First, interviewee N4 who is a prominent member of the 
management of ASCL described what he knows about ASCL as follows: 
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ASCL is a product of the nation’s vision at industrialisation apart from 
providing employment opportunities for the people of Nigeria. Nigeria occupies 
a very, very important place as regards her population and roles in African 
Union (AU). ASCL was incorporated as a private company solely owned by the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (FGN). ASCL has suffered some setbacks from the 
very beginning. The company has at various times being given to different 
companies to manage known as concessional arrangement but we witnessed 
failures from the concessionaires. There was a concession to Solgas Energy 
Limited (SEL) of USA which could not continue because of lack of funds to 
operate. There was also another concession in which the company was given to 
Global Infrastructure Holdings Limited (GIHL) of ISPAT of India which 
worked for a while. The managers were not transparent- they had something to 
hide having another agenda. Many different types of machinery installed by 
Tyazhpromexport (TPE) of Russia were looted and carted away by the Indians 
who brought no spanner. The spare parts stored in a particular location by the 
Russians were vandalised and exported out of the country. During this period, it 
was the indigenous Nigerian engineers that worked and not Indians technicians 
that came. These were the reasons why the contract agreement was terminated. 
It is still in limbo and we are still waiting. After the termination, Nigerian 
government inaugurated a group of politicians who are external to the company 
as Interim Management Committee (IMC) as management of the company but 
the company is yet to see the light of the day. Government should overhaul the 
whole system and give autonomy to the company and not to have a supervisory 
ministry. It should not be run as a unit of the ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development and the builder of the company should be invited to complete the 
project.  
Second, interviewee N1 argued that “ASCL is an incorporated company which was 
established to produce steel; to serve as the bed rock of Nigerian industrialization and 
economic development; to provide jobs and revenue for the country”. Interviewee N2 
described ASCL as a company which was established by the government of Nigeria to 
produce iron, steel, and also to provide services to other companies. For instance, the 
power plant of the company distributes light to Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
(PHCN) which it does by collecting revenue from PHCN.  
Interviewee M1 declared that “steel is a life blood of a nation. A country without steel is 
just like a human being without blood”. He maintained that a country without steel will 
find it difficult to develop and will depend on other nations for survival. Interviewee M2 
argued that having a steel company will generate employment; the products will be used 
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to produce military weapons; and construction companies will use the products for 
building bridges, rail tracks and houses. Interviewee M3 affirmed that it will generate 
employment and revenue to the government. He further stated that the objectives of 
establishing ASCL are numerous including employment generation, economic 
development and quick industrialisation of Nigeria. Miachi (2001) opines that:   
Apart from the foreign exchange and economic growth objectives, it was envisaged 
that the project would generate a myriad of socio-economic benefits to Nigeria such 
as increase in the productive capacity of the nation through its linkage effects and 
supportive roles to industries. In addition, it was expected that the project would 
greatly contribute to the achievement of other socio-economic goals of the nation, 
such as provision of materials for infrastructural development, technology 
acquisition, employment generation and training of labour, income distribution and 
regional development (p.10).  
Steel is important for economic competitiveness; national security; and is the backbone of 
bridges, skyscrapers, railroads, automobiles and appliances (Umunnakwe, 2009). 
Table 7.3 (Qfa) shows the results from questionnaires distributed and received between 
December 2011 and February 2012. The statement that ASCL was established to promote 
industrialisation, economic development and to provide employment for Nigerians and 
beyond received positive responses from the respondents. Among the three groups, group 
ACAJO (1.00) expressed the highest agreement that ASCL was established to promote 
industrialisation, development, and to provide employment to Nigerian and beyond. Other 
groups’ means are group ASCL (1.12) and group CISOT (1.20). The t-test conducted 
showed that overall mean equal 1.12 and p. value .000. This shows respondents 
significantly agreeing that ASCL was established to promote industrialisation and 
development of Nigeria. The KW and MW tests do not reveal any significant difference. 
The results of the overall mean and group means show that respondents agreed that ASCL 
has the potentials of bringing a lot of advantages to Nigeria. For example, the advantages 
of technological acquisition by Nigerians; the potential markets for the by-products of the 
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steel; national security and pride that follow the establishment of steel are tremendous to 
be neglected (Chukwu, 2013).  
7.2 Lack of Political Will 
Interviewees N1, N2, N4, N5, N6, and N7 believed that the major problem surrounding 
the serious delays in the completion of ASCL which was established in 1979 and was 
substantially completed in the 1990s has to do with the political will of the government. 
For instance, interviewee M1 argued that the main problem of ASCL is that there is no 
political will. He maintained that lack of political will means that the FGN has “no 
interest in steel.” Interviewee N1 contended that by the time Babangida visited ASCL, 
what he saw made him to write in ASCL’s visitors’ book that “the completion of ASCL is 
a must.” Interviewee N3 appeared to suggest that the FGN has no interest in the 
development of ASCL or priority in steel development.  The reasons why the completion 
of the company lingers on for decades, according to interviewees M1, M2, and M3 are: 
“the priority is not there” (M1); “lack of political will” (M2); “lack of political will, 
international and local politics” (M3).  
Interviewee M1 postulated that the World Bank is opposed to the project, “I doubt if it 
will agree to release money for the project.” He further maintained that ASCL will be 
completed if FGN takes it as a priority and decides to fund it. For instance, according to 
interviewee M1, FGN did not collect any money from anywhere to complete the project 
up to 98%, “is it the 2% that it will take loan?” Interviewee M1 maintained that as Nigeria 
is endowed with both mineral and human resources, the revenue from excess crude oil 
alone can be used to complete ASCL. That is why, according to the interviewees M1, M2 
and M3, it is said that if there is priority or political will on the part of the government, 
ASCL would have been completed long ago.  
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On the statement (Qfb) that Ajaokuta Steel was not completed because government is not 
willing to complete it, majority of respondents agreed to that statement. Group ASCL 
agreed that if the government is willing with political courage, it can complete ASCL. 
The test conducted revealed that: group ASCL’s mean is 1.82; group ACAJO’s mean is 
2.17; group CISOT’s mean is 2.10. Group ASCL expressed the highest agreement that the 
FGN can complete ASCL if it wills. Some respondents argued that, it is not that 
government is not willing to complete ASCL but when money is budgeted and released, 
the money will not get down for the purpose intended. This is the statement Qfc with the 
overall mean of 2.44. Group ASCL (2.12) expressed the highest agreement in statement 
Qfc while group CISOT (2.80) expressed the lowest agreement. The result of t-test 
carried out showed that the responses are significantly different from their neutral values, 
indicating agreement that the money meant for ASCL is not always used for the purpose 
intended.  
Dr Mohammed Sanusi who is the secretary-general of African Iron and Steel Association 
(AISA) remarked that the first phase of ASCL which is 1.3 million tonnes per year would 
have cost Nigeria not more than $1.5 billion, but the expenditure of the first phase so far 
is $6 billion and not yet completed. According to Sanusi, a contract that supposed to have 
cost the government N5 million will be tripled to N15 million in Nigeria (Kadiri, 2012).  
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Table 7.3 Ajaokuta Steel Complex. 
           Statements No Overall   Mean SD 
           Group Means K-W 
P-value 
                M-W 
               P-values 
ASCL ACAJO CISOT ASCL-ACAJO 
ASCL-
CISOT 
ACAJO-
CISOT 
Qfa- Ajaokuta Steel was established to 
promote industrialisation, development and to 
provide employment for Nigerians and 
beyond. 
49 1.12† 0.39 1.12 1.00 1.20 0.17 0.40 0.26 0.10 
Qfb- Ajaokuta Steel is not completed because 
the government is not willing to complete it.  
49 2.02† 1.18 1.82 2.17 2.10 0.86 0.58  1.00 0.65 
Qfc- Government is not willing to commit 
more money to the multi-billion dollar 
Ajaokuta Steel Complex because the money 
will not be used for its intended purpose.  
48 2.44† 1.33 2.12 2.25 2.80 0.30 0.86  0.14 0.30 
Qfd- The Russian’s technology, the builder of 
the steel, is an outdated technology. 
48 3.48† 1.29 3.94 2.92 3.45 0.14 0.06  0.18 0.38 
Note: The table (7.3) shows the results of questionnaires received from respondents. It reveals the statements made and the number that responded, 
overall mean, the number of respondents that agreed and disagreed to the statement, group means, Kruskal – Wallis (KW) p. value and Mann-Whitney 
(MW) p. values tests conducted. The table shows the mean responses to the statements at various levels: 1=strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3= neutral; 4 = 
disagree and 5= strongly disagree.  A † indicates significance difference at 5% level for overall mean from the midpoint using t-test. 
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7.3 ASCL technology, considered to be an out-dated technology  
Interviewees M2 and M3 argued that Russian technology is a rugged technology and 
there is no way the USSR technology can be converted into USA technology after it is 
substantially completed. The problem with ASCL, according to interviewees M2 and M3 
may be because it is a Russian technology and not western technology. They maintained 
that if government makes money and infrastructures available to them, ASCL will begin 
to produce steel. The USSR technology, according to M1 and M2, was used to produce 
iron rods by GIHL between 2004 and 2008. They further argued that one improves on 
technology and not to wholly jettison it.  
Interviewees N2 and N3 contended that there is nothing like obsolesce in ASCL’s 
technology. “The USSR was the highest producer of steel when they were together” 
(interviewee N2). Interviewee N3 contended that even if the technology is obsolete, we 
have to start from somewhere noting that the technology that was erected in the Soviet 
Union since the Second World War is still there. Interviewee N3 further explained that 
“even cars we use here are being used over there before they are exported to us which we 
use for some years before they are discarded.” He maintained that we need to try this 
technology this way for now before we change it to any other technology. He affirmed 
that GIHL used Russian technology to roll out iron rods and wires using the completed 
rolling mill units during the concession. 
The Russian technology according to statement Qfd in table 7.3 is said to be an obsolete 
technology but a majority of the respondents disagreed with that statement. The overall 
mean equal 3.48, with the group means showing group ASCL = 3.94 and group CISOT = 
3.45 meaning that they disagreed with the statement that ASCL technology is an outdated 
technology. Group ASCL expressed the higher disagreement while Group ACAJO (2.92) 
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held opposite view. The result of t-test carried out shows the overall mean = 3.48; p.value 
= .013 suggesting that the respondents rejected that ASCL technology is an outdated 
technology. KW and MW did not reveal any significant difference.  
Sections 6.7; 7.3; and table 7.3 (Qfd) are in agreement of the effectiveness of ASCL 
technology, suggesting that ASCL should not be abandoned as some people may suggest 
because it can still be used to turn out steel as envisioned. Nigeria Association of 
Technologists in Engineering (NATE) notes that technology, if it cannot meet the need of 
that time, can be modified to suit the need of the moment and not totally jettisoned as 
some may suggest (NATE, 2009). This steel professional association stated further that 
the ASCL installed machines are strong ones which are capable of achieving its purpose. 
In this case, according to these respondents, the technology can be improved upon if it 
cannot meet the need of the moment. 
 7.4 International and Local politics 
The majority of interviewees of the case attributed the non-completion of ASCL to 
international and local politics. Internationally, according to the majority of interviewees, 
because when ASCL is completed its products will compete with the products from other 
countries of the world. The ASCL steel products will prevent Nigerians from buying steel 
products from other countries. The local politics dimension is because of where ASCL is 
located. For instance, interviewee N1 and N2 argued that the politics of the North, East 
and West of Nigeria have made ASCL to be neglected. However, interviewee M2 argued 
that international and local politics are secondary. He further contended that “even 
location of ASCL is not the problem. For instance, what do you say of Kaduna refinery 
that is in the North and Port Harcourt refinery that was situated in the south-south that are 
not working? Forget about it, it is political will”  
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7.5 Lack of consistency in government policies 
A majority of the interviewees affirmed that the steel project is being prolonged because 
of government’s inconsistent policies and the practice of neglecting projects. For 
example, Mohammed and Yusuf (2004) opine that: 
Since Nigeria took her independence, the major forces that seem to threaten 
the techno-organisational capacity in Nigeria emerge from inconsistency in 
policy administration and high level of corruption in the polity, resulting in the 
current insecurity of persons and investment (p.7).   
Another thing worthy of note that is frustrating the development of ASCL is the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced by the Federal Military Government in 1986. 
Its negative results on government projects affected Nigeria’s industrialisation hence 
ASCL’s prolonged completion (Mohammed, 2002b). 
The changes in government affected the growth of ASCL greatly. For instance, 
interviewee M1 argued that a change of government led to a change in the management of 
the company. This, according to interviewee M1, affected the company’s policies and 
priorities as government’s policies and priorities changed. Interviewee M1 further stated 
that sometimes the company will be completely neglected when a new government comes 
in. He declared that immediately Shagari left in 1983, the incoming military government 
of General Buhari did nothing at ASCL and the company which its first phase of 1.3 
million tonnes of steel per annum would have been completed in 1986, still lingers on. 
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Table 7.4 Governance in parastatal organisations. 
Statements No Overall Mean SD 
Group Means 
K-W 
P-value 
M-W 
P-values 
ASCL ACAJO CISOT ASCL-ACAJO 
ASCL-
CISOT 
ACAJO-
CISOT 
Qea- parastatal organisations in Nigeria have 
active or passive governing boards. 43 2.21† 2.23 2.12 2.50 2.12 0.80 0.64 0.82 0.51 
Qeb- appointments to these boards are based 
on merit. 44 3.32 1.16 3.12 3.80 3.22 0.32 0.13 0.73 0.25 
Qec- appointments to these boards are based 
on political connections. 49 1.45† 0.71 1.23 1.33 1.70 0.24 0.57 0.11 0.33 
Qed- appointments of the chief executives 
into parastatals are based on merit and not 
on political connections. 
49 3.31 1.10 3.29 3.17 3.40 0.73 0.66 0.65 0.46 
Qeei-parastatal organisations’ governing 
boards are accountable the following: 
Parliament. 
42 1.81† .80 1.92 1.64 1.83 0.43 0.21 0.34 0.64 
Qeeii-Taxpayers 
37 2.76 1.38 3.08 2.78 2.47 0.49 0.51 0.24 0.66 
Qeeiii-Customers 34 2.97 1.31 3.18 2.33 3.21 0.19 0.12 0.86 0.11 
Qeeiv-Community 37 3.08 1.34 3.08 2.89 3.20 0.74 0.63 0.81 0.42 
Qeev-Media 
35 2.91 1.29 3.31 2.12 3.00 0.11 0.06 0.45 0.09 
Note: The table shows the responses of respondents who were served questionnaires by this researcher between December 2011 and February 2012. 50 questionnaires were 
received. No = numbers who ticked a particular statement, overall mean, SD= standard deviation, the total number who agreed to the statement, the total number that disagreed 
to the statement, group means, Kruskal-Wallis (KW) p. value and Mann-Whitney (MW) p. values. The table shows the mean responses to the statements at various levels: 
1=strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neutral; 4 = disagree and 5= strongly disagree. A † indicates significance difference at 5% for overall mean from the midpoint using t-test. 
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7.6 Appointments in parastatals based on political inclination 
There was no governing board at ASCL as at the time of interviews. This is because the 
company was under concessions to Solgas Energy Limited (SEL) and GIHL from 2003 to 
2008 and the Interim Management Committee (IMC) took over after the termination of the 
concessional agreement with GIHL in April, 2008. Before the concessions, between January 
2001 and 2003, according to majority of interviewees, there was a governing board headed by 
General Chris Ali (retd).  
The government appoints the members of the governing board of ASCL because it is the duty 
imposed by the Companies Act and the 1999 Nigerian constitution (as amended) on the 
owner (FGN) to appoint the chairman, members of the governing board, and the CEO (see 
also ECSAFA, 2004). The appointments of members of governing boards of parastatals, 
according to majority of interviewees, are based on political connection of which ASCL is 
one of them. For instance, some of the interviewees gave example of an Air Commander 
Ndasu Muhammed Umar who was appointed ASCL’s CEO in 1990. The period, according to 
these interviewees, witnessed the collapse of production in the completed rolling mills and 
the fund of the project went down the drains. 
The roles of governing board of ASCL according to interviewee N1 are to: formulate 
policies, approve promotions, demotions and contracts. Interviewee N1 further stated that all 
appointments, promotions and demotions that were not properly done by the management 
will be rectified by the governing board. He remarked that the ASCL governing board stands 
in the gap between the management of ASCL and the Ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development and met quarterly.  
Furthermore, on the interview question, on what basis are the chairman of the governing 
board and the CEO appointed?  Interviewee N1 declared that “their appointments are on 
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political basis and not on merit. A party faithful who has spent a lot of money during 
elections can be appointed the chairman of the governing board.”  
On the question of whether there is political interference in the affairs of ASCL, some of the 
interviewees affirmed that there were political interferences when ASCL was not yet given 
on concession. For example, interviewee N1 opined that:  
We used to have interferences here and there. If any fund is released from the 
ministry to the company, the ministry of Mines and Steel Development will send a 
list of contractors to whom the job must be given and it should not be given to any 
other contractor other than the ones the organisation was directed to give the job 
to otherwise the management will lose its job for incompetence.  
Table 7.4 of the questionnaire relates to the activities of governing boards of parastatals in 
Nigeria. Respondents to statement Qeb of table 7.4 disagreed to the statement that 
appointments into boards are based on merit. The overall mean (3.32) and group means 
(ASCL= 3.12; ACAJO= 3.80; CISOT= 3.22) revealed that the respondents did not agree with 
the statement. Group ACAJO revealed the highest disagreement with the statement while 
group ASCL expressed the lowest disagreement with the statement. Statement Qec states that 
appointments into the boards of parastatals in Nigeria are based on political connections. The 
t-test conducted showed overall mean of Qec to be 1.45 and p.value equal .000 meaning that 
the respondents significantly agreed that appointments into boards are based on political 
connections. The entire group means also agreed with the statement that appointments into 
boards are based on political connections with group ASCL’s mean =1.23 thus showing the 
highest agreement with the statement.  Moreover, groups ASCL (3.29), ACAJO (3.17), and 
CISOT (3.40) did not agree with the statement that the appointments of Chief Executives of 
parastatals are based on merit and not on political connections in statement Qed. The overall 
mean score is 3.31 disagreeing with that statement in Qed. 
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Majority of the questionnaire respondents affirmed that parastatals give account to the 
National Assembly (parliament) (Qeei). The survey of the group means showed group ASCL 
(1.92), group ACAJO (1.64), and group CISOT (1.83) suggesting that parastatals give 
account to the National Assembly.   
On the question of political interference, one of the respondents who wrote in question K 
noted that:  
There are lots of political interferences in the running of parastatals in Nigeria. In 
order to bring the needed change, government should stop unnecessary interferences 
and give the parastatals free hands to operate successfully. 
Other respondents who answered question K noted that government should ensure that 
appointments into parastatals should be by excellence and not on the basis of political party 
one belongs to. Other respondents responded to Question K in the questionnaire by noting 
that: 
       Government should encourage, promote and reward excellence. Appointments into 
boards of parastatals should not be based on party affiliations or political patronage 
in order to encourage productivity. Government should ensure that people are not 
appointed to offices on the basis of political party but on the basis of competence, 
qualification, integrity, honesty, good character, experience, and merit. Square pegs 
should be put in square holes. 
 These respondents further maintained that government should separate governance from 
political party permutations and due process should be followed in appointing persons into 
various levels of governance in parastatals.   
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Table 7.5 Neopatrimonialism and Accountability 
 Statements No OverallMeana SD 
           Group Means 
K-W 
P-value 
                M-W 
               P-values 
ASCL ACAJO CISOT ASCL-ACAJO 
ASCL-
CISOT 
ACAJO-
CISOT 
Qha- These factors affect good 
governance in Nigeria:  
Qhai- Ethnicity 
47 1.57† 0.80 1.50 1.33 1.79 0.31 0.28 0.55 0.15 
Qhaii-Corruption  48  1.12† 0.39 1.00 1.00 1.32 0.02* 1.00 0.02* 0.06 
Qhaiii-Patronage   47 1.96† 0.98 2.37 1.25 2.05 0.01* 0.00* 0.31 0.02* 
Qhaiv-Religion 46 2.06† 1.08 2.06 1.75 2.28 0.40 0.31 0.61 0.20 
Governance and accountability 
problems of parastatal organisations 
can be solved if: 
Qhbi- The notion of ‘businesses are 
best run by business people’ is applied 
to parastatal parastatal organisations. 
 
49 
 
1.82† 
 
1.01 
 
2.00 
 
1.42 
 
1.90 
 
0.12 
 
0.05* 
 
0.66 
 
0.08 
Qhbii-The governing board of 
parastatal organisations are appointed 
by independent private body instead by 
the Government. 
49 2.02† 1.05 2.23 1.67 2.05 0.29 0.13 0.59 0.24 
Qhbiii-Offenders are adequately 
punished to serve as deterrent to others.  49 1.43† 0.84 1.41 1.00 1.70 0.03* 0.04* 0.30 0.01* 
Qhbiv-Religion, ethnicity, political 
interference, conflicts of interest and 
corruption are not applied to parastatal 
organisations 
48 1.98† 1.30 1.44 1.50 2.70 0.00* 0.72 0.00* 0.01* 
Note: Table 7.5 shows the statistical results of neopatrimonialism and accountability with overall mean, standard deviation, the numbers that agreed or disagreed to 
the statement, group means, Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test which shows whether there are any differences in the means of the responses given by the three groups and 
Mann-Whitney (MW) test that shows whether there are significant different between the groups. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. The table shows the 
mean responses to the statements at various levels: 1=strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3= neutral; 4 = disagree; and 5= strongly disagree. A † indicates significance 
difference at 5% level for overall mean from the midpoint using t-test. 
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   7.7 Ethnicity 
 Table 7.5 (Qhai) revealed that ethnicity affects good governance. The overall mean is 1.57 and the 
group means equal ASCL = 1.50; ACAJO = 1.33; and CISOT = 1.79 thus expressing agreement 
with the statement that ethnicity affects good governance. KW and MW tests did not reveal any 
significant difference but t-test revealed significant difference meaning that ethnicity affects good 
governance. While discussing Nigerian contextual analysis, it was pointed out that even political 
parties were formed along ethnic divides (See section 2.1).  
7.8 Corruption 
A majority of interviewees maintained that there is corruption in Nigeria and it is affecting the 
completion of ASCL. Alli-Balogun (1988) argues that the size of ASCL alone makes it vulnerable 
to corruption. Alli-Balogun contends that in 1983 “Officials charged with the responsibility of 
overseeing the project to contractors handling it, everybody seems to have accepted fraudulent 
practice as the order of the day” (p.633). Okafor (2007) also advanced the argument that if it were 
not corruption, why is it that ASCL is yet to be completed which has similar design, state owned, 
and took off almost the same period with Pohang Steel Company Limited (POSCO) of India? 
POSCO, according to Okafor (2007), is the 10th largest steel company of the world today. 
 Besides, in 1981, ASCL became more complex because of ministerial mishandling; contracts 
outside the main contract were awarded at costs that were higher than the national resource could 
finance; and this made the FGN to default in paying the contract sum to Tyahzpromexport of Russia 
and European civil engineering contractors handling ASCL project (Mohammed, 2002b). This, 
according to Mohammed and Alli-Balogun, affected the date of completion of ASCL’s phase I of 
1.3 million tonnes of steel per year and was rescheduled from 1986 to 1989; from 1989 to 1991 and 
from 1991 to date.  
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In addition, according to interviewee N5, GIHL was not one of the bidders for concession of ASCL 
but was given the company on concession. According to Sanusi Mohammed, the Executive 
Secretary of African Iron and Steel Association, GIHL got ASCL on concession through 
“fraudulent arrangements” (Ayorinde, 2012 p.2). Interviewee N4 argued that corruption is the major 
enemy of ASCL and defined it as the “greed of technocrats who are not patriotic.” He further 
contended that corruption was displayed in the drafting of the concessional agreement with GIHL 
without the input of the office of Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) and also the actions of 
GIHL while managing the company portrayed corruption. For instance, the FGN set up a five 
member administrative panel of enquiry to investigate the operations of ASCL, National Iron Ore 
Mining Company (NIOMCO) and Delta Steel Company Limited (DSCL) under GIHL due to 
several petitions. The panel which was headed by Mallam Magaji Inuwa submitted its report in 
December 2007. The Panel observed the following from their investigations: (i) three years after 
GIHL started work, no workable business plan has been submitted to Nigerian Government; (ii) 
many clauses in the concessional agreement put the FGN at a disadvantage state. For example, 
article 3.8 of the concessional agreement states that “Ajaokuta Steel Project shall be carried out by 
GIHL for the account of and for the benefit of GIHL”; (iii) due to lack of records, the panel could 
not establish the annual turnover of the company and so there was no evidence that GIHL has ever 
paid the 1% concessional fee since it started work; (iv) there were other violations of the 
concessional agreement such as cannibalization and vandalization of plants and equipment, lack of 
maintenance of equipment, and exporting premium scraps imported for the project by Nigerian 
Government which have resulted in monumental financial loss to Nigerian Government; (v) the 
total statutory obligation standing against GIHL for three years was estimated at N350 million and 
total indebtedness of GIHL to Nigerian commercial banks pledging the assets of DSCL as collateral 
summed $192 million; and (vi) no evidence of capital importation  as claimed by GIHL - this was 
confirmed from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The panel recommended that in the future, 
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agreement of this nature should be drawn and vetted by the Attorney-General of the Federation and 
the concessional agreement should be terminated immediately (Report of Administrative Panel of 
Enquiry, 2007). The agreement between the FGN and GIHL was terminated in April 2008 because 
of its unethical practices and lack of adherence to agreement. These activities of GIHL adversely 
affected the completion of ASCL.  
Some of the interviewees cited the activity of their former acting Managing Director, Engineer 
Olufunso Elewa, in the issue of auctioning of the company’s properties as corruption. This, 
according to these interviewees, led to his removal and Dr Tom Miachi was appointed in his place 
as the acting Chief Executive of the company by the FGN. These issues ranging from personal 
interest to corruption might be the reasons while the company has not been completed. Interviewees 
N2, N4 and N7 maintained that ASCL was established as a conduit pipe for siphoning money, 
getting controls and directives from the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. For instance, 
interviewee N7 argued that “our leaders have used ASCL as a conduit pipe to steal allocations to 
ASCL. There is no commitment on the part of our leaders. These people when detected were just 
sacked without prosecuting them and at the end of it, the company will be worse for it.” Interviewee 
N1 illustrated how ASCL was always used as a conduit pipe to steal its allocations thus:  
When the ministry wants to release the budgetary allocation, they will release the 
total amount on paper but only one third of the amount will be given physically; they 
are the ones to send the list of contractors to handle the work; the company has to 
retire the total amount and not one third physical cash received; and the managing 
director is a human being who will manoeuvre the one third released. 
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Interviewee N1 further stated that about three years ago the President approved N650m for the 
reactivation of ASCL but the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development said it cannot prepare a 
memo for the release of the approved money because “it is outside the mandate of the IMC64.”  
Statement Qhaii in table 7.5 examined corruption as one of the characteristics of neopatrimonialism. 
The overall mean of 1.12 and the group means (group ASCL= 1.00; group ACAJO= 1.00; group 
CISOT= 1.32) revealed that there is corruption in Nigeria. KW p.value and MW p.values are 
significantly different. Groups ASCL and CISOT are significantly different. Groups ASCL and 
ACAJO have higher agreement than group CISOT to the presence of corruption in parastatals in 
Nigeria. A couple of respondents wrote about corruption in reaction to question K and statement L 
of the questionnaire. They contended that corruption deprives individuals of enjoying decent 
lifestyle and it should be totally discouraged, reduced, eradicated or tackled before the country can 
move forward. Some of the respondents noted in statement K that: 
The issue of corruption should be seriously tackled by first making political offices less 
attractive to Nigerians. Government should show commitment to patriotism and 
development by curbing corruption. Corruption should be avoided by all at all levels of 
the country’s governance. The perpetrators should be adequately punished and acquired 
properties confiscated to serve as deterrent to others. If corruption is tolerated at the top of 
governance it will cascade down to the ordinary workers.   
 
7.9 Patronage 
The examination of table 7.5 (Qhaiii) revealed that patronage65 affects good governance. The group 
means revealed that ACAJO (1.25) agreed most with that statement and also the other two groups 
with group means of 2.05 for CISOT and 2.37 for ASCL are in agreement that patronage affects 
                                                          
64 Interim Management Committee (IMC) is a committee set up by FGN after the termination of the contract between 
the FGN and GIHL. IMC is to oversee the day to day management of ASCL pending the approval of a substantive 
management for the company (GUSAU, 2008).  
65 Patronage is also one of the characteristics of neopatrimonialism which means politically motivated distribution of 
favours to ethnic groups by a leader (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). 
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good governance. KW test show a p. value of 0.01 which is significantly different thus showing that 
patronage is a problem of governance in Nigeria. MW p.values showed difference in the responses 
of ASCL group (2.37) and ACAJO group (Mean=1.25) and also groups ACAJO (mean=1.25) and 
CISOT (2.05) are statistically significant. The results showed that ACAJO group expressed the 
highest agreement than groups ASCL and CISOT meaning that patronage is a problem of 
governance in Nigeria.  
7.10 Punishment for offenders 
Statement Qhbiii states that the problem of governance will be solved if offenders are adequately 
punished to serve as deterrent to others. The overall mean is 1.43 agreeing to the assertion that if 
people who commit fraud or flout the laws are instantly punished, others will fear and there will be 
sanity in the system. The assertion is supported by the group means. The results of KW p.value test 
and MW p.values test are statistically significant. ACAJO group expressed the highest agreement 
with the statement than groups ASCL and CISOT. Group ACAJO is by implication suggesting that 
if offenders are adequately punished others will fear. This statement supports the view of the 
interviewees that suggested that if a staff is caught defrauding an organisation, he should not be 
merely sacked but should be prosecuted (see section 7.8).  
Finally, the statement (Qhbiv) that the problem of governance and accountability of parastatals will 
be solved if religion, ethnicity, political interference, conflict of interests and corruption are not 
allowed in parastatals received the overall mean of 1.98 and all the groups agreeing with that 
statement. The results of KW p.value test and MW p.values test are statistically significant.  
7. 11 Lack of accountability to all stakeholders  
On the question, how has ASCL been accountable to its stakeholders? Interviewee N4 said “I 
cannot say ASCL gives account to all the stakeholders because there is no social contract”. The 
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accountability in the public sector is to the National Assembly (Sendt 2002). Interviewees M1 and 
M2 appeared to suggest that ASCL has no obligation to give account to any other stakeholder rather 
than to the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. One of the interviewees said: 
“This is a private company owned by FGN. We report directly to the Ministry of Mines and 
Steel Development immediately our accounts have been audited, thereafter our obligation 
as regards accountability has ended” (M1). 
 The company has obligation to its owner, the FGN and “to whom we render account” (M1). This is 
what the management of the company was doing, according to interviewees M1 and M2, before the 
concessions of the company to SEL and GIHL.  
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 Table 7.6 Anti-corruption agencies. 
  Statement No Overall    Mean SD 
           Group Means 
K-W 
P-value 
                M-W 
               P-values 
ASCL ACAJO CISOT ASCL-ACAJO 
ASCL-
CISOT 
ACAJO-
CISOT 
Qj- Nigeria has adequate structure 
to bring fraudsters, corrupters, 
money launders and other economic 
and financial crimes offenders to 
justice.  
50 2.34† 1.27 2.94 1.92 2.05 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.63 
Note: Table 7.6 Anti-corruption agencies show the number of respondents, the overall mean, standard deviation, the number that agreed and disagreed to the 
statement, the group means, Kruskal – Wallis (KW) p. value test and Mann-Whitney (MW) p. value test. KW test tries to establish whether there are any 
differences in means of the responses given by the three groups and MW wants to open up any significant differences between the group means. A * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. The table shows the mean responses to the statements at various levels: 1=strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3= neutral; 4 = disagree and 
5= strongly disagree. A †  indicates significance difference at 5% level for overall mean from the midpoint using t-test. 
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7.12 Ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies 
Table 7.6 (Qj) requested the respondents to tick one of the options from the questionnaire the 
assertion that Nigeria has adequate structure to bring fraudsters, corrupters, money launderers 
and other economic and financial crimes offenders to justice. ACAJO believes there are 
enough anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria to track down financial and economic crimes 
offenders. The ASCL group mean = 2.94, CISOT group mean = 2.05 and ACAJO group 
mean = 1.92 with group ACAJO expressing the highest agreement than the other two groups. 
However, the other two groups may be suggesting that even though there are enough anti-
corruption agencies, their implementation is weak and ineffective. The result of KW showed 
that group ASCL and ACAJO; ASCL and CISOT are significantly different. Respondents 
suggested in question K that:  
To bring the needed change and sanity to Nigeria, Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) should have their own special court to punish offenders.  
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Table 7.7 Privatisation of parastatal organisations                                                                              
 Statements No OverallMean SD 
           Group Means 
K-W 
P-value 
                M-W 
               P-values 
ASCL ACAJO CISOT ASCL-ACAJO 
ASCL-
CISOT 
ACAJO-
CISOT 
Qga-Political and bureaucratic interferences 
make many government parastatal 
organisations to perform poorly.  
48 1.46† 0.68 1.31 1.42 1.60 0.70 0.58 0.42 0.81 
Qgb-There should be clear separation of 
politics from parastatal organisations.  48  1.71† 0.97 1.71 1.42 1.89 0.40 0.37 0.60 0.19 
Qgc- Businesses are best run by business 
people.  49 1.86† 0.96 1.88 1.33 2.15 0.05* 0.11 0.39 0.01* 
The following are the advantages of 
privatisation: 
Qgdi-It encourages domestic and foreign 
investments. 
49 1.45† 0.71 1.47 1.08 1.65 0.08 0.05* 0.65 0.03* 
Qgdii- it generates employment. 49 1.84† 1.01 1.76 1.75 1.95 0.57 0.47 0.63 0.32 
Qgdiii- It creates increased competition that 
leads to decrease in prices and increase in 
efficiencies. 
50 1.78† 1.05 2.22 1.17 1.75 0.02* 0.01* 0.22 0.07 
Qgdiv-It leads to improvement in quality of 
services. 48 1.50† 0.71 1.69 1.17 1.55 0.10 0.03* 0.39 0.15 
Qgdv- It enables government to focus on 
other areas of development.  
46 1.67† 0.99 1.69 1.25 1.94 0.24 0.09 0.97 0.16 
Qgdvi- Managers’ performances are closely 
monitored and controlled. 
47 1.87† 0.99 1.94 1.73 1.90 0.60 0.77 0.47 0.35 
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Qgdvii- Businesses are in the hands of 
professional to run. 42  1.93† 1.00 2.27 1.87 1.68 0.35 0.42 0.15 0.84 
Qgei- The following are the demerits of 
privatisation: 
Privatisation leads to selling parastatal 
organisations at a give-away price to 
oneself, friends or cronies. 
 
48 
1.75†  
1.02 
 
1.53 
 
1.92 
 
1.84 
 
0.49 
 
0.54 
 
0.22 
 
0.72 
Qgeii- Only the rich can afford to buy the 
organisation thereby leading to monopoly 
and making the rich get richer. 
48 1.60† 0.89 2.00 1.18 1.50 0.03* 0.01* 0.13 0.11 
Qgeiii- Privatisation makes government to 
stop giving subvention to the organisation 
concerned thereby making the poor unable 
to afford the services provided by the 
privatised parastatal. 
46 2.20† 1.24 2.50 2.00 2.05 0.40 0.29 0.23 0.83 
Note: Table 7.7 shows the numbers of respondents, the overall means, the standard deviation, the numbers who agreed and disagreed to the statement, the group 
means, KW test which shows whether there is a difference among the group means and MW test showing whether the group means are statically significant for 
statements Qga-Qdgeiii. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. The table shows the mean responses to the statements at various levels: 1=strongly agree; 2 = 
agree; 4 = disagree and 5= strongly disagree. A † indicates significance difference at 5% level for overall mean from the midpoint using t-test. 
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7.13 Privatisation of parastatals   
Interviewees M1, M2, M3, N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, and N7 suggested that privatisation 
may bring ASCL to life. Interviewee N7 remarked that “Government is not a good 
businessman.” But before ASCL is privatised, according to them, the company should be 
completed for it to have good sale value. Interviewees N1, N4 and N7 argued that the 
original builder of ASCL should be invited to complete the project and thereafter 
government should enter into PPP with the same organisation to run the steel company. 
Interviewee N1 contended that “government cannot run this company because it will be 
used as a sucking venture. So privatisation is okay but the company should be completed 
first so that it will not be sold below its value”. As insiders, some of the interviewees 
believe that as far as government continues to be the sole owner of ASCL, it will not 
perform as intended because there will be interferences from politicians. Interviewee N3 
argued that:  
If ASCL is privatised it is okay. It is a welcome development. Investors aim at 
profit maximisation. The personnel will be maximally used. ASCL will pick 
up without political interference. The privatised company will not look up to 
the government for funding and the Federal Character Commission system 
whereby both the qualified and unqualified persons are employed into the 
system based on where you come from will not be there in the privatised 
company.  Those to be employed are those who are professionals with relevant 
qualifications, skills, and experience.  
Interviewee N4 added voice to his admittance of privatisation and how it should be done. 
He argued that:   
I am an advocate of privatisation. We have also witnessed the failure of 
concessional agreements. Even if ASCL is to be given out, it should be 
completed first if government is serious about industrialisation, development 
and vision 20:2020. Government should not privatise a sick baby. Privatisation 
should be in the form of a joint venture with the government. 100% 
privatisation should not be now. We are products of our experiences. Even 
though privatisation increases efficiency, the ones we had before failed. 
 
 
                                                                     
 235 
 The former president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in his inaugural address to the 
National Council on Privatisation (NCP) in 1999 posited the following as regards 
privatisation: 
State enterprises suffer from fundamental problems of defective capital structure, 
excessive bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross 
incompetence and mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling complacency 
which monopoly engenders. Inevitably, these shortcomings take a heavy toll on 
the national economy (Mohammed, 2008). 
Statements in table 7.7 using questionnaire survey addressed the privatisation of 
parastatals in Nigeria including ASCL. The table shows in statement Qga that political 
and bureaucratic interferences in the running of parastatals make them to perform poorly. 
The overall mean is 1.46 with group means showing CISOT =1.60; ACAJO =1.42 and 
ASCL=1.31 agreeing with statement Qga. Group ASCL expressed the highest agreement. 
The t-test conducted show overall mean of Qga to be 1.46 and p.value equal .000 which 
means that the respondents significantly agreed to statement Qga. The tests of KW and 
MW show no significant difference for statement Qga. 
Interference by politicians in the administration of parastatals including the appointment 
of their board members by politicians has negative effects in the running of parastatals. 
Results of statements Qgb and Qgc show that parastatals should be separated from 
politics because businesses are best run by business people. The calculation of Mann-
Whitney test show significant difference between group ACAJO (1.33) and group CISOT 
(2.15) in Qgc. The responses of ACAJO group revealed their agreement that businesses 
are best run by business people. Kruskal-Wallis statistic was calculated to determine if 
there was any statistically significant difference among the three groups and the results 
revealed significant difference. Group ACAJO expressed the highest agreement with the 
statement in Qgc. 
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The advantages of privatisation of encouraging domestic and foreign investments, 
increasing competition, improving the quality of services, government focusing on other 
areas of development, and business being in the hands of professional people received 
strong positive responses. There were also significant differences in KW and MW tests 
carried out. A majority of the respondents argued that privatisation is a welcome 
development but before ASCL’s privatisation, the Russian company (Tyazhpromexport) 
that installed those machines at Ajaokuta should be invited to complete the project. This 
is because, according to the majority of respondents, as the entire plant is their own 
technology, they will know how to handle their own technology. One of the respondents 
from ASCL wrote in question K that when privatising ASCL: 
The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) should fund the project under 
Public Private Partnership (PPP). The private company which must be 
Tyahzpromexport should head the establishment and should report directly to 
the office of the President instead of Ministry of Mines and Steel Development 
as it is now. 
7.14 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter sought to highlight the key findings from the case study and questionnaire 
survey. The chapter detailed the reasons why ASCL has not been completed including the 
governance and accountability limitations in parastatals; and how governance and 
accountability can be improved in parastatals. The findings show that ASCL has not been 
completed because of: lack of political will of the government; ASCL technology is 
considered to be an out-dated technology; international and local politics; lack of 
consistency in government policies; appointments in parastatals based on political 
inclination; and lack of accountability to all the stakeholders. The findings also show that 
appointments into parastatals are done based on ethnicity, partisanship and lots of 
political interference, thus neglecting appointments into positions based on integrity, 
honesty, good character, qualifications, experience and meritocracy. Findings show also 
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that for governance and accountability of parastatals to be improved, parastatals, 
including ASCL, should be privatised by PPP. ASCL should be completed before 
privatisation and should be under the presidency instead of the present Ministry of Mines 
and Steel Development.  
In conclusion, ASCL was established to fulfil Nigeria’s quest for industrialisation and 
economic development. The findings from the questionnaires support the findings from 
the case and the semi-structured interviews.  
The next chapter will discuss the findings.  
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion  
 
8.0 Introduction  
This thesis examined governance and accountability issues in Nigerian parastatals using 
the case of Ajaokuta Steel. The current study explored the reasons for parastatals’ failures 
and ASCL’s protracted struggle, through the use of semi-structured interviews, case study 
interviews and a questionnaire survey, and found a list of complex factors at work: lack of 
political will; international politics—forces and pressures—and local politics; military 
interventions in politics; corruption; location of ASCL; dissolution of NSDA; ASCL 
technology, considered to be an out-dated technology; lack of consistency in government 
policies; appointments in parastatals based on political inclination; lack of accountability 
to all stakeholders by parastatals; ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; and 
privatisation of parastatals. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the research outcomes within the adopted theoretical 
framework of neopatrimonialism using the key empirical findings in relation to the 
theoretical framework as presented above. The framework of this study is a critical and 
interpretive perspective that gives substantive consideration to neopatrimonialism. 
Neopatrimonialism as discussed in chapter four is the co-existence of legal-rational 
authority and patrimonialism. However, legal-rational authority is on the face of it in 
Nigeria being supplanted by patrimonialism system of governance. The research findings 
will be examined in the light of a critical and interpretive perspective reflecting on 
neopatrimonialism, governance, and accountability.  
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The chapter is structured as follows: rational-legal bureaucratic authority; governance by 
neopatrimonialism using the key issues identified in the empirical chapters; and chapter 
summary. 
8.1 Legal-rational bureaucratic authority 
Many developing countries, immediately or very soon after political independence, 
established parastatals ostensibly to secure economic independence (Etukudo, 1997). 
Most of these parastatals were established due to such an economic motive. Others were 
officially legitimated for the welfare of the people (Etukudo, 1997). The present study 
focuses on the ones established for economic motives, being established by Act of the 
National Assembly or decree and incorporated by Company Act with memorandum and 
articles of associations; and having governing boards and management. This is the type of 
organisations where accountability, according to Sendt (2002), is from the subordinate to 
the next upper level up to the National Assembly and accountability to the National 
Assembly is understood to be accountability accomplished (Sendt, 2002). Consistent with 
this sentiment, interviewees from the case analysis contended that they give account to the 
Ministry of Mines and Steel Development after their accounts have been audited and that 
is the end of the matter. 
 In parastatals, every detailed bureaucratic process is being maintained and followed but 
this is a surface level, instrumental compliance (Clapham, 1985; Wanyama et al., 2013). 
Rules, regulations and bureaucratic procedures are followed but are in effect superseded 
by patrimonialistic practice (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). Every parastatal organisation has 
a code that guides its operations. The laws and rules are there; they are written down, but 
the actual work in practice is different from the work on paper. Some of the interviewees 
are of the opinion that if it is possible government’s pronouncements, physical 
achievements and records should be verified to see government’s sincerity. Parastatals’ 
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documents and records always exclude important matters (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 
2002). In essence people are not satisfied with government’s promises and achievements. 
It is in line with neopatrimonial governance system where patrimonial systemic practices 
penetrate the legal-rational system and twists its logic (Erdmann and Engel, 2007).  
8.2 Governance by neopatrimonialism 
The findings indicate that many of the parastatals established immediately after 
independence were used by politicians to give jobs and contracts to their kinsmen and 
associates. All inefficiencies and fraudulent behaviours are shielded and subsidized by the 
government. That is why one of the interview participants in the case analysis remarked 
that some fraudulent people when discovered to have defrauded the organisation, will be 
merely sacked without being prosecuted. Parastatals are being used to fix it that unelected 
politicians fall into positions in order to close political gaps.  
8.2.1 Lack of political will  
The problem of ASCL is understood to be lack of political will as evidenced from the 
semi-structured interviews; case study interviews and questionnaire survey (see sections 
6.1 and 7.2). Lack of political will, according to interviewees, means lack of government 
seriousness, patriotic zeal, or taking ASCL as priority by maintaining a sustained 
commitment to using political power and available resources to accomplish the task of 
completing ASCL. Interviewees from the semi-structured interviews and case study 
believe that Nigeria is capable of completing ASCL if she chooses to because she is a 
very rich country. Nigeria did not borrow anything to complete the project substantially 
and the remaining work is relatively insignificant. The reason for lack of political will 
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may be because there are no pressure groups to pressurise66 the government to complete 
ASCL. Political pressure and peaceful protest can be done to remind the government of 
its election campaign promises and to stress ASCL’s benefits to the people. Some of the 
interviewees suggested using prominent members of the State to pressurise the 
government to complete ASCL. Respondents from the questionnaire agreed that if 
government is willing it can complete ASCL but however noted that sometimes when 
money is budgeted and released for ASCL’s reactivation it will not reach where it is 
needed or meet the purpose it was released for. ASCL group has the higher view that if 
government takes it as priority, it would have completed ASCL. 
One of the interviewees argued that the political will of the government is absent here 
because of the government inability to re-award67 ASCL where it can get benefits from. 
Interviewees pose the question; why all the attempts to give out ASCL on concessions 
while it has not yet been completed or the builders not invited to complete the project first 
before concessions? This may be to enable leaders to distribute the State resources to 
friends and political associates (neopatrimonialism). This kind of leadership 
unfaithfulness and unreliability typifies neopatrimonialism (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 
2002). 
Lack of political will may be because of ethnicism, which is typically one of the elements 
of neopatrimonialism. Politicians prefer a parastatal to be located in their ethnic area 
where their kinsmen and political associates will be given jobs and contracts. Since 
Nigerian independence in 1960, people in government have been loyal to their ethnic 
origin by drawing government projects and parastatals to where they come from (Akinola, 
                                                          
66 The reason for pressurising the government is to tell the government that this is what the people want and 
to remind them of the promises they made at the time of the electioneering campaigns. 
67 The benefits of re-awarding of projects are to award them at inflated prices to political supporters, locate 
them at their ethnic origin or the contractor to give them kick back (see El-Rufai, 2012; Olalusi and 
Otunola, 2012; and Ubani and Ononuju, 2013). 
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1988; Iyoha, 2008; Aluko and Ajani, 2009; Salawu and Hassan, 2011; Agbiboa, 2012). 
ASCL may be unfortunate as the bulk of the Nigerian politicians who should have 
influenced its completion are from the majority tribes and not from the minority tribe 
where ASCL is located. Lack of political will may be as a result of politicians’ and 
bureaucrats’ self-interests, who are interested in doing only what’s best for themselves, 
families, friends, and ethnic groups (Urgoji, 1995; Balko, 2013).  
8.2.2 International and local politics  
Several interviewees (including those interviewed by semi-structured interviews and 
those in the case analysis – see sections 6.2 and 7.4) argued that ASCL is incomplete 
because of international and local politics – forces and pressures – and local politics. 
Interviewees opined generally that the Nigerian market for steel is a large market as a 
result of her population – but there are international and local interests that oppose ASCL. 
If Nigeria’s integrated steel company is working the livelihood of both locally and 
internationally steel businessmen will be in jeopardy and therefore everything must be 
done to prevent ASCL’s completion. The international and local steel businessmen 
believe that they will sell more of their steel products if Nigerian steel company is not 
working.  
The findings also suggest that the Cold War feud between the Western and Eastern blocs 
is a factor which may be responsible for non-completion of ASCL. In this regard, the 
statement made by the Russian ambassador to Nigeria, Vladimir Snegirev, in 1983, 
should not be lightly ignored. He declared that “we agreed to build this project for your 
country at a time when no other country in the world wanted to” (Alli-Ballogun, 1988 
p.623). From that statement, it may be inferred why IMF, DFID, and the World Bank are 
not comfortable with ASCL technology. If it is not the issue of Western and Eastern 
blocs, some interviewees argued; why is it that Nigeria did not invite the Russians that 
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mounted the technology to complete ASCL instead of companies like Solgas of US and 
GIHL of India that Nigeria invited? In this case, Nigeria is confused, leading to insecurity 
and corruption which pose danger to Nigerian development - which is neopatrimonialism 
(Erdmamnn and Engel, 2007). 
The local businessmen, according to interviewees, are not in support of ASCL’s 
completion because those of them who import steel materials like generators, motor bikes, 
bicycles, plates and other steel products are afraid of being thrown out of business should 
ASCL start working. These fears by the local steel businessmen have stopped political 
class to take political decision (lack of political will) to finance the completion of ASCL. 
The bill for the completion of ASCL, according to interviewees, was killed at the National 
Assembly and the National Assembly advised the government to sell ASCL as scrap. This 
action by local steel businessmen and politicians is an intention to personalise public 
affairs and take decisions without public discussion or involvement (neopatrimonialism).  
Several interviewees suggested that the problem of ASCL is not international and local 
conspiracies but the aforementioned issue of political will. This is because nothing 
stopped Nigeria from substantial completion of the project.   
8.2.3 Military interventions in politics 
Section 6.3 of this present study presented the views of interviewees pointing to the 
military intrusions in governance as one of the core reasons why ASCL is not completed. 
This is because according to the military (see section 2.2) their main reason for taking 
over the governance is to stamp out corruption, but corruption became the mainstay of 
their government (APRM report No. 8, 2009; Uneke, 2010). Some of the interviewees 
maintained that they took over and did not pay attention to ASCL, which will also benefit 
them in terms of producing military hardware and weapons. The military promotes ethnic 
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politics and take public offices as if they were their personal properties. For instance, (see 
section 6.3; Apter 2005; Agbiboa, 2012) a dedicated account amounting to $12.4 billion 
(being excess revenue from the sales of crude oil during the Gulf War meant for ASCL 
and other two parastatals) depleted to $200 million under the military watch. The $12.4 
billion, according to General Babangida (Daniel, 2015), was not stolen but used for 
regenerative investment and critical infrastructure which were not what the money was 
meant for. $2.5 billion meant for the payment of debts to Tiazhpromexport of Russia was 
withdrawn from the CBN but only $500 million was paid to them by the military 
government of General Sani Abacha (BBC NEWS, 1998; Oyediran, 1998; Obadina, 
1999; Daniel and Freeman, 2007; Agubamah, 2009; and Administrator, 2011); Air 
Commander Ndasu Muhammed Umar, according to interviewees, was appointed the CEO 
of ASCL; and a retired general (General Chris Ali) was made the chairman of the 
governing board of ASCL before the concessions by the military. This is a neopatrimonial 
system whereby leaders transfer public goods and services to oneself, friends and ethnic 
origin for personal benefits (Le vine, 1980; Ikpe, 2000; Erdmann and Engel, 2007). The 
military is prebendal in that they used political office as personal inheritance and at their 
discretion (Ikpe, 2000). 
Military government, according to interviewees, is opposed to democracy as there is no 
voice for the voiceless. They are neopatrimonialistic because they promote corruption, 
ethnicism, patronage, prebendalism, and owe no accountability to anyone (Ikpe, 2000). 
Their government exhibits almost all the characteristics of neopatrimonialism by 
personalising public infrastructures, goods, and services to the detriment of the generality 
of the citizenry for their own personal gain. The literature revealed that the military 
government is opposed to democracy because it promotes ethnic politics and personalises 
public offices (Ikpe, 2000). The military regime is a patrimonial regime that monopolises 
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power to reward friends and relations at the expense of the people without accountability. 
This is because for there to be accountability to the principal there must be a bond of 
accountability between the principal and agent (Stewart, 1984; Gray et al., 1996). 
Stakeholders cannot demand accountability from the military because there is no 
contractual, constitutional, or charismatic authority relationship. The military believe their 
authority is personal, displaying self-importance (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). 
They wield much influence but deem themselves accountable to no one (Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith, 2002).  
8.2.4 Corruption 
Sections 6.4 and 7.8 present the analysis of Corruption. Corruption, according to one of 
the interviewees, is like a tap that is always open in parastatal organisations. Some of the 
interviewees maintain that corruption is prevalent everywhere in the world but its level in 
Nigeria is very high because of her uncontrolled population, illiteracy, greediness, 
poverty, and ethnic persuasions. Interview participants declared that corruption is carried 
out through inflation of contracts, lack of transparency and accountability, favouritism, 
and the practice of not completing projects of previous governments. ASCL, according to 
the interviewees, was given to GIHL through fraudulent means and is being used by 
leaders as a conduit pipe to siphon the allocations to ASCL. Also, according to 
interviewees in the case analysis, the drafting of the concessional agreement was carried 
out without the input of AGF. GIHL left ASCL worse than it met it.  
A majority of respondents of questionnaires affirmed that corruption affects governance 
of a country which is common in Nigeria and affecting the completion of ASCL (see 
section 7.8). Corruption is one of the elements of neopratimonialism. Where policy 
decisions are taken secretly without public involvement, it is neopatrimonialism 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002) – the drafting of the concessional agreement between 
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the FGN and GIHL. Corruption involves manipulating things in favour of oneself, 
friends, and family through illegal means at public expense or using public authority for 
personal gain (Klitgaard, 1997; Dike, 2005). Parastatals have been used by both the 
military and politicians to get money out of the public treasury for personal use (see 
section 6.3). That is why parastatals are being described as unproductive and inefficient 
and hence calls by the World Bank and interviewees that parastatals should be privatised 
(Urgoji, 1995, Etukudo, 1997).  
Interviewees and scholars argued that ASCL is in the state it is today because of many 
inflated contracts and ministerial mishandling (Alli-balogun, 1988; Mohammed, 2002b; 
and Kadiri, 2012). However, one of the interviewees contended that corruption is good for 
the development of a country like Nigeria. This echoes some prior literature - some 
scholars like Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Uneke (2010) contended that corruption is 
good for the development of individuals and countries. This is because, according to the 
above scholars, corruption lubricates the wheels of rigid bureaucracy and enables 
politicians to give jobs to people from their ethnic origin even if they are not qualified.  
Another thing worthy of note about corruption is Klitgaard’s (1997) metaphorical 
corruption formula (Corruption equals Monopoly plus Discretion minus Accountability: 
C = M + D – A). This, according to Klitgaard, is when a public office holder has wide 
unlimited powers with no accountability. This thesis presents an improvement to the 
formula given by Klitgaard in 1997. This is: A = D + M + N.  A stands for 
Accountability; D stands for Discretion; M stands for Monopoly; N stands for 
Neopatrimonialism. The formula being interpreted as Accountability equals Discretion 
plus Monopoly plus Neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism, according to Nawaz (2008), 
is “a system of governance where the formal rational-legal state apparatus co-exists and is 
supplanted by an informal patrimonial system of governance” (p.2). Accountability is 
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“giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts & Scapens, 1985 p.447). 
Discretion means when someone has freedom or authority to decide or judge and to act as 
he likes or sees fit (Collins Dictionary & Thesaurus, 2000). Monopoly means when a 
person has exclusive rights, control, possession or use of something (Collins Dictionary & 
Thesaurus, 2000). This means that when an individual has the discretion to give public 
goods to whomsoever he likes; has the monopoly to supply public goods at any time he 
wants to anybody of his choice; has power to neopatrimonialise (personalise) public 
goods and positions, there will be no accountability. That means when the accountability 
crosses the equals sign, it becomes negative (lack of accountability). In the absence of 
discretion, monopoly, and neopatrimonialism (negative D, M and N), there will be 
accountability (a positive term). The problem with Klitgaard’s formula is that he made 
accountability a negative term and corruption a positive term even if they cross the equals 
sign, the meaning in real sense is quite different from what the formula seems to convey.       
8.2.5 Location of ASCL 
 Some of the interview participants contended that the Nigerian government considered 
that Ajaokuta and its environs have enough raw materials for the siting of ASCL before 
locating ASCL at Ajaokuta. The location of ASCL at Ajaokuta became possible as a 
result of feasibility studies carried out by the Russians (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). 
So, Ajaokuta was considered a very feasible site. The management staff of Ajaokuta and 
other stakeholders interviewed lamented that supposing ASCL were to be located in one 
of the three major tribes; it would have been completed long ago. Ajaokuta is located in 
Kogi which is one of the minority states in Nigeria. They suggested that this was key – 
not the feasibility of the site but that Ajaokuta was in a minority tribe area, a tribe with 
little influence over the central government. 
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Ethnic preferencing is one of the elements of neopatrimonialism. It is where the leaders 
draw parastatals to their ethnic origin even if the environment is not necessarily the most 
attractive to the parastatal, by ignoring the lack of basic raw materials or the danger posed 
by the environment (Akinola, 1988; Iyoha, 2008; Aluko and Ajani, 2009; Salawu and 
Hassan, 2011; Agbiboa, 2012). 
Agbu (2007) contends that ASCL was located at Ajaokuta by political calculation of 
politicians. This thesis argues that industries are typically located near to raw materials, 
land, transport, water, markets, and source of power. ASCL is located in the Middle-Belt 
area of Nigeria where anybody from any part of Nigeria can get to in a day’s journey, 
transact business and go back the same day. Ajaokuta town in Kogi State is surrounded by 
the needed raw materials68, as noted by Oyeyinka & Adeloye (1988 p.19) and Agbu 
(2007)69, and other raw materials are to be imported. The majority of the raw materials 
needed for ASCL are available in Kogi State where ASCL is located (Oyeyinka and 
Adeloye, 1988; Agbu, 2007). ASCL is located at the bank of the rivers Niger and Benue 
where it is possible for ships to bring in raw materials and carry out manufactured steel 
products to any part of the world. There are dual carriage ways from Okene to Ajaokuta 
and an airstrip at Adogo. ASCL is occupying a large mass of land and can even expand if 
the need arises in the future because of the availability of large acres of land. The 
researcher believes that since industries are located near to source of raw materials, 
power, transport, water, markets and also as a result of the feasibility studies carried out 
by the Russians, Ajaokuta site may not be out of places to locate ASCL.  
                                                          
68 Iron ore at Itakpe, Ajaba Noko, Shokoshoko, and Agbaja (all in Kogi where ASCL is located); Coal at 
Enugu, Okaba (Kogi), Lafia. They are to be imported because of high ash and surphur contents making it 
difficult to be mined. Limestone at Jakura (Kogi) and Dolomite at Osara (Kogi). Water, ASCL is situated at 
the bank of rivers Niger and Benue. Refractory Clay at Onibode, Oshiele and Ozubulu (Imo). All others are 
to be imported or widespread (Oyeyinka and Adeloye, 1988; Agbu, 2007). 
69 See table 5.1 on page 46 of Agbu (2007) 
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However, location may not be the major problem of ASCL because even the Kaduna and 
Port Harcourt refineries, according to the interview participants, that are located at the 
majority tribe areas are not working. Non-completion of a project or lack of maintenance 
of projects may be intention of leaders to relocate or divert the funds meant for such 
projects to fund another one to be located in their ethnic origin – Neopatrimonialism 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002). 
8.2.6 Dissolution of the Nigeria Steel Development Authority (NSDA) 
The findings from the interviews and the case revealed that the Russians experts that built 
ASCL advised the FGN to establish an agency free from political interference. The 
agency consists of professionals who are to plan, construct and operate the steel plants 
and carryout geological surveys (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). This was suddenly 
dissolved by politicians in 1979 and its functions transferred to the Ministry of Mines and 
Steel Development. The NSDA was an agency similar to Temasek Holdings Limited 
(THL) in Singapore, which is independent of government control (see section 6.6). 
The transfer of ASCL to the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development was to make the 
Ministry have full control of ASCL’s resources and management. The transfer was to 
enable the Ministry to control and direct ASCL. The action of the government in 
transferring ASCL from NSDA to the Ministry, according to Mohammed (2002b), led to 
many of the ASCL’s activities being done haphazardly and the inflation of the costs of 
many projects. The transfer was done in order to use the public authority to serve the 
personal interest of those in authority (Ministry). It therefore can be argued that the 
transfer was also done in order to ensure that the resources allocated to ASCL are under 
the control and direction of politicians, their friends and others who are not part of the 
State structure but take decisions about the State, aspects of neopatrimonialism (Nawaz, 
2008).  
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The interviewees in the case analysis contended that the Ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development had not been considerate to ASCL’s plight. Interviewees suggested that 
ASCL should be autonomous by removing it from the control of the Ministry. This is 
because apart from ministerial mishandling of ASCL, the FGN approved N650 million in 
March 2010 for the reactivation of ASCL and the National Iron Ore Mining Company 
(NIOMCO), Itakpe, but the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development distanced itself 
from the Interim Management Committee (IMC), saying that it has no part in its 
constitution and that also the N650 is outside the mandate of the IMC. If an independent 
agency like NSDA had been in place, as soon as the fund was approved the money would 
have been released to the two organisations immediately. This is in line with 
neopatrimonialism whereby leaders make public affairs a personal affair (Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith, 2002). Personal judgement and subjective reasoning with the intention of 
controlling and directing ASCL (neopatrimonialism) made politicians to transfer the 
functions of ASCL to the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development.  
8.2.7 ASCL technology, considered to be an out-dated technology 
Some of the interviewees claimed that the ASCL machines installed by the Russian 
experts are obsolete and they were dumped by the Russians looking for a place to dump 
their obsolete technology (see sections 6.7 and 7.3). Other interviewees countered that if 
the Russian technology built at Ajaokuta was obsolete, why then did the four completed 
rolling units turn out iron rods and cables during its occupation by GIHL? The Russians 
themselves and Nigerian Association of Technologists Engineering (NATE) vouched for 
the efficacy of ASCL technology reporting that Nigeria can still excel with the 
technology. The technology could be improved upon and need not be completely 
jettisoned. Some of the respondents from the questionnaires did not support the argument 
that ASCL technology is an obsolete technology. 
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There are different interests in ASCL issue. Some are interested in the government 
abandoning the ASCL technology for another one so that they will have the opportunity 
of participating in re-awarding the contract. One of the interview participants argued that 
if ASCL would have been possible to be re-awarded, Nigerian leaders would have done it 
a long time ago in order to obtain the benefits of awarding it as a new contract. The re-
awarding of the contract will be shaped by clientelism (an aspect of neopatrimonialism) 
where contracts and jobs will be given to friends, kinsmen, or for client-patronage (Ikpe, 
2000). The view on the re-awarding of projects for political benefit as expressed by the 
interviewees is similar to the findings of El-Rufai (2012) and Ubani and Ononuju (2013). 
8.2.8 Lack of consistency in government policies 
There are lots of neglected projects in Nigeria (see sections 6.8 and 7.5). There have been 
about 11,886 neglected projects in Nigeria since independence as reported by Presidential 
Projects Assessment Committee (PPAC). Interviewees argued that negligence of projects 
is more rampant in public projects than in private projects. This is because there is no 
benefit accruing to a government that completes a project embarked upon by its 
predecessor - and a lack of respect for continuity (Okafor, 2007). 
Reasonable argumentation to explain the reason for government inconsistency in policies 
and priorities, it seems, would involve reference to client-patronage, corruption, nepotism, 
and re-awarding the projects to party members and supporters as campaign gifts which 
are the symptoms of neopatrimonialism.  
8.2.9 Appointments in parastatals based on political inclination 
Governing board members of parastatals, according to the interview participants, are 
appointed by the government of the day and their functions are to formulate policies for 
the organisation; approve contracts; approve appointments, promotion, demotion and 
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discipline of staff; and approval of the budget of the organisation (see sections 6.9 and 
7.6). The board by the above directs and controls the parastatal organisation. However, 
according to interview participants, appointments of staff, CEO and members of the 
governing boards and the awarding of contracts are based on political patronage, tribal 
sentiment, religion, ethnic balancing, the influence of a party strongman, and generous 
campaign gifts. Respondents to questionnaires also supported the interviewees by holding 
that appointments into boards are not based on merit, including the appointment of chief 
executives, but on political connections. Research findings from interviews appear to 
show that in parastatals there is complete neglect for experience, qualifications, men of 
truth, track records of good character and values. 
Governance in parastatals shows the characteristics of neopatrimonialism. The 
characteristics of neopatrimonialism are corruption, clientelism, patronage, ethnicity, 
bribery and nepotism. These characteristics are manifested by the governing boards in 
appointments of staff and in awarding of parastatals’ contracts. Governance in parastatals 
in Africa is said to be based on nepotism, favouritism, patronage, corruption, clientelism 
and ethnic balancing. This is similar to the findings of Uneke (2010) and Sarbah and Wen 
(2014)   
8.2.10 Lack of accountability to all stakeholders  
Accountability means explaining your stewardship to those who keep their resources with 
you (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). The findings from the interviews and questionnaires 
survey of the current study show that in parastatals, accountability means giving report of 
your stewardship to those who gave you the opportunity to serve and to the National 
Assembly and not to the stakeholders (see sections 6.10 and 7.11). In bureaucratic 
authority, the constitution requires that you give accountability to the next higher rank up 
to the National Assembly, and accountability to the National Assembly is accountability 
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discharged (Mulgan, 1997; Sendt, 2002). No attempt is made to go to their constituencies 
to relay this information to the taxpayers. Parastatals themselves, according to 
interviewees, do not treat their customers with decorum or respect by not informing them 
when they are going on holidays or stopping operations for a definite period. One 
interviewee from the case affirmed that parastatals do not give account to stakeholders 
because of lack of social contract. However, according to some of the case interviewees, 
they have the obligation of sending their audited accounts to their supervisory ministry 
according to law before the concessions. This is in line with the literature that parastatals 
give account on the basis of subordinate to the superior, CEO, board, ministry and that 
order to the National Assembly (Mulgan, 1997; Sendt, 2002). There is no accountability 
to other stakeholders through the mass media as it is being done in the private sector. 
However, for there to be accountability there must be a bond of accountability between 
two parties: there must be giver of resources and managers (Tricker, 1983; Stewart, 1984; 
Laughlin, 1990; Gray et al., 1996). For instance, accountability is difficult for an 
undemocratic State where the military rules as accountability is not expected from them 
(Yinusa and Basil, 2008). This is because accountability to the National Assembly means 
accountability discharged (Sendt, 2002) and there was no National Assembly during the 
military rule and no mandate was given to them by the general public. 
The accountability in parastatals is from politicians to politicians meaning the 
accountability to the cabals who recommended them for that position rather than the 
people who own the resources. Since this system of accountability works according to the 
principles of garbage in garbage out, it would then be logical to believe that 
neopatrimonialism in governance produces “neopatrimonialistic accountability.” This 
accountability is just to fulfil all the bureaucratic and constitutional requirements and 
therefore decorative. Accountability in Africa has been difficult because of the long 
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military rule (Yinusa and Basil, 2008). There was no mandate given to the military and 
because of that they cannot give account of their stewardship to anybody (Yinusa and 
Basil, 2008). 
8.2.11 Ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies 
The two main anti-corruption agencies put in place to deal with corruption and economic 
crimes in Nigeria are the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences 
Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (see 
sections 6.11 and 7.12). Their functions are to curb bribery, corruption, to fight economic 
and financial crimes; investigate, prevent and prosecute those that have committed corrupt 
offences (ICPC Act 2000; Sec.46, EFCC Act 2004; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). These 
organs, according to interviewees, are weak; the judicial system is also weak and the 
implementation poor. The interviewees also noted that these agencies teach people what 
to do to get their freedom; the accused persons hire senior lawyers to defeat the cases of 
anti-corruption agencies in courts; government interferes in the operation of the agencies; 
they lack funds and manpower; there is no protection for whistle blowers; and no special 
court for the trial of the accused persons. These weaknesses lead to miscarriage of justice 
and therefore respondents suggested a special court for the EFCC. 
The findings from the interviews revealed that several of the accused persons who have 
cases with EFCC have their cases quashed because of government interests, interventions, 
and showing favouritism (impunity) to some people. The actions of the government have 
made the ICPC and EFCC not perform effectively. This agrees with Goldsmith (2007) 
who notes that preferential treatments are given to those in authorities and close to them 
in law courts.  Respondents to the questionnaires argued that there is adequate structure to 
deal with financial crimes but people do not see the actual implementation of those 
structures because of some people getting preferential treatment (Brinkerhoff and 
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Goldsmith, 2002). This is neopatrimonialistic practice in Nigeria. Government 
interference in the work of the agencies can be argued to be patron-client relationship.  
8.2.12 Privatisation of parastatals  
The findings (see sections 6.12 and 7.13) show that parastatals have failed in Nigeria 
because of political patronage in appointments, corruption, inefficiency, lack of 
accountability, lack of transparency, lack of funds, and wastefulness (aspects of 
neoptrimonialism). Therefore, stakeholders posited that they are not satisfied with the 
services parastatals render and should be privatised to enable them have a constant supply 
of these services no matter the cost of those goods and services. Interviewees and 
respondents to questionnaires suggested that parastatals should be privatised because 
businesses are best run by business people.  
As regards the privatisation of ASCL, interviewees of the case analysis stated that 
government is not a good businessman; the Tyazhpromexport of Russia should be invited 
to complete the project; ASCL should be removed from the Ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development to an agency to be overseen by the President; or ASCL should be privatised 
through PPP with Tyazhpromexport as a partner.  
Generally, the findings from the interviews revealed that parastatals have the problems of 
excessive bureaucratic control, interventions or interferences, gross incompetence and 
mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling complacency (aspects of 
neopatrimonialism) making the Nigerian economy bear the brunt of their failures. 
Respondents to the questionnaires subscribed to privatisation because it increases 
efficiency and so is the way out to reduce the burden on the government.  
The findings from the interviews and case analysis revealed that what is needed now in 
Nigeria is Public Private Partnership (PPP). The present study argues that there should be 
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complete handover of parastatals by the government. Stakeholders may be ignorant of the 
trends the world over now as regards the privatisation of parastatals. There are completly 
hollowed out parastatals in the Western World and the hollowed out organisations are 
serving the people well. Countries that have strong private sectors will be the focus of 
foreign investors (Wanyama, 2006). Moreover, as seen in the literature (Etukudo, 1997), 
politicians will surely interfere in parastatals. This is because one of the reasons for 
establishing parastatals is for political motive of providing jobs by politicians to their 
constituents, relations, classmates, friends, giving of contracts and patronage (Ugorji, 
1995) - Neopatrimonialism. The joint ownership apart from government owning shares in 
the company will lead to interference by politicians which then mean putting new wine 
into an old bottle. However, Momoh (2002) in Okafor (2007) argues that complete private 
sector may not be convenient for Nigeria now because:  
       The Nigerian private sector is one of the most inhumane, insensitive, callous and 
exploitative to be found anywhere in the world. Many of the private sector 
employers neither provide insurance nor social security for their employees. 
They do not obey labour laws and they sack workers arbitrarily, for good or bad 
reasons. Many of them do not have pension schemes etc. The private sector 
employers do not, in some cases, permit their employees to unionize (p.129).   
That is why Uddin and Hopper (2003) argue that privatisation should not be embarked 
upon by developing nations because of its consequences for the citizenry. 
8.3 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter tries to bring together the semi-structured interviews, the case study 
interviews, and questionnaire survey; relate them to theoretical framework of 
neopatrimonialism; and the literature reviewed in chapter three. The research findings in 
chapters six and seven are contributions to the earlier findings on governance and 
accountability in parastatal organisations in Africa and Nigeria in particular. 
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Lack of political will is the reluctance of the leaders to mobilise men, money, and 
materials to complete ASCL which may be due to lack of pressure and politicians not 
being reminded of their campaign promises. ASCL is not completed because of 
international and local conspiracies, competitions and as Nigeria is a large market for 
steel products. Moreover, military intervention in politics for 29 years has affected 
governance and accountability in Nigerian parastatals. They treated parastatals as a 
personal fiefdom as they released large sums of money from the CBN in respect of ASCL 
and other parastatals without due process and which were not used for the purpose 
intended. Parastatals have been used as a pipe through which public money and resources 
are swindled into private pockets of leaders and their well-wishers. Other research 
findings discussed in this chapter are location of ASCL, dissolution of NSDA, ASCL as 
an out-dated technology, and inconsistency in government policies acting as a clog in the 
completion of ASCL.  
Appointments in parastatals are based on political inclination. In this regard, governance 
in parastatals is bedevilled with patronage, clientelism, favouritism, ethnicism, nepotism, 
and rewards for active participation in political campaigns. There is a strong disregard for 
professional qualifications, experience, values and neglect of track records of good 
antecedents. Besides, accountability in parastatals is merely to fulfil all righteousness; 
anti-corruption agencies cannot fulfil the reasons for their establishment; and therefore the 
stakeholders suggested that for improvement of governance and accountability in Africa, 
parastatals should be privatised via Public Private Partnership (PPP). 
Ajaokuta issue is a complex one. There are different interests in the ASCL issue. While 
some people’s interest is as a result of competition, other interests result from the feud 
between the Western and Eastern blocs. Other stakeholders are interested in the 
government abandoning the ASCL technology to embark on another one so that they will 
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have the opportunity of participating in re-awarding the contract. The story of ASCL is 
not a simple one. The ways forward in terms of governance and accountability to respond 
to this complex reality are the appointment of people of good records of excellent 
performance elsewhere; accountability of parastatals should not be limited to their 
supervisory ministries and National Assembly only but accounts of parastatals should be 
published in the national dailies for the consumption of the public; parastatals should have 
an agency quite different from the ministry to control and direct the parastatals; and in the 
extreme case parastatals should be privatised as possible ways forward in this complex 
reality.  
The next chapter hosts summary, conclusions and suggestions for future research.              
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Chapter Nine 
 Conclusions and suggestions for Future Research 
 
9.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the findings from the empirical analyses in chapters six 
and seven. The present chapter provides a brief summary of the thesis, its contributions 
and limitations, and suggestions for further research. 
The area of research that provides the specific focus of the study here is worthy of 
attention for a number of reasons. There has been a colossal amount of resources spent on 
materials, machines and men by the FGN. Steel, moreover, remains an important 
commodity, the production of which is yet to take off at ASCL.  Steel products are used 
for both local and industrial purposes; steel contributes to a nation’s GDP growth, makes 
it possible for the exploitation of natural resources and economic activities in the 
upstream industries and by-products in the downstream industries; creates jobs at both 
downstream and upstream industries for Nigerians and beyond; makes it possible for the 
acquisition of technical skills, transfer of technology and the provision of machine parts 
and tools.  
ASCL is a company solely owned by the FGN to carry out the functions of producing 
steel. However, the company that was established by decree 19 of 1979 and incorporated 
by company statute in 1979 has never attained the purpose for which it was envisioned. 
The study sought to gain insights into why a company established in 1979 and 
substantially complete by the early 1990s has not produced steel to date. The study is 
specifically concerned about the role of governance and accountability in the case. 
This study of governance and accountability issues in Nigerian parastatals with the case 
of Ajaokuta Steel was carried out following frequent industrial strikes by ASCL workers 
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and worrisome headlines in Nigerian newspapers relating to the negligence of ASCL. 
That attracted the researcher to use the torchlight of neopatrimonialism as part of critical 
and interpretive perspective to highlight and understand the governance and 
accountability issues involved. The idea is to gain insight into how governance and 
accountability are executed in Nigerian parastatals and how governance and 
accountability can be enhanced. 
Chapter one introduced the research focus, the 98% complete status of ASCL, the gaps in 
the previous work and the potential contributions of the present study, and elaborates the 
research objectives and questions, and the structure.  Chapter two provides a contextual 
analysis elaborating the Nigerian economic and socio-political environment, Nigerian 
challenges, and the role of iron and steel development in Nigeria. Chapter three explores, 
as appropriate, literature on governance and accountability in Africa and beyond. Chapter 
four articulates the theoretical framework of the study - a critical and interpretive 
approach around the idea of neopatrimonialism. Chapter five outlines the methodology 
and methods of the thesis. In this study, a middle-range interpretive approach was 
adopted. Interviews, case study and questionnaire survey are the three primary methods of 
gathering data that were adopted and used for this study. A significant number of 
interviews were conducted to inform the analysis, 23 semi-structured interviews and 10 
case study interviews were carried out with 50 completed questionnaires were received 
from respondents to inform an analysis of questionnaires that added to the findings 
(chapter seven). Interviews were carried out in two phases because of the sensitivity of 
the case. Chapter six contains the analysis of the results of the semi-structured interviews 
while chapter seven hosts the case study interviews and questionnaire survey, which was 
done to provide additional material. Chapter eight discusses the key findings reported in 
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chapters six and seven. In this chapter, the researcher attempts to provide summary 
answers to the research questions.  
The research questions explored in this study (outlined in chapter one previously) are: 
• Why has ASCL experienced serious delays in steel production over the period 
from 1979 to date in relation to practices of governance and accountability? 
• How are governance and accountability executed in Nigerian parastatals?  
• How can governance and accountability of parastatals be enhanced in Nigeria? 
Given the surveys and analysis performed in relation to the selected case study, several 
policy issues and considerations can be extracted in response to the above questions. 
9.1 Reasons for serious delays in steel production since 1979 in relation to practices 
of governance and accountability 
The key focal research question of this study concerns the non-completion of ASCL after 
three decades of its establishment. Interviewees in the case study argued that ASCL 
suffered setbacks from the very beginning.  
A key setback in relation to Nigeria’s vision of a steel industry is found in the opinion of 
the international development community. Early on, before ASCL was established, 
between 1958 and 1965, Nigeria was advised to concentrate on agriculture rather than 
establish a steel industry because the raw materials available could not be used in 
conventional iron and steel making technologies; Nigeria would not be able to acquire the 
manpower and skills required to maintain a steel industry; and there would be no readily 
available local market for the steel products (Mohammed, 2002b; Agbu, 2007). The 
World Bank in 1987 and 2001 opined similarly that it was more profitable for Nigeria to 
import steel than to use Ajaokuta technology to produce steel and that ASCL should be 
converted to a generating plant (Ayorinde, 2012). The United Kingdom Department For 
 
 
                                                                     
 264 
International Development (DFID) also posited that the economic viability of ASCL was 
marginal (Chukwu, 2013). Another discouragement came when the World Bank Chief, 
Nicholas Stern, visited Nigeria in July 2002. He said during his four days official visit to 
Nigeria that the Soviet-era (1970s) technology was a drain on the nation’s resources. He 
maintained that most countries that produce steel have changed their technologies. He 
argued that if Nigeria should continue with ASCL, she should be ready to spend more 
money (Botha, 2002). Stern’s position begs the question: If Soviet-era technology is an 
out-dated technology, why then did GIHL in 2004 produce iron rods and cables using the 
machines installed by the Soviet experts in the four completed rolling units? And, 
moreover, the Nigerian Association of Technologists in Engineering (NATE, 2009) has 
argued that ASCL’s rugged installed equipment is capable of performing the functions for 
which it was established. 
Also, the Nigeria Steel Development Authority (NSDA), the agency comprising of 
professionals established in 1971 on the advice of the Russian experts to deal with steel 
matters professionally was dissolved in 1979. This agency is similar to Temasek Holdings 
Limited in Singapore (see Anwar and Sam, 2006). The function of the NSDA was 
returned to the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development. From this point, ASCL was 
less independent from the political whims of the Nigerian State and the political 
interference in the activities of ASCL affected the prospects for the completion of ASCL.  
Further, in 1981, shortly after the transfer of ASCL to the Ministry, the situation at ASCL 
became more complex because of ministerial mishandling (Mohammed, 2002b). 
Contracts outside the main contract, according to Alli-Balogun (1988) and Mohammed 
(2002b), were awarded at costs that were subsequently considered by the FGN as 
excessive (even in relation to the national resource) and this led to the default by the FGN 
in paying the contract bill due to Tyahzpromexport of Russia and European civil 
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engineering contractors handling the ASCL project. This affected the targeted date of 
completion for ASCL’s phase I of 1.3 million tonnes of steel per year, this being 
rescheduled from 1986 to 1989 (Mohammed, 2002b). The interviewees from the case 
study contended that the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development, understood to clearly 
interfere in ASCL’s activities, has not been considerate to ASCL’s plight. Interviewees 
argued that ASCL should be autonomous by removing it from the Ministry. Apart from 
the above ministerial mishandling of ASCL, it was noted that the FGN approved N650 
million in March 2010 for the reactivation of ASCL and National Iron Ore Mining 
Company (NIOMCO), in Itakpe, but the Ministry of Mines and Steel Development 
distanced itself from the Interim Management Committee (IMC), declaring that it has no 
part in IMC’s constitution. In effect, the Ministry did not make any effort for the release 
of the money from the FGN’s account. 
Moreover, the case study interviewees and the stakeholder interviewees generally 
contended that military regimes in Nigeria were responsible for ASCL’s issues. The 
democratic government of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari worked very hard to keep the 
date of 1986 of the scheduled completion of the first phase of 1.3 million tonnes per year 
but was toppled in a military coup on 31 December 1983. The rescheduled targeted 
completion date of 1989 was not met and completion has still not been achieved. In 
addition, various amounts set aside for the completion of ASCL were withdrawn from the 
treasury by the military and have not been recovered to date. Also, in 1990, still under the 
military regime, Air Commander Ndasu Muhammed Umar was appointed ASCL’s CEO. 
The period, according to the findings, witnessed the collapse of production in the 
completed rolling mills and the funding for the project was misapplied.  
Another major factor that has been, according to the interviewees, responsible for non-
completion of the ASCL, is the lack of political will on the part of the government. The 
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suggestion is that the government has not taken ASCL as a priority or seriously. 
Governments of all countries that have steel industries usually take the steel industry as a 
serious national project. It was mentioned by one of the interviewees at Ajaokuta that if 
the government of Nigeria intends to complete ASCL, it may not need to borrow a dime 
because it did not borrow any money to complete the project up to the level it is today. 
Unbudgeted excess revenue from crude oil can complete the project. Nigeria is very rich 
in human and natural resources but “one of the poorest in terms of human development 
and poverty” (Okafor, 2007 p.124). Okafor further argued that Nigeria is a “country 
which has everything and produces nothing, and Japan which has nothing produces 
everything” (p.124).  
Moreover, international politics have been identified by the interviewees as a clog in the 
wheel of progress of the ASCL. Interviewees attributed the failure of ASCL to the politics 
between the Western and Eastern blocs. In this regard, it is of note that the former Soviet 
Ambassador to Nigeria, Vladimir Snegirev, in 1983 declared that “we agreed to build this 
project for your country at a time when no other country in the world wanted to” (Alli-
Ballogun, 1988 p.623). Also another international dimension of the ASCL issue, 
according to interviewees, is that countries that produce steel are not interested in Nigeria 
completing her own but are interested in making Nigeria a perpetual huge market for their 
steel products. Interviewees suggested that this led the World Bank and other Western 
agencies to describe ASCL technology as drains on resources and as having minimal 
economic viability. The interviewees asserted also that steel importers have contributed to 
ASCL’s non-completion because of the interest in their personal business rather than 
public interest. 
In addition, local politics is another problem identified by the interviewees hindering the 
progress of ASCL. Local politics in the sense that those who import steel products 
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connived with those in the National Assembly to discourage the FGN to complete ASCL. 
Moreover, ethnicity plays important roles in the siting of projects in Nigeria. Ethnicity is 
one of the characteristics of neopatrimonialism as substantively established in the 
literature. Ethnicity is one of the reasons why projects are neglected immediately after 
their initiators leave office in Nigeria. Agbu (2007) argues that ASCL was located at 
Ajaokuta by the political calculation of politicians- reflecting geo-political and ethnicity 
considerations. Ethnicism has pulled down projects that could have potentially benefited 
Nigerians. However, ASCL was perfectly located because of advantages of its nearness to 
raw materials, water, road and land.  
Furthermore, corruption, beyond the above, is another problem in the way of ASCL’s 
progress. Findings show that corruption in Nigeria has affected the progress of ASCL. 
Corruption is and has been prevalent all over the world. Corruption in Nigeria, according 
to interviewees, is due to mass poverty, greediness, large unmanageable population and 
illiteracy, which are the characteristics of developing countries and consequences of 
neopatrimonialism. Interviewees remarked that the drafting of concessional agreement 
with GIHL was done without the input of Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) and 
that was identified to be corruption. Findings show that ASCL was wrongly and 
fraudulently given on concession to GIHL leading to cannibalization and vandalization of 
plants and equipment, lack of maintenance of equipment, and exporting premium scraps 
imported for the project by Nigerian Government. On the face of it, lack of records, 
cannibalisation and vandalization of assets and refusal to involve the Attorney-General of 
the Federation in the drafting of the concessional agreement, amount to fraud and 
attempts to evade accountability. 
Interviewees identified also lack of consistency in government policies as a reason why 
ASCL is not completed. One of the factors here is the neglect of projects started by a 
 
 
                                                                     
 268 
previous administration. From the findings, about 11,886 projects including ASCL have 
been neglected since Nigeria’s independence according to Presidential Projects 
Assessment Committee (PPAC) set up by President Jonathan in 2011. This spirit of 
neglect of projects can be said to be one of the reasons affecting the completion of ASCL. 
The reasons why projects are neglected in Nigeria are that there will be no benefit flowing 
to a government that completes an old project – this is from their neopatrimonialistic 
perspective, which, especially with public funded projects, can override basic economic 
and financial considerations. It is when a project can be initiated and awarded that it can 
be appealing to the incumbent government. Some of these projects are neglected in order 
to start another one in another location that will favour some ethnic groups for political 
reasons so that the contract is awarded to their relatives, children, friends or classmates. 
This is patron/client relationship. 
In summary, it may be argued that, the reason why the above issues are significant is 
because of failings in governance and accountability. For instance, the Western World 
want to promote their steel market and Soviet Union wants to promote her political and 
economic influence in Africa but Nigeria has no strong political will to go ahead to 
complete her steel industry. The lack of political will relates to lack of planning, 
transparency, accountability, control, accounting and mismanagement of funds which is 
as a result of failings of governance and not lack of resources. Those in public offices 
hold such offices as personal ones with no opposition and run such offices in accordance 
with the dictates of their godfathers. Furthermore, inconsistencies in government policies 
and dissolution of NSDA are as a result of ethnicism, personal gain and corruption – 
which are characteristics of neopatrimonialism. Also the appointment of military 
personnel as CEO of ASCL, are governance issues. Moreover, the absence of agency like 
NSDA to monitor and control parastatals make accountability to the 
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taxpayers/stakeholders to be difficult since accountability by parastatals and ministries to 
the National Assembly is accountability discharged. The independent agency will be able 
to publish their annual reports in the national dailies for the consumption of the 
stakeholders as is being done in the private sector. In addition, lack of involvement of the 
AGF in the drafting of agreement between the FGN and GIHL was evasion of the law – a 
failure of governance. Also lack of records, cannibalisation and vandalization of assets are 
accountability issues. 
The attempts made to strengthen governance and accountability through various reforms 
failed particularly because of lack of political will and the influences of international 
agencies claiming that ASCL technology is an outdated technology. Neopatrimonialism 
was too dominant making rational-legal authority to be twisted and ignored.  
9.2 How governance and accountability are executed in Nigerian parastatals 
Parastatals have governing boards that formulate policies, approve recommendations by 
management, and award contracts - providing parastatals with direction and control. The 
members, according to the interviews, are appointed by the government of the day and 
hence their appointments are politically motivated. The findings show that the 
appointments of the members of the board, CEO, and staff are based on political 
patronage, tribal sentiment, ethnic balancing, religion, and rewards for active participation 
in political campaigns. Also in awarding contracts, the same factors are given 
consideration. In this case, according to the findings, there is little regard for merit, 
professional qualifications and competence, experience, values and track records of 
credible antecedents of the persons appointed as members of the board, CEO, or staff of 
parastatals. These are characteristics of neopatrimonialism and therefore represent a 
failure of governance. In Nigeria, politicians and their agents are those who are appointed 
members of boards, CEOs, and staff of parastatals.  
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Moreover, accountability in parastatals as reviewed by the literature, involves a system 
whereby the junior gives account to his senior up to the National Assembly. Once the 
board gives accounts to the ministry and the ministry gives account to the National 
Assembly, the accountability of a parastatal has been discharged. Since the appointments 
of these people are politically motivated, accountability will only be given to those who 
appointed them up to the National assembly and no attempt is made to give account to the 
owner of the resources over which they were made stewards. Members of National 
Assembly who are supposed to go to their constituencies to relay the accountability of the 
parastatals to their people do not; parastatals themselves that are supposed to display 
accountability to the citizenry do not; and there are no publication in the national dailies 
of the activities of parastatals. These make parastatals’ customers to be left in the dark, 
stranded and unfulfilled. The findings show that the accountability as presently given is to 
fulfil constitutional provisions and therefore can be taken to be cosmetic.  
9.3 Enhancements of governance and accountability in Nigerian parastatals  
Findings show that parastatals are bedevilled with political patronage in appointments and 
in awarding of contracts which lead to multifarious problems like corruption, inefficiency, 
incomplete accountability, lack of transparency, and lack of political will. Others are 
wasteful nature of paying staff that are not working; giving a project on contract to 
contractors while there are staffs on ground to do the work; and being starved of the funds 
allocated to them in the budget. These problems make the stakeholders of parastatals to 
declare that they are not satisfied with the services of the parastatals and prefer to pay 
more money to have consistent supply of parastatals’ services. 
Interviewees noted also that governance and accountability will be enhanced if the 
parastatals are removed from the ministry to the presidency. This involves having an 
agency like NSDA which can improve their services and give proper accountability to the 
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stakeholders. Governance and accountability in parastatals, according to interviewees, can 
also be enhanced if people with good records of credible antecedents are appointed the 
chairmen, CEOs and staffs of parastatals. Accountability in parastatals can also be 
enhanced if parastatals publish their accounts in the national dailies instead of only to the 
National Assembly as it is presently done.  
Moreover, findings from the interviews and questionnaire results show that privatisation 
seems to be another way out. The argument is that since parastatals do not make profit 
and are prone to corruption, favouritism, political interference and cannot operate 
successfully as government is not a good businessman, parastatals should be made to face 
the market system and competition in order to be effective, efficient and productive. The 
findings show that government can go into PPP for now. This will relieve government of 
financial burdens and at the same time make the services of these organisations efficient 
and available to the people.  
9.4 Suggestions by interviewees and Policy Implications 
 Interviewees provided some suggestions for the improvement of governance and 
accountability in parastatals in Nigeria: 
• Government should do more to reduce corruption. This is because corruption has 
great and direct impact on good governance and accountability.  
• People of questionable characters should not be appointed into positions of trust. 
Appointments into governing boards and the appointments of CEOs should be based 
on integrity, experience, professional qualifications, technical competence, and a look 
at a track record of credible antecedents. 
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• Government should give full autonomy to ASCL by removing it from the Ministry of 
Mines and Steel Development and create an agency comprising of professionals who 
will supervise the steel company. In this case, parastatals should have an agency that 
will direct and control them. 
• Anti-corruption agencies responsible for prosecuting corrupt people should be given 
political support; equipped with resources to employ capable hands to carry out their 
duties effectively without fear or favour.  
• Government should summon enough political will, courage and patriotic zeal to 
complete ASCL. ASCL should be completed, assessed and privatised using the 
method of PPP. 
• Government should be consistent with its policies and monitor its implementation. 
Government is a perpetual succession and therefore the new government should 
continue with the projects initiated and embarked upon by the previous government. 
• The Russian contractors who installed the machines at Ajaokuta should be invited to 
complete ASCL since they know where they stopped work at ASCL.  
• The military should face their constitutional duties and professional calling.  
• Parastatals should organise a forum where they can tell their stakeholders how they 
managed the resources they were made steward of. 
Respondents of questionnaires suggested that for the much needed change to happen: (i) 
ASCL should not be abandoned under the guise of being out-dated but should be 
improved upon; (ii) government should encourage excellence by rewarding those who 
have performed well; (iii) governance should be properly understood by people seeking 
for positions; (iv) political offices should be made less attractive to Nigerians; (v) 
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government should not interfere in the management of parastatals; (vi) people in 
government should avoid sentiment and ethnicity; (vii) competence, integrity, experience, 
honesty, merit and due process should be followed in appointing people into various 
levels in parastatals; (viii) Anti-corruption agencies should have their own special court. 
(ix) Government should enter into Public Private Partnership (PPP) with 
Tyahzpromexport of Russia and should have agency different from the Ministry of Mines 
and Steel Development.       
9.5 Limitations of the study 
This present study has some weaknesses. Case study is argued not to be of value outside 
the case because it cannot be generalised to population, replicated or used for prediction. 
Moreover, the sample size of 33 interviewees and 50 questionnaires may not represent the 
opinion of the total number of those who have a stake in ASCL. The mixed method of 
data collection used helps towards a more comprehensive knowledge of the case study. 
The decision to restrict the study to the host state and ASCL out of 36 states of Nigeria by 
the researcher is a limitation of this thesis. ASCL belongs to all Nigerians who are 
stakeholders and who were supposed to be participants in this study. It is a limitation of 
this study since the opinions of all Nigerian stakeholders were not sought and received. 
However, Burrell and Morgan (1979) maintain that the researcher should go nearer to the 
phenomenon he is investigating to let “one’s subject unfold its nature and characteristics 
during the process of investigation” (p.6).  
Also, since the study is limited to the host state and ASCL, the findings may be 
influenced by ethnic tones and tensions. This weakness is mitigated by the administration 
of questionnaires. The decision to limit the study to ASCL without comparing it with a 
similar company is a limitation of this research. The circumstances surrounding ASCL 
necessitate a holistic and an in-depth study to unearth the reasons for stoppage of work for 
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over two decades ago. Also the limitation of comparison with similar organisation is due 
to time factor, lack of resources, and difficulty in gaining access to parastatals. To gain 
access to ASCL was as a result of a friend who assisted the researcher. With the 
shortcomings of case study, to generalise this study may not be appropriate. 
Also the appearance of the researcher might have influenced the answers given by the 
interviewees. This may be because some interviewees may not want to badmouth their 
organisation or expose their ignorance. Also, the sensitive nature of the case study might 
have influenced some interviewees to reserve their comments about ASCL. That is a 
limitation of this research. However, these limitations have been overcome by the 
administration of questionnaires. 
Another limitation may be that there might be some questions which were supposed to 
have been asked in the interviews or questionnaire which might have been omitted by 
error or commission. This is taken to be a weakness of this study. 
9.6 Contributions to knowledge 
Parastatals were established in Nigeria because of the socio-economic infrastructural 
capital that private organisations lacked; the risk of Nigeria asking for future economic 
independence; and for such parastatals to act as employers of last resort. Recent studies 
show that parastatals are rife with corruption; inefficiency; low level of accountability; 
and lack of transparency. However, these literatures failed to identify the areas that these 
corruptions are perpetrated which this current research unveiled, more notably relating to 
ASCL. The study contributes to the limited literature on governance and accountability of 
parastatals in Nigeria, Africa and other developing countries. This study contributes to the 
literature of governance and accountability of parastatals because no study of this kind 
has been carried out on parastatals in Nigeria, including ASCL. Existing literature relates 
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to advanced countries which have environments and cultures much different from 
developing countries like Nigeria. The sensitive nature of ASCL means that people are 
reluctant to carry out this kind of work. It was not easy to gain access to this company to 
interview the staff. The researcher was able to gain access through a personal 
acquaintance who is a staff member of the company and also a letter from one of the 
supervisors of the researcher to the company helped in gaining access. The letter of 
approval is attached as appendix I to this thesis. 
Moreover, the theoretical framework used in this study relate to developing countries 
which require an in-depth study of the case under investigation. There is no study known 
to this researcher relating to governance and accountability in parastatals in Nigeria 
including ASCL, or Africa, or in the world that has used neopatrimonialism theoretical 
framework as a lens to investigate governance and accountability in parastatal 
organisations. 
The study contributes to knowledge by showing that parastatals are tools in the hands of 
politicians which are used to further their cause without giving clear accountability. This 
study discovered that accountability to the National Assembly is accountability 
discharged and therefore no accountability to stakeholders. This current study argues that 
accountability of parastatals to the National Assembly should be transmitted live on the 
national television and radio. Nigerian national newspapers, parastatal’s website, 
newsletters and corporate reports should publish its performance and financial accounting 
for the viewing of stakeholders. 
Another contribution is that a serious national project should not be taken to the non-
technical bureaucratic ministry. This is because the organisation will have the interference 
of politicians in the ministry where is the convergence of politicians. The dissolution of 
Nigeria Steel Development Authority (NSDA) contributed to the condition of ASCL, as 
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their functions were transferred to the Ministry of Steel where politicians are their 
supervisors.   
The study contributes to knowledge in that the findings showed how political governance 
mixes with corporate governance. There is no complete separation between the two in 
parastatals, for the political class interferes in the activities of the economy. The hybrid 
nature of parastatals means they have two masters which lead to subsequent failure, since 
a servant cannot serve two masters. 
The study contributes to knowledge in the area of appointments of members of the 
boards, CEO of parastatals, and other members of staff of parastatals. People of honesty, 
integrity, experience, professional qualifications, technical competence, and track records 
of credible antecedents should be employed.  
The research, improving on Klitgaard’s (1997) metaphorical corruption formula, 
establishes a novel formula. The novel formula for this thesis is Accountability equals 
Discretion plus Monopoly plus Neopatrimonialism (A=D+M+N). Note that military 
regime is a neopatrimonialistic regime in its entirety and with no accountability to 
anyone. The improvement of Klitgaard’s corruption formula by this study is another 
contribution of this thesis to knowledge (see section 8.2.4 for details).   
9.7 Recommendations for future research 
Some aspects of this study can be revisited and explored further. A single case was 
studied but could be expanded by studying multiple cases, for comparison. This study 
should be conducted on other parastatals such as Zobe Dam in Katsina, Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), National Iron Ore 
Mining Company (NIOMCO) and Delta Steel Company Limited (DSCL). The study can 
be extended beyond the company and the host state to other states since it is a national 
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issue. The researcher can also use ASCL and Wempco Steel Mills Company Limited (a 
private company) as case studies. The study may be replicated in other African countries 
like Ghana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Uganda, Cameroun, and Benin Republic, 
to see if the findings will be similar, using the theory of neopatrimonialism.     
The international comparison will also reveal the effect of international and local politics 
on parastatals’ ability to accomplish their objectives. 
9.8 Conclusions    
In conclusion, the research has detailed why Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited is 
experiencing serious delays in steel production in relation to governance and 
accountability since 1979; how governance and accountability are practised in Nigerian 
parastatals and how they can be improved. The findings indicate that governance and 
accountability in parastatals in Nigeria are bedevilled with nepotism, corruption, 
ethnicism, favouritism, bribery, patronage, clientelism, corruption, prebendalism, and 
presidentialism which are the characteristics of neopatrimonialism. Other relevant issues 
are political interference, lack of accountability to all the stakeholders of parastatals, and 
lack of transparency. Moreover, the government of the day that appoints the members of 
the board and CEO of parastatals, which leaves room for interference (Etukudo, 1997; 
ECSAFA, 2004). The suggestions by the stakeholders are that parastatals should be 
removed from the ministries and have an agency that directs and controls them which will 
be able to give accountability to all stakeholders; appointments of members of the boards, 
CEO, and other staff members should strictly be based on merit, professional 
qualifications and competence, experience, values and track records of credible 
antecedents; and ultimately be privatised by way of Public Private Partnership (PPP) as 
the last resort as government is not a good businessman instead of continuous enactment 
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of laws and more anti-corruption agencies. Weak accountability and transparency is a 
result of neopatrimonialism. 
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Appendix 1 (letter of approval of access to the case company)  
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Appendix II (Interview schedule for the first phase of interview-Management and 
staff of Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited) 
 
                                                                   
 
Semi-structured interview 
Details of interviewee  
Name:...................................................................................................................... 
Gender:..................................................................................................................... 
Department:.............................................................................................................. 
Qualifications:.......................................................................................................... 
Date of first appointment:........................................................................................ 
Age group: 25- 35;   36-45; 46-55; 56-65. 
 
For Management and Staff of ASCL 
 
1) When was this management put in place? 
2) Since the establishment of ASCL, how many management have been put in place? 
3) What are the reasons for frequent change in management? 
4) If the government decides to finance this organisation fully, in which way do you 
think you can do better than the management before you? 
5) What are the benefits of steel to your country and beyond? 
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6) It is believed that Steel is the strength of any economy. Do you agree? In which 
way is it the strength of a country like Nigeria in terms of military, engineering 
and other areas? 
7) How many departments does your company have? Which ones are completed and 
which ones are 98% completed? 
8) The World Bank Chief said in 2004 when he visited Nigeria that the Russian 
technology is an outdated technology. Won’t this affect the performance of this 
organisation?    
9) Why did the founding fathers decide to go for USSR Technology instead of 
Western Technology? 
10) How is this organisation financed? 
11) Do you owe the World Bank, IMF or any financial institutions? 
12) Where does the budget of the company originate from? Is it from the company or      
from the government? 
13) Is the budget prepared and approved for your organisation and the money released 
for the organisation? 
14) How do you render accounts of your stewardship to the taxpayers? 
15) Does the siting of this organisation at Ajaokuta have great influence on its 
completion? 
16) When you compare this organisation with other Steels all over the world, this 
company is unnecessary delayed. What is the reason for this? 
17) What do you think can be done to resume full activities here? 
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Appendix III (Interview schedule for the first phase of interview-National Assembly 
members from Kogi State, Nigeria) 
 
                                                              
Semi-structured interview 
Details of interviewee  
Name:...................................................................................................................... 
Gender:..................................................................................................................... 
Department:.............................................................................................................. 
Qualifications:.......................................................................................................... 
Date of first appointment:........................................................................................ 
Age group: 25- 35;   36-45; 46-55; 56-65. 
For members of Parliament from Kogi State, Nigeria. 
          1)      Were you happy for the decision to site ASCL at Ajaokuta? 
2)    What will be the benefits of the company to your constituency if completed? 
3)  How many times have you tabled the problems of ASCL before the house and 
being debated upon? 
4) Some people said that it is lack of political will on the part of the government 
that the completion of ASCL is still lingering. Do you agree to that? 
5) What do you think can be done to solve ASCL’s problem? 
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Appendix IV (Interview schedule for the first phase of interview-Taxpayers/public) 
                                                                     
Semi-structured interview 
Details of interviewee  
Name:...................................................................................................................... 
Gender:..................................................................................................................... 
Department:.............................................................................................................. 
Qualifications:.......................................................................................................... 
Date of first appointment:........................................................................................ 
Age group: 25- 35;   36-45; 46-55; 56-65. 
For Taxpayers/Public 
                  1)     Were you happy for the siting of ASCL at Ajaokuta? 
2)   What do you think will be the benefits of ASCL to you and your country? 
3) What do you think should be the reasons why the company has not being 
completed up till now?  
4) What do you think should be done to keep the company on?   
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Appendix V (Letter of introduction to conduct interview from the supervisors) 
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Appendix VI (Interview guide for the second phase of interview) 
                                             
 
Governance and Accountability issues in Nigerian parastatals:  
                                      The case of Ajaokuta Steel. 
Semi-structured interview questions. 
 
Personal details of interviewee. 
 
Name (optional):………………………………………………. 
Gender:……………………………………………… 
 
Educational qualification:……………………………….. 
 
Organisation:…………………………….. 
 
Work experience (years):………………………… 
 
Date and time of interview:………………………… 
 
Can the interview be taped?....................................... 
 
Signature/Date:……………………………………  
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                                Semi-structured interview 
                         (For the Management and Staff of ASCL). 
A) Governance and Accountability in Ajaokuta  
1) What do you understand by governance? How important do you think it is to     
Nigeria? 
  2) What is your definition of accountability? How is it important to Nigerian people? 
     3) What do you understand by transparency? 
4) What do you know about Ajaokuta Steel? 
5) What do you think is the major problem surrounding the serious delay in the 
completion of Ajaokuta steel which was established in 1979 and was 98% 
completed in the early 1990s? 
6) To what extent do you think these problems surrounding Ajaokuta steel can be 
linked to governance and accountability? 
    B) Governing Board of Ajaokuta steel 
7) Does Ajaokuta steel have active or passive governing board? 
8) How are the members appointed?  
9) What are the roles of the governing board and how regular do they meet?  
10)  On what basis are the chairman and chief executive officer appointed? 
11) Is there political interference in the running of skeletal services? To what extent is 
the level of interference? 
12) How can privatisation help to reduce the level of political interference and other 
governance issues surrounding Ajaokuta? 
13) What in your opinion are the benefits of privatisation? 
14)  What do you think make privatisation not desirable? 
     C)  Stakeholders 
14)  Who are the stakeholders of Ajaokuta steel company? 
15 How has Ajaokuta steel been accountable to its stakeholders? 
17)  Literature suggests that there is rampant corruption in Africa and Nigeria is on the 
higher side, to what extent can you link the Ajaokuta steel’s problems to this scourge? 
18) What do you think should be done to bring the needed change? 
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 Semi- structured interview for other stakeholders 
(Journalists, Academicians, Politicians, Labour unions and Lawyers) 
 
A) Governance and Accountability in Nigeria 
 
1) What do you understand by governance? How important do you think it is to 
Nigeria? 
2) What is your definition and understanding of accountability? How is it important 
to Nigerian people? 
3) What does transparency mean to you? 
4) What are the governance and accountability problems facing Nigeria? 
 
     B) Governing Board of parastatal organisations  
 
1) Do parastatal organisations have passive or active governing boards? 
2) How are the members of governing boards of parastatals appointed? 
3) What are their roles and how regular do they meet? 
4) On what basis are the chairman and the chief executives of parastatals appointed? 
5) Does the appointment of the chief executive of parastatals pass through 
competitive examination or selection process? 
6) Is there political interference in the running of boards and parastatal organisations? 
How does it affect the organisation? 
 
    C) Stakeholders 
 
1) Who are the parastatal organisations’ stakeholders? Do they have representatives 
on the governing board? 
2) How are parastatal organisations accountable to the stakeholders? 
3) Do the stakeholders exercise their rights? 
4) To what extent are the stakeholders satisfied with the services rendered by 
parastatals organisations in Nigeria? 
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  D) Perspective on Accountability and Neo-patrimonialism 
1)  Literature suggests that there is rampant corruption in Africa and Nigeria is believed to 
be on the higher side, how do you agree to that assertion? 
 
2)  Can the governance and accountability problems of Ajaokuta steel be linked to the 
levels of corruption in Nigeria? 
 
3) To what extent do the institutional capacities put in place in Nigeria strengthen 
governance and accountability? 
 
4) How do parastatal organisations in Nigeria give account of their stewardship to their 
stakeholders? 
 
E) Ajaokuta Steel Complex 
  1) What do you know about Ajaokuta steel? 
 
  2) What are the governance and accountability issues surrounding Ajaokuta steel 
complex involving serious delay in the completion of the complex? 
 
4) How can privatisation help to reduce the problems of interference in parastatal 
organisations and Ajaokuta steel? 
 
5) What do you think should be done to bring the needed change?  
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Appendix VII (letter of introduction from the supervisors in respect of survey 
questionnaire for the second phase of interview). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                     
 318 
Appendix VIII (Survey questionnaire for the second phase of interview) 
 
Survey questionnaire                                             
 
 
School of Business 
Dept of accounting and finance 
University of Dundee 
DD1 4HN 
Scotland, UK. 
 
Dear Respondent, 
I am a doctoral degree student of the University of Dundee, Scotland, UK under the 
supervision of Professor Robin Roslender and Professor Jim Haslam. The title of my 
study is ‘Governance and Accountability issues in Nigerian parastatals: the case of 
Ajaokuta Steel’.  The objective of the research is to examine the governance and 
accountability issues surrounding parastatal organisations in Nigeria and Ajaokuta Steel 
complex. In order to do this, i need your assistance by completing this questionnaire. 
 
I would like to assure you that all the information supplied by you will be treated 
confidentially and will be used only for academic purpose. 
 
Thanks. 
Obera Johnson O. J. 
E-mail: J.O.J.Obera@dundee.ac.uk 
            oberajeremiah@yahoo.com 
Mobile: +447587877633 
             +2348037739525 
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A) Personal details 
a) Name (optional):......................................................................................... 
 
b) Gender:........................................................................................................ 
 
            c)   Educational qualification........................................................................... 
  
           d)   Organisation;................................................................................ 
 
           e)  Years of experience:……................................................................. 
 
 
 
B)  Indicate your profession: 
a) Civil servant:.................................................................................................. 
 
b) Lawyer:.......................................................................................................... 
 
c) Journalist:....................................................................................................... 
 
d) Politician:...................................................................................................... 
 
e) Academician:................................................................................................. 
 
f) Trade/Labour Union:..................................................................................... 
 
g) Others (specify):............................................................................................ 
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C)  You are requested to make a tick ( / )  in the appropriate box for Strongly agree 
(1); Agree (2); Undecided (3); Disagree (4); Strongly disagree (5) to the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with the statements below. 
D) To what extent do you agree with these definitions? 
 
 
 
 
(i) 
 
 
 
Governance definitions 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
a Governance is the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all 
levels. 
     
b Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources. 
     
c Governance is the exercise of political power to manage a 
nation’s affairs. 
     
d  Governance is the exercise of power in the management of a 
country’s political, economic and social resources for 
development. 
     
e Governance is the use of political authority and exercise of 
control in a society in relation to the management of its 
resources for social and economic development. 
     
f Governance is the process by which organisations are directed, 
controlled and held to account. 
     
D(ii) Accountability definitions 1 2 3 4 5 
a Accountability is explaining and taking responsibility for 
actions. 
     
        
B 
Accountability is the process by which individuals or 
organisations are answerable for their actions and the 
consequences that follow them. 
     
C Accountability is a social relationship in which an actor feels an 
obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct to some 
significant order. 
     
D Accountability is a process whereby organisations or 
individuals are responsible for their decisions and actions 
including stewardships of public funds and all aspects of 
performance and submit themselves to public scrutiny. 
     
 
 
                                                                     
 321 
e Other (specify)      
D 
(iii) 
Transparency  definitions 1 2 3 4 5 
a Transparency means to be open, seen by everybody. Having 
nothing to hide. 
     
b Transparency is a moral virtue and entails openness, 
faithfulness, truthfulness, sincerity, loyalty, dependability and 
allegiance. 
     
c Transparency is the transmitting light so that objects or images 
can be seen clearly. 
     
d Other (specify)      
 
 
E  Governing Boards of Parastatal organisations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
a Parastatal organisations in Nigeria have active or passive 
governing boards. 
     
b  Appointments to these boards are based on merit.      
c  Appointments to these boards are based on political 
connections. 
     
d  Appointments of the chief executives into boards and 
parastatals are based on merit and not on political connections. 
     
e Parastatal organisations’ governing boards are accountable to 
the following: 
     
 i) parliament      
 ii) taxpayers       
 iii) customers      
 iv) community      
 v) media      
 vi) other (specify)      
 
F  Ajaokuta Steel Complex 1 2 3 4 5 
a  Ajaokuta Steel was established to promote industrialisation,      
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development and provide employment for Nigerians and 
beyond. 
b  Ajaokuta Steel is not completed because the government is 
not willing to complete it. 
     
c  Government is not willing to commit more money to the 
multi-billion dollar Ajaokuta Steel complex because the 
money will not be used for its intended purpose. 
     
d  The Russian’s technology, the builder of the steel, is an 
outdated technology. 
     
G Privatisation 1 2 3 4 5 
a  Political and bureaucratic interference make many 
government parastatal organisations to perform poorly.          
     
b There should be clear separation of politics from parastatal 
organisations. 
     
c  Businesses are best run by business people.      
d The following are the advantages of privatisation:      
  i) It encourages domestic and foreign investment.      
  ii) It generates employment.      
 iii) It creates increased competition that leads to decrease in 
prices and increase in efficiencies. 
     
 iv) It leads to improvement in quality of services      
 v) It enables government to focus on other areas of 
development 
     
  vi) Managers’ performances are closely monitored and 
controlled 
     
 vii) Businesses are in the hands of professionals to run       
e The followings are the demerits of privatisation 1 2 3 4 5 
 i) Privatisation leads to selling parastatal organisations at a 
give-away price to oneself, friends or cronies. 
     
 ii) Only the rich can afford to buy the organisation thereby 
leading to monopoly and making the rich to get richer 
     
 iii) Privatisation makes government to stop giving subvention 
to the organisation concerned thereby making the poor unable 
to afford the services provided by the privatised parastatal.  
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H  Accountability and Neo-patrimonialism 1 2 3 4 5 
a These factors affect good governance in Nigeria:      
 i) Ethnicity      
 ii) Corruption      
 iii)  Patronage      
  iv) Religion      
b The governance and accountability problems of parastatal 
organisations will be solved if: 
     
 i) The notion of ‘businesses are best run by business people’ is 
applied to parastatal organisations. 
     
 ii) The governing board of parastatal organisations are 
appointed by independent private body instead of the 
government. 
     
 iii) Offenders are adequately punished to serve as deterrent to 
others. 
     
 iv) Religion, ethnicity, political interference, conflicts of 
interest and corruption are not applied to parastatal 
organisations. 
     
 v) Other (specify)      
 
I Stakeholders  1 2 3 4 5 
a Government of Nigeria always debates and communicates its 
decisions, actions and performances to Nigerian people. 
     
b The rights of the stakeholders are established by the law in 
Nigeria and respected. 
     
c There is adequate protection of the rights of creditors in case 
the parastatal organisation goes insolvent. 
     
d The stakeholders are treated with dignity and respect      
e The employees of Nigerian parastatal organisations can 
communicate their grievances to the governing board without 
the fear of being victimised.   
     
 
J  Nigeria has adequate structure to bring fraudsters, corrupters, 
money launders and other economic and financial crimes 
offenders to justice. 
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K)    What other things do you think should be done to bring the needed change? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L)  Any other comments will be appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks for participating. If you need the summary of the result of this research please feel 
free to write your address hereunder. 
 
.......... ........................................................................................................................... 
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Appendix IX (T.Test results). 
 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Qdia 50 1.54 .762 .108 
Qdib 48 1.85 .743 .107 
Qdic 45 1.93 .889 .133 
Qdid 47 1.53 .620 .090 
Qdie 49 1.65 .969 .138 
Qdif 44 1.86 1.091 .164 
Qdiia 47 1.85 .932 .136 
Qdiib 49 1.47 .767 .110 
Qdiic 46 2.02 .954 .141 
Qdiid 49 1.24 .630 .090 
Qdiie 0a,b . . . 
Qdiiia 49 1.49 .649 .093 
Qdiiib 49 1.24 .630 .090 
Qdiiic 46 2.63 1.306 .193 
Qdiiid 0a,b . . . 
Qea 43 2.21 1.226 .187 
Qeb 44 3.32 1.157 .174 
Qec 49 1.45 .709 .101 
Qed 49 3.31 1.103 .158 
Qeei 42 1.81 .804 .124 
Qeeii 37 2.76 1.383 .227 
Qeeiii 34 2.97 1.314 .225 
Qeeiv 37 3.08 1.341 .220 
Qeev 35 2.91 1.292 .218 
Qeevi 0a,b . . . 
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One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Qfa 49 1.12 .389 .056 
Qfb 49 2.02 1.181 .169 
Qfc 48 2.44 1.335 .193 
Qfd 48 3.48 1.288 .186 
Qga 48 1.46 .683 .099 
Qgb 48 1.71 .967 .140 
Qgc 49 1.86 .957 .137 
Qgdi 49 1.45 .709 .101 
Qgdii 49 1.84 1.007 .144 
Qgdiii 50 1.78 1.055 .149 
Qgdiv 48 1.50 .715 .103 
Qgdv 47 1.70 .998 .146 
Qgdvi 47 1.87 .992 .145 
Qgdvii 42 1.93 .997 .154 
Qgei 48 1.75 1.021 .147 
Qgeii 48 1.60 .893 .129 
Qgeiii 46 2.20 1.240 .183 
Qhai 47 1.57 .801 .117 
Qhaii 48 1.13 .393 .057 
Qhaiii 47 1.96 .977 .143 
Qhaiv 46 2.07 1.083 .160 
Qhbi 49 1.82 1.014 .145 
Qhbii 49 2.02 1.051 .150 
Qhbiii 49 1.43 .842 .120 
Qhbiv 48 1.98 1.296 .187 
Qhbv 0a,b . . . 
Qia 49 3.00 1.155 .165 
Qib 47 2.85 1.161 .169 
Qic 49 2.80 1.099 .157 
Qid 48 2.81 1.142 .165 
Qie 48 2.79 1.237 .179 
Qj 50 2.34 1.272 .180 
a. t cannot be computed because the sum of caseweights is less than 
or equal 1. 
b. t cannot be computed. There are no valid cases for this analysis 
because all caseweights are not positive. 
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One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 3 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Qdia -13.556 49 .000 -1.460 -1.68 -1.24 
Qdib -10.678 47 .000 -1.146 -1.36 -.93 
Qdic -8.046 44 .000 -1.067 -1.33 -.80 
Qdid -16.224 46 .000 -1.468 -1.65 -1.29 
Qdie -9.727 48 .000 -1.347 -1.63 -1.07 
Qdif -6.909 43 .000 -1.136 -1.47 -.80 
Qdiia -8.451 46 .000 -1.149 -1.42 -.88 
Qdiib -13.977 48 .000 -1.531 -1.75 -1.31 
Qdiic -6.953 45 .000 -.978 -1.26 -.69 
Qdiid -19.496 48 .000 -1.755 -1.94 -1.57 
Qdiiia -16.278 48 .000 -1.510 -1.70 -1.32 
Qdiiib -19.496 48 .000 -1.755 -1.94 -1.57 
Qdiiic -1.920 45 .061 -.370 -.76 .02 
Qea -4.230 42 .000 -.791 -1.17 -.41 
Qeb 1.824 43 .075 .318 -.03 .67 
Qec -15.315 48 .000 -1.551 -1.75 -1.35 
Qed 1.943 48 .058 .306 -.01 .62 
Qeei -9.601 41 .000 -1.190 -1.44 -.94 
Qeeii -1.070 36 .292 -.243 -.70 .22 
Qeeiii -.131 33 .897 -.029 -.49 .43 
Qeeiv .368 36 .715 .081 -.37 .53 
Qeev -.393 34 .697 -.086 -.53 .36 
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One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 3 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Qfa -33.782 48 .000 -1.878 -1.99 -1.77 
Qfb -5.805 48 .000 -.980 -1.32 -.64 
Qfc -2.918 47 .005 -.563 -.95 -.17 
Qfd 2.577 47 .013 .479 .11 .85 
Qga -15.641 47 .000 -1.542 -1.74 -1.34 
Qgb -9.258 47 .000 -1.292 -1.57 -1.01 
Qgc -8.356 48 .000 -1.143 -1.42 -.87 
Qgdi -15.315 48 .000 -1.551 -1.75 -1.35 
Qgdii -8.085 48 .000 -1.163 -1.45 -.87 
Qgdiii -8.174 49 .000 -1.220 -1.52 -.92 
Qgdiv -14.543 47 .000 -1.500 -1.71 -1.29 
Qgdv -8.914 46 .000 -1.298 -1.59 -1.00 
Qgdvi -7.796 46 .000 -1.128 -1.42 -.84 
Qgdvii -6.962 41 .000 -1.071 -1.38 -.76 
Qgei -8.482 47 .000 -1.250 -1.55 -.95 
Qgeii -10.829 47 .000 -1.396 -1.66 -1.14 
Qgeiii -4.398 45 .000 -.804 -1.17 -.44 
Qhai -12.206 46 .000 -1.426 -1.66 -1.19 
Qhaii -33.075 47 .000 -1.875 -1.99 -1.76 
Qhaiii -7.315 46 .000 -1.043 -1.33 -.76 
Qhaiv -5.853 45 .000 -.935 -1.26 -.61 
Qhbi -8.172 48 .000 -1.184 -1.47 -.89 
Qhbii -6.527 48 .000 -.980 -1.28 -.68 
Qhbiii -13.070 48 .000 -1.571 -1.81 -1.33 
Qhbiv -5.456 47 .000 -1.021 -1.40 -.64 
Qia .000 48 1.000 .000 -.33 .33 
Qib -.880 46 .384 -.149 -.49 .19 
Qic -1.300 48 .200 -.204 -.52 .11 
Qid -1.137 47 .261 -.188 -.52 .14 
Qie -1.167 47 .249 -.208 -.57 .15 
Qj -3.670 49 .001 -.660 -1.02 -.30 
 
 
 
